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be anything other?
To answer this question, I begin with the swerve, a motion embedded in the
switchback, and evoked in passing throughout this project. The swerve is one of the
originary concepts of materialist philosophy, what Althusser calls in his later work “a
secret tradition” (183) that begins with the atomism of Epicurus, which contends that the
world is formed by the unpredictable and anticausal collision of atoms. Even falling
straight down through a void, this philosophy argues, these atoms “
deflect a bit in space
at a quite uncertain time and in uncertain places, just enough that you could say that their
motion has changed
,” and suggesting that matter itself, as Lucretius puts it, is “in the
habit of swerving” (Inwood 66). Thus begins the philosophical undercurrent, in
Althusser’s succinct cobbling together of terms, of “
the ‘materialism’…of the rain, the
swerve, the encounter, the take [prise]” (168). In this listing of like concepts there is a
history (or perhaps, an anti-history) that rejects a fixation on questions pertaining to
“Reason, Meaning, Necessity and End” (Althusser 169) in favor of an exploration of
everything that escapes design, resists rationalism, that assumes “the primacy of the
swerve over the rectilinearity of the straight trajectory” (Althusser 190).
This “habit of swerving” evokes the same aleatory materiality involved in the
inanimate acts of breakage and intrusion that Graham Harman takes up in his
reconsideration of Heidegger’s tool-analysis, wherein Harman argues that one way in
which things function as nonhuman agents is in the way that they break. In this way,
Heidegger posits in Being & Time (without directly ascribing any form of agency to
objects), “the environment announces itself afresh” (105). As my project demonstrates,
this announcement or obtrusiveness, obstinacy, breakage, or troublemaking are all ways
60
in which it is possible to think of the nonhuman as acting upon, resisting, and
determining the experience of being-in-the-world for human actors. However, where
does the human actor’s own material being come in to this? How do we swerve? How do
we break? What is in question here is not the ability to choose to stray from the beaten
path, nor to strategize a motion—the swerve is not a human thing in this sense—but to
feel as if through the materiality of our being, we are moved, and to experience the
aleatory as something that is of us, rather than something—some offense or intrusion—
that happens to us.
What I think of as Vineland’s response to these questions comes in the form of its
encoding of “the spilled, the broken world” (267). This is not a world of human control
systems and predictable outcomes, but a world that begins with the assumption of the
swerve, and then tries to find a way to fit the human in among all this spilling, breaking
material discursivity. There may not be untroubled human spaces in this world, but what
Pynchon does seem to suggest is that there are navigational strategies that can be
deployed to allow the movement of human beings, the contribution of our own narrative
meanderings, through the highly contested spaces of nonhuman assembly. Given these
terms, Vineland’s switchback narrative strategy becomes, as I argue throughout this
thesis, a kind of survival strategy for humans, or what I’d like to call a
nonanthropocentric humanism. This seemingly contradictory term is intended to
acknowledge that the human is not a privileged being that finds itself obtruded upon by
the largely nonhuman assemblages that dominate the spaces of material existence, but
simultaneously, that its human embodied materiality is part of the breakage, part of the
spill. This suggests, in turn, much like the switchbacks of Vineland County, and the
61
desire lines cut into the grass of my campus, that even within the individual human actor,
there is something that swerves, a perhaps unconscious agential materiality that does not
always choose which direction it travels or sees in, that does not always move in the way
that it is conditioned through repetition to move. While the nightmare aspect of this in
Pynchon is the human-become-automaton—the unconscious repetition of actions
sanctioned by state capitalist modernity which render the laborer-consumer’s
“disassembly plausible as that of any machine” (V. 40); the body-in-war that has “taken
on much of the non-humanity of the debris, crushed stone, broken masonry, destroyed
churches and auberges of his city” (V. 307)—the other side of the coin is that people are,
at last, at least as unpredictable as things, and that we all, humans and nonhumans alike,
may move in ways that are surprising. As Ahmed puts it, “places where we are under
pressure do not always mean we stay on line; at certain points, we can refuse the
inheritance, points that are often lived as ‘breaking points.’ We do not always know what
breaks at these points” (“Orientations” 248). Ahmed emphasizes the unconscious nature
of the human swerve, falling out of line with certain material assemblages, falling in with
others, causing ontological scandals (as do the Thanatoids of Shade Creek), making
trouble (as do Prairie and Ché with every move they make), getting “in the way of
domination” (Latour 81), or conversely, out of its way, as Frenesi does when she
abandons her radical leftist roots for a life as an FBI rat.
