Neg China Reaction da 1NC

Aff

Northeast Asia

Turn: US Presence is the cause of Chinese aggression

US Presence causes hostility in South China Sea—aff solves by sending a signal of cooperation with China

Hernández 7/30/15

(Javier, writer for The New York Times 7/30/15 “China Blames U.S. Military Actions for Tensions in the South China Sea” accessed 7/31/15 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/31/world/asia/china-blames-us-military-actions-for-tensions-in-the-south-china-sea.html LC)

HONG KONG — A top Chinese official said Thursday that American military drills and surveillance flights in the South China Sea were threatening regional stability, a harsh assessment that seemed likely to heighten tensions between the two countries before several crucial meetings.¶ The official, Col. Yang Yujun, a spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense, said it was the United States, not China, that was to blame for rising tensions in the resource-rich South China Sea, where China and several other countries are engaged in territorial disputes.¶ “The Chinese side expresses its deep concern about the United States pushing the militarization,” Colonel Yang said at a news conference in Beijing. “The behavior by the United States can only lead one to suspect whether the American side is driven by a desire to see the world in turmoil.”¶ The dispute over the South China Sea, one of the world’s busiest trade routes, has emerged as a serious point of contention between China and the United States.¶ It is likely to be high on the agenda when President Xi Jinping visits the United States to meet with President Obama in September, and when Secretary of State John Kerry goes to Malaysia next week for a meeting of Asian nations.¶ China has argued that it is entitled to 90 percent of the sea, putting it at odds with several nearby countries, including the Philippines and Vietnam. In recent months, it has accelerated its efforts to build artificial islands hundreds of miles off its shore, capable of holding runways, radar and missile systems. China maintains that the islands will primarily be used for rescue operations and scientific research.¶ While the United States has not taken a formal position on the territorial disputes, it has called on China to resolve the disagreements in international courts, an idea that Beijing has resisted. American officials have also worked to deepen military ties in the region, for example, by participating in joint military exercises with the Philippines, as well as air and sea surveillance operations.¶ In his remarks on Thursday, Colonel Yang took aim at those efforts, pointing to a recent seven-hour surveillance flight over the South China Sea by the commander of the United States Pacific Fleet, Adm. Scott H. Swift. Colonel Yang warned that the United States should maintain a “safe distance to avoid unexpected incidents.”

Sino-US war only likely if US maintains presence—China blames US for rising tensions

Reuters 7/30/15

(No Author 7/30/15 “China Slams U.S. for ‘militarizing’ South China Sea” accessed 7/31/15 from http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/07/31/asia-pacific/china-slams-u-s-militarizing-south-china-sea/#.VbxX1xNViko LC)

China’s Ministry of National Defense on Thursday accused the U.S. of militarizing the South China Sea as Beijing makes increasingly bold moves to assert its claim to virtually all of the sea’s waters, islands and reefs.¶ Spokesman Yang Yujun’s remarks were prompted by comments last week from the head of the U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. Harry Harris, criticizing Chinese projects to build up islands in disputed waters.¶ Harris warned such work could undermine international norms that have long supported the global economy and political order.¶ Speaking at a monthly news conference, Yang said China rejected such claims totally and accused the U.S. of ulterior motives.¶ “The U.S. side disregards and distorts the facts and plays up China’s military threat to sow discord between China and the littoral states in the South China Sea. We firmly oppose such actions,” Yang said.¶ U.S. close-in reconnaissance of the Chinese armed forces, strengthened military alliances with the Philippines and others, and frequent military exercises are raising tensions and creating risks of incidents in the air and at sea, Yang said.¶ “The Chinese side expresses its serious concern over U.S. activities to militarize the South China Sea region,” he said. “Such actions taken by the U.S. side would inevitably arouse suspicion from others that, does the U.S. want nothing better than chaos in the region?”

US Not Necessary

Japan can successfully counter Chinese aggression

Reuters 7/16/15

(No Author Reuters 7/16/15 “Japan may conduct South China Sea patrols says military chief” accessed 7/31/15 from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/17/japan-may-conduct-south-china-sea-patrols-says-military-chief LC)

Japan’s top military commander, Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, said on Thursday he expected China to become increasingly assertive in the South China Sea and it was possible Japan would conduct patrols and surveillance activities there in the future.¶

Arab Gulf

Non-unique

Nuclear deal makes China-Iran strategic cooperation inevitable – triggers the impact

