Synonyms of the New Testament



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[xl. 27 LXX.]; Polybius, iii. 112. 8).

Thus much on the distinction between these words

although, when all has been said, it, will still to a great

extent remain true that they will often set forth, not

different kinds of prayer, but prayer contemplated from

different sides and under different aspects. Witsius (De

Orat. Dom. § 4) ‘Mihi sic videtur, unam eandemque rem

diversis nominibus designari pro diversis quos habet as-

pectibus. Preces nostrae deh vocantur, quatenus iis

nostram apud Deum testamur egestatem, nam de, in-

digere est; proseuxai<, quatenus vota nostra continent;

ai]th, quatelus exponunt petitiones et desideria; e]n-

teuquatenus non timide et diffidenter, sed familiariter,

Deus se a nobis adiri patitur; e@nteucij enim est colloquium



et congressus familiaris: eu]xaristi gratiarum actionem,

esse pro acceptis jam beneficiis, notius est quam ut moneri

oportuit.' On the Hebrew correlatives to the several

words of this group, see Vitringa, De Synagoga, iii. 2. 13.

§ LII. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 193
§lii. a]su, a@spondoj.
]Asu occurs only once in the N.T., namely at Rom.

i. 31; cf. Jer. iii. 8-11, where it is found several times,

but not elsewhere in the Septuagint. There is the same

solitary use of a@spondoj (2 Tim. iii. 3); for its right to a

place in the text at Rom. i. 31 is with good reason con-

tested, and the best critical editions omit it there. It is

nowhere found in the Septuagint.

The distinction between the two words, as used in

Scripture, is not hard to draw;—I have said, as used in

Scripture; because there may be a question whether



a]su has anywhere else exactly the meaning which it

challenges there. Elsewhere often united with a[plou?j,

with a@kratoj (Plutarch, De Comm. Not. 8), it has the pas-

sive sense of 'not put together' or 'not rude up of several

parts'; and in this sense evidently the Vulgate, which

renders it ‘incompositus,’ has taken it; we have here the

explanation of the ‘dissolute’ of the Rheims Version. But

the a]su, of St. Paul—the word w th him has an ac-

tive sense—are they who, being in covenant and treaty

with others, refuse to abide by the e covenants and

treaties: mh> e]mme); pac-

torum haudquaquam tenaces' (Erasmus); ‘bundbruchig’

(not ‘unvertraglich,’ as Tittmann maintains); ‘covenant-

breakers' (A. V.). The word is associate with a]sta,

Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. 383.

Worse than the dusdia, (Aristotle, Ethic. Nic. iv. 5,

10), who are only hard to be reconciled, the a@spondoi are

the absolutely irreconcileable (a@spondoi kai> a]kata,

Philo, Quis Rer. Div. Haer. 50); those who will not be

atoned, or set at one, who being at war refuse to lay aside

their enmity, or to listen to terms of accommodation;

‘implacabiles, qui semel offensi reconciliationem non. ad-

midunt’ (Estius); ‘unversohnlich,’ ‘implacable’ (A. V.);

194 SYNONMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LII.

the word is by Philo (De Mere. Mer. 4) joined to a]su

and a]kooinw, opposed to eu]dia by Plutarch (De

Alex. Virt. 4). The phrase, a@spondoj kai> a]kh

is frequent, indeed proverbial, in Greek (Demosthenes, De



Coron. 79; Phil., De Praem. et Paen. 15; Lucian, Pisc. 36);

in this connexion a]kh does not mean a war

not duly announced by the fecial; but rather one in which

what Virgil calls the ‘belli commercia’ are wholly sus-

pended; no herald, no flag of truce, as we should now say,

being allowed to pass between the parties, no terms of

reconcilement listened to; such a war, for example, as

that which the Carthaginians in the interval between the

first and second Punic Wars waged with their revolted

mercenaries. In the same sense we have elsewhere a@spon-



doj ma a]dia(Aristaenetus, 2, 14); cf.

a@speistoj ko (Nicander, Ther. 367; quoted by Blom-

field, Agamemnon, p. 285); a@spondoj e@xqra (Plutarch,

Pericles, 30); a@spondoj qeo(Euripides, Alcestis, 431).

]Asu then presumes a state of peace, which they

who are such unrighteously interrupt; while a@spondoj

presumes a state of war, which the a@spondoi, refuse to bring

to an equitable close. It will follow that Calvin, who

renders a@spondoi ‘foedifragi,' and a]su, ‘insociabiles,’

has exactly missed the force of both; Theodoret has done

the same; who on Rom. i. 31 writes: a]sunqe, tou>j



a]koinw ponhro>n bij

a]dew?j ta> sugkei. Only by ascribing to

each word that meaning which these interpreters have

ascribed to the ether, will the right equivalents be ob-

tained.