This habit of swerving, which Pynchon assigns not only to nonhuman matter but
also to that which is matter in humans and that which tangles with the Titans of Vineland,
is a form of resistance that constitutes a nonanthropocentric humanist survival strategy. It
is aleatory, contingent, the opposite of predictable, quantifiable, or controllable, but these
62
are features that also what makes it useful to the humans of a nonhuman-centric world. In
writing the switchback, then, Pynchon writes that which escapes us in our own material
being, and that which connects us most physically and intractably to “the spilled, the
broken world.” Importantly, this does not make humans the helpless pawns of the
aleatory, of fate, of the Titans, but rather, all the more responsible for small actions that
reverberate out into the webs of causal implication we can barely imagine, barely, in the
grips of the rectilinear, the narrative straight shot, stand to look back on.
What, then, finally, does a nonanthropocentric humanism look like?
• Anchored in the materiality of human being, it sees the connections between that
materiality and the materiality of nonhuman bodies. It acknowledges the elements
of human materiality that escape the control of the human mind.
• It is limited in its opportunities for agency; however, it finds those opportunities
within and among assemblies of human and nonhuman actors. Simultaneously, it
resists and troubles systems of domination and control that seek to overstep the
limits on agency dictated by the other actors in a given assembly.
• It is spatially aware, and sensitive to the large-scale contests that create spaces of
protection and/or exposure of the human body.
• It is phenomenologically flexible, open to perspectival shifts and anticipative of
disorientating situations that require radical swerves in perception and navigation.
It avoids adherence to hegemonic systems of control and political stasis.
• It is temporally flexible, in that it acknowledges the presence of multiple and
competing histories (and even possible futures), encoded into the spatio-material
present that humans occupy.
63
• It is, above all, a strategy of movement, of thinking human material being in
movement through space and time, of the impacts of that movement, and of the
opportunities and risks inherent in the movement between and among titanic
assemblies of actors.
The implication in Vineland, and in Pynchon’s entire corpus, is that these spatialized
determinants may be the limits of what any humanism can propose in a
nonanthropocentric cosmos which, perhaps inevitably, takes on a tinge of the sinister
given the very facticity of material being, of the unavoidable movement that takes us
from birth to death. In one of Vineland’s last paragraphs, there is a strange scene in which
Pynchon describes
The unrelenting forces that leaned ever after the partners into Time’s wind,
impassive in pursuit, usually gaining, the faceless predators who’d once boarded
Takeshi’s airplane in the sky, the ones who’d had the Chipco lab stomped on, who
despite every Karmic Adjustment resource brought to bear so far had simply
persisted, stone-humorless, beyond cause and effect, rejecting all attempts to
bargain or accommodate, following through pools of night where nothing else
moved wrongs forgotten by all but the direly possessed, continuing as a body to
refuse to be bought off for any but the full price, which they had never named.
(383)
Contained within this sequence is Pynchon the mystic, the existentially stunned
philosopher for whom ultimately, every strategy of narrative negotiation and survival
fails. This scene is a reminder that Pynchon’s work never deals in the realm of the
exclusively material, because all the nonhuman agential matter in the world will not
64
suffice to explain away the “unrelenting forces” that follow us always “through pools of
night where nothing else moved.” These forces, like the unsignable bomb, haunt the
periphery of all Pynchon novels, and they cannot be ignored in any consideration of his
work. What role they play or what price they demand is never clear. The only thing that
Pynchon shares about these forces is the certainty that they pursue us, “as a body,” a
nonhuman assembly with a constitution and politics all its own, and which, in a sense,
come to define the human as that which is the pursued other whose inscriptive
authority—its “attempts to bargain or accommodate”—is always unable to bridge the
discursive gap between itself and the world from which it is set apart by the ideality of its
sign systems. Under these conditions, the political stakes are shifted, and the question
becomes one not of how we bring nonhuman actors into our world, but rather, how we
find a way into a world without us. How change the terms of the pursuit in order to
become participants in a politics that we have not authored? Under these conditions,
humanism becomes a contestable and marginal scrawl, a weird and private code that has
pushed us to the edge of being, and that must now find the means of negotiating some
“way to return” (VL 379).
65
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