Rosenberg and Sullivan 15 [Elizabeth Rosenberg is director of the Energy, Economics and Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and Alexander Sullivan is an associate fellow in the center's Asia-Pacific Security Program, Why China likes the Iran deal, CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/31/opinions/rosenberg-sullivan-china-iran-deal/]

(CNN)As members of Congress debate whether to back the deal over Iran's nuclear program, one source of support seems guaranteed -- China. It's one of the biggest winners in the agreement, with the lifting of sanctions as Iran pulls back key elements of its enrichment program set to allow Beijing to deepen its historic partnership with Tehran. While China is undoubtedly eyeing the potential economic benefits, Beijing also likely sees an opportunity to challenge U.S. influence in the Middle East. China has been an important critic of Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions and a supporter of nuclear diplomacy. It is therefore likely to hold ranks with the United States and other international partners during the hard work and political turbulence involved in implementing the accord. And if Iran cheats, Beijing can be relied upon to at least join in a strong statement of condemnation -- and may go along with the reimposition of sanctions on Iran. But China also sees an important strategic opportunity in a renewed relationship with Iran, and can be expected to expand its traditional friendship in four key areas: infrastructure development, energy, limited regional security cooperation and political cooperation to dilute U.S. influence in the region. First, through its "One Belt, One Road" initiative, China aims to link itself with Eurasia and the Middle East through trillions of dollars in infrastructure investment. Sanctions-scarred Iran is in desperate need of new infrastructure and is keen to expand the flow of people and commerce across its borders. Iran is an attractive target for such investment both economically and geopolitically, with its overland borders and proximity to key energy shipping routes. Such commerce will help China and Iran meet their reported target of $160 billion additional trade volume by 2024. Second, as some of the only foreign energy companies left in Iran under the stranglehold of sanctions, Chinese energy giants are well-placed to invest in Iranian oil and gas development in a post-sanctions environment. The bilateral energy relationship isn't without disagreements and pique, and China will see real competition in Iran with technically superior European companies. However, Iran and China both have a stake in bolstering their ties in the energy arena. Doing so will support the goals of both nations to diversify their energy partners, balance Saudi Arabia's oil market dominance and lock in strategic energy trade for the future. Security cooperation between China and Iran will be a third important feature of their relationship in the post-sanctions era. Once-robust naval cooperation is showing signs of revival. On land, they will no doubt cooperate to try and stabilize Afghanistan following the withdrawal of U.S. and other coalition forces at the end of 2016. Both nations are deeply invested in preventing ISIS from gaining a foothold in Afghanistan -- Iran will not tolerate insurgents on its eastern border, while China fears the spread of radicalism to its restive Uyghur population in neighboring Xinjiang province. Indeed, Chinese President Xi Jinping has already pledged unprecedented security assistance to Afghanistan, and China has reportedly brokered peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Unfortunately, the fourth renewed area of Sino-Iranian cooperation may be the expression and amplification of anti-Western, and especially anti-U.S., sentiment. With the nuclear impediment removed, China and Iran are likely to join forces diplomatically in criticizing the United States for its enduring focus on human rights and its international activism. Beijing may also seek to boost Iran's role in China-led multilateral institutions that do not include the United States, especially the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. True, some forms of China-Iran cooperation are positive for U.S. interests. For example, regional economic development, including in Iran, should be welcomed if it is done according to international best practices and lifts people out of poverty. Likewise, if China can, with Iran's help, contribute to Afghanistan's stability, so much the better. Other forms of China-Iran cooperation, however, have the potential to do serious harm to U.S. policy in the Middle East and beyond. An Iran that is overly dependent on China will bolster Beijing's efforts to create alternative political forums that exclude Washington. Meanwhile, if the United States does not take a prominent role in Afghanistan's peaceful reconstruction and the development of Eurasia more broadly, it will cede influence in a pivotal region.

China and Iran are already strategic partners – nuclear deal proves

Kahn 15 [Tzvi, Senior Policy Analyst for the Foreign Policy Initiative. He previously served as Assistant Director for Policy and Government Affairs at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), FPI Bulletin: China-Iran Strategic Partnership Undermines Nuclear Talks, The Foreign Policy Initiative, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpi-bulletin-china-iran-strategic-partnership-undermines-nuclear-talks#sthash.J8CZT6fh.dpuf]

Indeed, Beijing opposes the imposition of automatically reversible sanctions on Iran, also known as “snapbacks,” to ensure compliance with a final deal. While analysts have questioned the practical feasibility of such sanctions in any event, China’s stated position suggests that its economic ties with Iran take precedence over securing Tehran’s compliance. As such, any sanctions relief Beijing grants as part of a final agreement is likely to remain permanent even if Iran violates it.