In agreement with what has been just said, and in con-

firmation of it, is the distinction which Ammonius draws

between sunqh and spondh<. Sunqh assumes peace;

being a further agreement, it may be a treaty of alliance,

between those already on general terms of amity. Thus

there was a sunqh between the several States which

§ LIII. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 195
owned the leadership of Sparta in the Peloponnesian War,

that, with whatever territory any one of these began the

war, with the same it should close it (Thucydides, v. 31).

But spondh<, oftener in the plural, assumes war, of which

the spondh< is the cessation; a merely temporary cessation,

an armistice it may be (Homer, Il. ii. 341). It is true

that a sunqh may be attached to a spondh<, terms of al-

liance consequent on terms of peace; thus spondh< and



sunqh occur together in Thucydides, iv. 18: but they

are different things; in the spondh<; there is a cessation of

the state of war, there is peace, or a all events truce; in

the sunqh there is, superinduced on this, a further

agreement or alliance.— Eu]su, I may observe, which

would be the exact opposite of a]su, finds no place in

our lexicons; and we may presume is not found in any

Greek author; but eu]sunqesi in Phil. (De Merc. Mer. 3);

as a]sunqesi in the Septuagint (Jer. i i. 7), and a]qesi in

the same sense often in Polybius (ii. 3 ).


§ liii. makroqumi.
BETWEEN makroqumi and u[pomonh<, which occur, together

at Col. i. 11 and in the same context 2 Cor. vi. 4, 6; 2

Tim. iii. 10; Jam. v. 10, 11; cf. Clement of Rome, 58;

Ignatius, Ephes. 3, Chrysostom draws he following dis-

tinction; that a man makroqumei?, who having power to

avenge himself, yet refrains from th exercise of this

power; while he u[pome, who having no choice but to

bear, and only the alternative of a patient or impatient

bearing, has grace to choose the former. Thus the faith-

ful, he concludes, would commonly be called to exercise the

former grace among themselves (1 Co vi. 7), the latter

in their commerce with those that were without: makro-



qumij a]llhn pro>j tou>j e@cw: makroqumei?

gaj e]kein kai> a]mu

de> ou{j ou] du. This distinction, however,

196 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LIII.


will not endure a closer examination; for see decisively

against it Heb. xii. 2, 3. He to whom u[pomonh< is there

ascribed, bore, not certainly because He could not avoid

bearing; for e might have summoned to his aid twelve

legions of angels, if so He had willed (Matt. xxvi. 53). It

may be well then to consider whether some more satis-

factory distinction between these words cannot be drawn.

Makroqumi belongs to a later stage of the Greek

language. It occurs in the Septuagint, though neither

there nor elsewhere exactly in the sense which in the N.T.

it bears; thus at Isai. lvii. 15 it is rather a patient hold-

ing out under trial than long-suffering under provocation,

more, that is, the u[pomonh< with which we have presently to

do; and compare Jer. xv. 15, I Macc. viii. 4; in neither

of which places is its use that of the N. T.; and as little

is it that of Plutarch (Lucul. 32); the long-suffering of

men he prefers to express by a]necikaki (De Cap. ex Inim.



Util. 9; cf. Epictetus, Enchir. 10), while for the grand

long-suffering of God he has a noble word, one probably of

his own coining, megalopa (De Ser. Num. Vind. 5).

The Church-Latin rendered it by ‘longanimitas,’ which

the Rheims Version sought to introduce into English in

the shape of ‘longanimity.’ There is no reason why

‘longanimity’ should not have had the same success as

‘magnanimity’; but there is a fortune about words, as well

as about books and this failed, notwithstanding that

Jeremy Taylor and Bishop Hall allowed and employed it.

We have preferred ‘long-suffering,’ and understand by it

a long holding out of the mind before it gives room to

action or passion —generally to passion; a]nexo

lwn e]n a]ga
, as St. Paul, (Ephes. iv. 2) beautifully ex-

pounds the meaning which he attaches to the word.

Anger usually, but not universally, is the passion thus

long held aloof the makro being one bradu>j ei]j



o]rgh, and the word exchanged for kratw?n o]rgh?j (Prov.

xvi. 31); and set over against qumw (xv. 18). Still it

§ LIII. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 197
is not necessarily anger, which is thus excluded or set at

a distance; for when the historian of the Maccabees de-

scribes how the Romans had won the world by their policy

and their patience’ (1 Macc. viii. 4) makroqumi expresses

there that Roman persistency which would never make

peace under defeat. The true ant thesis to makroqumi in

that sense is o]cuqumi, a word belonging to the best times

of the language, and employed by Euripides (Androm. 729),

as o]cu by Aristotle (Rhet. ii. 12; cf. o]cu, Solon).

