Neg China Reaction da 1NC

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Withdrawal Good

US presence in Asia causes China war

Chan 10 (John, staff writer for the World Socialist specializing in international affairs and East Asian political actions, 2/1/10 “US China tensions the result of rise of China’s power” accessed 7/31/15 from https://mlyon01.wordpress.com/2010/02/01/us-china-tensions-the-result-of-rise-of-chinas-power/ LC)

The secretary of state emphasised that the “future of this region depends on America”. It was in the interests of Asian countries to have the US as “a dynamic economic partner and a stabilising military influence”. She highlighted Washington’s formal defence treaties with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines as the cornerstone of US policy in Asia.¶ These remarks sought to send a message that the US would not allow Beijing to use its economic power to exclude the US from the region, and would contain China militarily. Clinton was more explicit in comments to reporters on Monday, declaring: “Everyone’s aware that China is a rising power of the 21st century. But people want to see the United States fully engaged in Asia, so that as China rises the United States is there as a force of peace.”¶ Far from being a “force for peace,” the US military build-up raises the dangers of conflict between the two powers. As its economic power has waned, Washington has increasingly used its military might to further its interests. Its alliances in Asia form part of a longstanding US strategy of encircling China with allies, strategic partners and military bases. As planned in 2006, the US will deploy 6 of its 11 aircraft carriers and 60 percent of its submarine fleet in the Pacific this year, shifting from its previous strategic focus on the Atlantic.¶ The Pentagon is acutely aware of China’s rising military strength. A recent assessment by the US Office of Naval Intelligence estimated that China’s naval expansion would be at its height in the next 10–15 years, with “one or more aircraft carriers” and 75 submarines operating beyond Taiwan and South China Sea to protect China’s vital sea lanes, particularly to the Middle East and Africa.¶ The growing rivalry between the US and China is reverberating throughout the region. Every government has been compelled to try to balance economic relations with China against concerns to maintain relations with the US. Those issues would certainly have dominated Clinton’s discussions in Australia, which relies heavily on exports of minerals and other raw materials to China, but depends on its military alliance with the US, not least to back its interventions in neighbouring island states.¶

No China War

China will not go to war—its foreign policy is deeply rooted in a culture that emphasizes long-term solutions

Yongnian 12

(Zheng, PhD in political science from Princeton, Professor and Director of East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore 3/19/12 “Cultural Reasons China won’t go to war with US” in “The Straits Times” pA20 accessed 7/13/15 from http://newshub.nus.edu.sg/news/1203/PDF/CULTURAL-st-19mar-pA20.pdf LC)

After the United States’ declaration of a “return” to Asia, Sino-American relations entered an unusually tense period. Many have asked if the two big powers will go into conflict, and even a war. If one looks at the essence of Chinese culture, the answer is no.¶ Culture matters in international affairs and influences foreign policy as a way of thinking. The mode of thinking is not a cause of conflicts, but the interactions between two different ways of thinking is likely to lead to conflict. Culture can also be mobilised and utilized to influence foreign policy. Once mobilised, the impact of culture is infinite. ¶ So why is a war an impossibility between the two? One should distinguish between small-scale conflicts and major wars. All kinds of conflicts such as trade disputes and ideology-oriented debates on human rights are inevitable and normal. But for the China-US conflict to result in a major war is unlikely.¶ Here is the cultural argument. A long undisputed history of several thousand years has bestowed China with a rare sense of “big history”. China perceives long-term issues with a long-term vision. China is slow in dealing with international issues, while the Americans sometimes become impatient. China’s normal approach to problems is to find the best solutions before acting on them. China sees many problems as inherent in the process of development and believes solutions will eventually emerge with time. ¶ An analogy can be made here with Chinese medicine, which is slow in curing an illness but is considered better in completely curing one. The American way is similar to Western medicine’s delivering of quick fixes.¶ The differences between cultures are also demonstrated in the different understanding of strategy. The West views China’s “Tao Guang Yang Hui” (translated literally as “hiding brightness and cherishing obscurity”) strategy as something temporary and believes China is waiting for better opportunities to emerge. This strategy is apparent in China’s reactive and defensive foreign policy of the last few centuries. Its defensive foreign policy is best reflected in China’s Great Wall, which was built for defending aggressive invasions. Although such defensive strategies are not very successful in Chinese history, they are deeply rooted in Chinese culture.¶ This defensive culture also prevails in China’s military development. The military philosophy of “zhi ge wei wu” simply means that the purpose of developing weapons is to use them to stop their usage. For the West, it is deterrence while for the Chinese it is defense. China develops a certain kind of weapon or military plan only to counteract weapons and military plans directed at it. China is rarely pre-emptive like the US. China has repeatedly stressed its nuclear policy of maintaining a minimum deterrence with a no-first-use pledge. Chinese defense policy is very different from the ones adopted by the Soviet Union, Germany and Japan before World War II, which all had a state will and plan to achieve hegemony.¶ The reactive elements is also in the daily practices of China’s foreign policy, which runs on a reactive mode like firefighters. This scant regard for foreign policy can be seen in China’s chess game, “weiqi” (Japanese go). In Dr Henry Kissinger’s new book, On China, he uses an analogy of weiqi to depict the difference between Western and Chinese strategic culture. Western strategic culture is like a game of chess which tends to be a zero-sum game, while the Chinese weiqi is a non-zero-sum game where relative gains are possible. ¶ In the West, be it the presidential system or the Cabinet system, the minister of foreign affairs is a prominent and influential position. By comparison, the weiqi philosophy emphasises relative gains. Chinese-style foreign policy could be likened to doing business: you may make more profits today, but I may make more tomorrow. With such a mentality, foreign policy is never an urgent matter. Unlike his counterpart in the West, the Chinese minister of foreign policy occupies an extremely low position in the administrative hierarchy and has limited influence.¶ Chinese culture is also unique because of its secular nature. It does not have a mission to change others. In international affairs, it is reflected in the Chinese understanding of sovereignty. Sovereignty in the West means homogeneity and convergence, while Chinese sovereignty emphasizes “harmony in diversity”. Western countries have the tendency to change the polities of other countries to conform to their own, whereas China is strongly against such practices and values coexistence of different countries.