Put differently, the Iran-China partnership helps bolster Tehran’s intransigence at the negotiating table and gives the Islamist regime little incentive to compromise. It effectively offsets the international isolation Iran has experienced due to Western sanctions, supplying Tehran with a powerful patron that shares its foremost adversary.

Conclusion

The United States must first demonstrate it understands that Tehran and Beijing are working together to undermine American leadership in the Middle East. Then it must act to prevent them from doing so. Unfortunately, by failing to combat Iranian regional aggression and seeking a deal that would allow the regime to become a threshold nuclear state, the Obama administration conveys the message that Beijing and Tehran’s efforts are succeeding.

Link Turn

No Chinese-Iran partnership—China sees Iran as a competitor not an ally

Shabaneh 6/15/15

(Dr. Ghassan, associate professor of international studies at Marymount Manhattan College in New York City, 6/15/15 “The Implications of a Nuclear Deal with Iran on the GCC, China, and Russia” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies accessed 7/29/15 from http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/ Documents/2015/6/14/20156148505316734Iran.pdf LC)

¶ Geopolitics, energy, and China’s desire for hegemony in Asia and beyond complicate the¶ Sino-Iranian relations and overshadow any possible peaceful resolution to Iran’s¶ disagreements with the West. Publically China states its desire for a peaceful resolution¶ between Iran and the West over the nuclear issue, but China has much to worry about if¶ Iran is to conclude such an agreement anytime soon. China has built a complex network of relations with many Arab, Islamic, Western, and Latin American countries in the last¶ three decades, and many of these relations clash with Iranian interests in the short and¶ long runs. Both countries have hegemonic economic and military agendas in Asia and¶ aspire to expand their maritime influence and establish themselves as substantial naval¶ powers. Therefore, China sees Iran as a potential competitor rather than a close ally.

Iran Deal

US-China have shared goals in GCC—cooperation on Iran deal proves

Reuters 4/3/15

(No Author, 4/3/15 “China: Iran deal good for Sino-U.S. relations” accessed 7/31/15 from http://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/03/china-iran-deal-good-for-sino-us-relations.html LC)

This week's framework nuclear deal with Iran was also good for boosting relations between China and the United States, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in a call with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry.¶ The agreement can be attributed to all sides seizing a historic opportunity through concerted efforts, Wang told Kerry, China's foreign ministry said in a statement released late on Friday.¶ "China and the United States, both taking on major responsibilities in safeguarding the international nuclear non-proliferation system, maintained good contact with each other during the negotiations, while instilling positive energy into bilateral relations," the statement cited Wang as saying.¶ "In a bid to finalize a comprehensive deal as scheduled, China will maintain close coordination with all parties concerned, including the United States, and continue to play a constructive role during the process," Wang added.

Nuclear deal already solidified Sino-Iranian relations

Rosenberg and Sullivan 7/31/15

(Elizabeth, a Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy, Economics and Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and Alexander, associate fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program, 7/31/15 “Why China likes the Iran deal” CNN accessed 7/31/15 from http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/31/ opinions/rosenberg-sullivan-china-iran-deal/ LC)

