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Political demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt

have sparked a century old discussion: Is Tur-

key a model for the Middle East? Two contem-

porary  examples  of  the  “Turkey-as-a-model”

debate show how this issue can play out: Turkey 

was  presented  as  a  moderate  Islamic,  demo-

cratic  model  for  the  Middle  East  as  part  of

George W. Bush’s “freedom agenda,” and more 

recently as part of Barack Obama’s democ-

racy promotion efforts in the Middle East. It is

ironic that in 2010 the debate revolved around 

concepts such as a “shift of axis,” “torn country,”

and “drifting away,” but now Turkey has trans-

formed from a “lost” ally to a “model” country.

Interestingly  enough,  Islamist  actors  such  as

Rachid Ghannouchi of Tunisia and the Muslim

Brotherhood of Egypt declared their intention 

to emulate the Turkish experience in order to

differentiate  themselves  from  the  examples  of

Iran and Taliban. How is it that Turkey is pre-

sented as a model country by political actors as 

varied  as  high-level  U.S.  officials  and  Islamist

groups? To make sense of this irony, one needs 

to consider the questions: whose model and 

which Turkey?

In  fact,  there  are  three  main  political  groups

with competing narratives on what the Turkish 

model means. The first group, predominantly 

authoritarian secular elites of the Middle East,

portrays  Turkey  as  an  exemplar  of  both  con-

trolled modernization under military tutelage 

and integration of Islamist actors into the po-

litical system. This group’s “Turkey model” is 

tainted with Eurocentric and Orientalist preju-

dices about the relationship between Islam and

modernity.  For  them,  since  Middle  Eastern

peoples are not mature enough to embrace de-

mocracy immediately, there needs to be a tran-

sitional period under the tutelage of the mili-

tary. In this paradigm, Islamists can be tamed

in order to guarantee the pro-Western orienta-

tion of a given country. The Obama administra-

tion has referred to this an “orderly transition.” 

The second group, mainly Islamist movements

in the region, sees Turkey as a model for a com-

pletely different set of reasons. This group con-

SETA YORUM

Whose Model? Which 

Turkey? 

It is ironic that in 2010 the debate revolved around concepts such as a “shift of axis,” 

“torn country,” and “drifting away,” but now Turkey has transformed from a “lost” 

ally to a “model” country.

BURHANETTIN DURAN & NUH YILMAZ

model mi esin kaynağı mı?

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m o d e l   m i   e s i n   k a y n a ğ ı   m ı ?

siders Turkey’s transformation over the last de-

cade under the Justice and Development Party

(AKP) government as an example of coming to

power through the democratic electoral pro-

cess and the successful reconciliation of Islam

with democracy, rule of law, and economic 

development. Furthermore, Turkey’s image as 

a prominent and independent actor that can 

criticize Israel appeals to this group. The third

group, people in the streets of the Middle East,

looks to Turkey as an inspiration because of its 

democratic transformation, vibrant economic 

development, and liberal political life. This 

group, which has observed the more liberal 

aspects of Turkish life through the country’s 

cultural  influence,  especially  its  famous  TV

serials, is particularly attracted to Turkey. The 

third group longs to erase injustices and pov-

erty in their countries, but these hopes for the 

future have not and will not be inspired by a 

Turkey under military tutelage. Turkey’s politi-

cal posture in the Middle East is what makes it

an archetype for the rest of the region. To be 

precise,  Turkish  Prime  Minister  Erdogan’s  ef-

fective leadership resonates with aspirations 

and expectations for a dignified foreign policy

model mi esin kaynağı mı?

ŞUBAT  2011  - 

Türkiye son yıllarda sağladığı siyasi ve ekonomik yükseliş ile komşuları için 

referans noktası haline geldi. Arap Baharı ise Türkiye’nin hali hazırda yükselen bölgesel profilini 

yeni bir safhaya taşıdı. Bu anlamda ülkenin demokrasi ve İslam’ı harmanlayan siyasi tecrübesi 

Ortadoğu’da demokratik değişim talep eden kesimlere model olarak sunuldu.  Ancak model 

kavramının farklı anlamlara (ordunun etkili olduğu siyasal yapı mı yoksa demokratikleşme sü-

reci mi) açık içeriği kafa karışıklıklarına neden olarak Türk modeli neyi içeriyor tartışmalarını 

beraberinde getirdi. Ayrıca Türkiye’nin kendine has laik sistemi, tarihi, sosyo-politik tecrübesi 

ve Batı ile olan özgün ilişkisinin Arap dünyasında tekrar edilebilir nitelikte olmayışı kimi çevre-

leri ilham kaynağı ifadesine yöneltti.

AA

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in the region. This was epitomized by Erdo-

gan’s sustained and consistent critique of Israeli

policies during the Gaza crisis in 2008 and in 

Davos in 2009. In the eyes of ordinary people

in  the  Muslim  world  Erdogan  has  emerged

as the most influential leader because Turkey 

maintains a critical and independent distance 

to Western policies in the region despite its in-

tegration with the West. Turkey, as a country 

that determines its own national interests and 

stands up to Western influence, has adopted 

a posture that people in the region would like 

see in their own governments embrace. How-

ever, if the Turkey model were to be imposed 

upon Egypt or Tunisia, this might backfire as 

each of the political groupings described above 

would reject to one aspect of this framework 

while embracing another. Turkey, because of its 

unique political culture, cannot be a model for 

the Islamist movements of the region. Turkish

political vocabulary does not provide for such 

concepts as shura or sharia to advance an “Is-

lamist” political agenda, as promoted by groups 

such as the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, Tur-

key would not stand out as an appropriate 

model for many Muslims who would be unable

to reconcile pseudo-democratic practices with 

their expectations from a democratic regime.

One such example is the Turkish ban on heads-

carves at higher education institutions. Any 

failure to draw the right lessons from the Turk-

ish  experience  might  send  the  wrong  signals

to Tunisia and Egypt who are poised to create 

their own models of democratization in the re-

gion. The best model for the region, therefore, 

is not to impose a framework on any country, 

but rather to allow each to choose its own path. 

If we are genuinely interested in the realization

of people’s will in the Middle East, pushing for

a model of military tutelage for any country 

would be insincere at best. Moreover, if a gov-

ernment with military supervision is presented 

as the Turkish model, this would not find any 

resonance  on  the  streets  of  the  Middle  East.

Turkey did not become a source of inspiration 

for the masses due to the benefits of military 

tutelage.  It  followed  a  different  path;  it  made

risky decisions when threatened by the military 

interference in politics, it pursued a principled 

critique of Israel, and it has nearly completed its

democratic transformation. Now we can return

to our initial question: whose model and which 

Turkey? The old authoritarian Turkey under 

military oversight or the new democratic Tur-

key with its dignified foreign policy?

www.foreignpolicy.com, 8 Şubat 2011

“

Whose  model  and  which  Tur-

key?  The  old  authoritarian  Turkey 

under military oversight or the new 

democratic  Turkey  with  its  dignified 

foreign policy?

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