As members of Congress debate whether to back the deal over Iran's nuclear program, one source of support seems guaranteed -- China. It's one of the biggest winners in the agreement, with the lifting of sanctions as Iran pulls back key elements of its enrichment program set to allow Beijing to deepen its historic partnership with Tehran. While China is undoubtedly eyeing the potential economic benefits, Beijing also likely sees an opportunity to challenge U.S. influence in the Middle East.¶ China has been an important critic of Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions and a supporter of nuclear diplomacy. It is therefore likely to hold ranks with the United States and other international partners during the hard work and political turbulence involved in implementing the accord. And if Iran cheats, Beijing can be relied upon to at least join in a strong statement of condemnation -- and may go along with the reimposition of sanctions on Iran.¶ But China also sees an important strategic opportunity in a renewed relationship with Iran, and can be expected to expand its traditional friendship in four key areas: infrastructure development, energy, limited regional security cooperation and political cooperation to dilute U.S. influence in the region.¶ First, through its "One Belt, One Road" initiative, China aims to link itself with Eurasia and the Middle East through trillions of dollars in infrastructure investment. Sanctions-scarred Iran is in desperate need of new infrastructure and is keen to expand the flow of people and commerce across its borders.¶ Iran is an attractive target for such investment both economically and geopolitically, with its overland borders and proximity to key energy shipping routes. Such commerce will help China and Iran meet their reported target of $160 billion additional trade volume by 2024.¶ Second, as some of the only foreign energy companies left in Iran under the stranglehold of sanctions, Chinese energy giants are well-placed to invest in Iranian oil and gas development in a post-sanctions environment. The bilateral energy relationship isn't without disagreements and pique, and China will see real competition in Iran with technically superior European companies. However, Iran and China both have a stake in bolstering their ties in the energy arena. Doing so will support the goals of both nations to diversify their energy partners, balance Saudi Arabia's oil market dominance and lock in strategic energy trade for the future.¶ Security cooperation between China and Iran will be a third important feature of their relationship in the post-sanctions era. Once-robust naval cooperation is showing signs of revival. On land, they will no doubt cooperate to try and stabilize Afghanistan following the withdrawal of U.S. and other coalition forces at the end of 2016.¶ Both nations are deeply invested in preventing ISIS from gaining a foothold in Afghanistan -- Iran will not tolerate insurgents on its eastern border, while China fears the spread of radicalism to its restive Uyghur population in neighboring Xinjiang province. Indeed, Chinese President Xi Jinping has already pledged unprecedented security assistance to Afghanistan, and China has reportedly brokered peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban.¶ Unfortunately, the fourth renewed area of Sino-Iranian cooperation may be the expression and amplification of anti-Western, and especially anti-U.S., sentiment. With the nuclear impediment removed, China and Iran are likely to join forces diplomatically in criticizing the United States for its enduring focus on human rights and its international activism. Beijing may also seek to boost Iran's role in China-led multilateral institutions that do not include the United States, especially the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.¶

A2: Iranian Hegemony

No Iranian heg – economy is weak and proxies are too unstable

Zapfe 3/30/15 [Martin, Center for Security Studies, “The Middle East’s Thirty Years’ War?,” The International Relations and Security Network, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=189508]

Fragile Iranian hegemony

Iran has, so far, been the great winner in the turmoil that has beset the re­gion since 2003, as the last years have seen the advance of Iranian proxies throughout the Middle East. In Leba­non, no political issue can be decided against objections of Hizbollah; in Iraq, Tehran has secured a government dominated by Shi’ites, and it has the last word on most matters of impor­tance; and in Yemen, Shi’ite rebels al­legedly supported by Tehran appear to have the upper hand in a violent struggle for power in Sana’a. However, as impressive as Iran’s influence in the region is at the beginning in 2015, it stands on shaky ground, and it is not at all clear that this influence can be transformed into the regional hegem­ony that Tehran aspires to. Two factors are reason enough for skepticism. First, in economic terms, Iran is rela­tively weak, suffering from years of in­creasingly effective international sanc­tions and, lately, the punishing effects of the drop in world oil prices. Iran is estimated by the IMF to need an oil price of USD 131 to finance a bal­anced budget; at the time of writing, the price hovered around USD 50. As Anthony Cordesman has noted pointedly in a study for the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP), Iran’s economic performance is al­ready dwarfed just by the combined GCC states – not taking into account the other Sunni Arab states not at all friendly with Iran. Second, and more important, in a region made up of overwhelmingly Sunni Arab states and people, Shi’ite Iran is an outlier. It cannot hope to dominate the region against a united front of Arab states; therefore, its only hope lies in dominating the states individually through Shi’ite prox­ies, either in the form of regimes or through de-facto independent forces like Hizbollah. This proxy-based he­gemony is inherently unstable, fuels a violent sectarianism, and would in no way resemble the long-term struc­tural hegemony that many observers fear. It is here that the IS constitutes a paradoxical threat to Iran: The in­stability caused by the war benefits Iranian involvement through proxies; however, a collapse of the state-based order would be detrimental to Irani­an interests, as it needs those states to dominate the system.

Iran can’t dominate the Middle East – stopped by Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Nader 15

[Alireza, senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, “Relax, Iran Is Not Taking Over the Middle East,” the National Interest, February 11, http://nationalinterest.org/feature /relax-iran-not-taking-over-the-middle-east-12222]

The nuclear program, which has cost Iran tens of billions of dollars through sanctions, has hardly been a boon to Iranian power. Rather, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Arab uprisings, and the collapse of weaker regional states have allowed Iran to fill the regional vacuum. But Iran is not alone in this. Tehran faces competing powers such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, both of which are also expanding their influence, and not always in line with U.S. interests. The corrosion of state authority in the region is hardly just due to Iran’s “malign” influence. Nevertheless, Iran does pose certain challenges to the United States, and devising the right approach to dealing with them should remain a key focus. This effort must begin by first identifying key American interests.