But u[pomonh<,—basili>j tw?n a]retw?n Chrysostom calls it,

—is that virtue which in heathen ethics would be called

more often by the name of karteri1 (the words are joined

together, Plutarch, Apoph. Lac. Ares. 2), or karte,

and which Clement of Alexandria, allowing in the track

of some heathen moralists, describe as the knowledge of

what things are to be borne and what are not (e]pith)



e]mmenete ou]k e]mmenete, Strom. ii. 18; cf. Plutarch,

De Plac. Phil. iv. 23), being the Latin ‘perseverantia’

and ‘patientia’2 both in one, or, more accurately still,

‘tolerantia.’ ‘In this noble word u[pomonh< there always

appears (in the N. T.) a background of a]ndrei (cf. Plato,



Theaet. 177 b, where a]ndrikw?j u[pomei?nai is opposed to

a]na; it does not mark merely the endurance,

the "sustinentia" (Vulg.), or eve the "patientia"

(Clarom.), but the "perseverantia," the brave patience

with which the Christian contends against the various

hindrances, persecutions, and tempta dons that befal him

in his conflict with the inward and outward world’ (Elli-

cott, on I Thess. i. 3). It is, only springing froth a nobler
1 If, however, we may accept the Definitions ascribed to Plato, there

is a slight distinction: karteri lu




po.

2 These two Cicero (De Inven. ii. 54) thus defines and ditinguishes:

Patientia est honestatis aut utilitatis causa rerum arduarum ac difficilium

voluntaria ac diuturna perpessio: perseverantia est in ratione bene con-

siderata stabilis et perpetua permansiu;' compare Tusc. Disp. iv. 24, where

he deals with ‘fortitudo'; and Augustine, Quaestes lxxxiii. qu. 31.

198 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LIII.


root, the kratera> tlhmosu of Archilochus, Fragm. 8.

Cocceius (on Jam. i. 12) describes it well: ‘ [Upomonh< ver,

satur in contemtu bonorum hujus mundi, et in forti sus-

ceptione afflictionum cum gratiarum actione; imprimis

autem in constantia fidei et caritatis, ut neutro modo

quassari aut labefactari se patiatur, aut impediri quominus

opus suum et laborem suum efficiat.' For some other

definitions see the article ‘Geduld’ in Herzog's Real



Encyclopeidie.

We may proceed now to distinguish between these;

and this distinction, I believe, will hold good wherever the

words occur; namely, that makroqumi will be found to

express patience in respect of persons, u[pomonh< in respect

of things. The man makroqumei?, who, having to do with

injurious person does not suffer himself easily to be pro-

voked by them, or to blaze up into anger (2 Tim. iv. 2).

The man u[pome who, under a great siege of trials, bears

up, and does not lose heart or courage (Rom. v. 3; 2 Cor.

i. 6; cf. Clement of Rom,1 Ep. § 5). We should speak,

therefore, of the makroqumi of David (2 Sam. xvi. 10-13),

the u[pomonh< of Job (Jam. v. 11). Thus, while both graces

are ascribed to the saints, only makroqumi is an attribute

of God; and there is a beautiful account of his makroqumi

at Wisd. xii. 2 however the word itself does not there

appear. Men may tempt and provoke Him, and He may

and does display an infinite makroqumi in regard of them

(Exod. xxxiv. 6; Rom. ii. 4; I Pet. ii. 20); there may be

a resistance to God in men, because He respects the wills

which He has given them, even when those wills are

fighting against Him. But there can be no resistance to

God, nor burden upon Him, the Almighty, from things;

therefore u[pomonh< can find no place in Him, nor is it, as

Chrysostom rightly observes, properly ascribed to Him;

(yet see Augustine, De Patientia, § I), for it need hardly be

observed that when God is called qeo>j th?j u[pomonh?j (Rom.

xv. 5), this does not mean, God whose own attribute u[po

§ LIII. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 199
monh< is, but God who gives u[pomonh< to his Servants and

saints (Tittmann, p. 194: [Qeo>j th?j u[pomonh?j, Deus qui

largitur u[pomonh;’ cf. Ps. lxx. 5, LXX.); in the same

way as qeo>j xa (I Pet. v. 10) is God who is the author

of grace; qeo>j th?j ei]rh (Heb. xiii. 20), God who is the

author of peace; and compare qeo>j th?j e]lpi (Rom. xv.

13), 'the God of hope.'

]Anoxh<, used commonly in the plural in classical Greek,

signifies, for the most part, a truce or suspension of arms,

the Latin ‘indutiae.’ It is excellent rendered forbear-

ance' on the two occasions of its occurrence in the N. T.

(Rom. ii. 4; iii. 25), Between it any makroqumi Origen

draws the following distinction in his Commentary on the

Romans (ii. 4)—the Greek original is lost:—‘Sustentatio

[a]nxh<] a patientia [makroqumi] hoc videtur differre, quod

qui infirmitate magis quam proposito delinquunt sustentari

dicuntur; qui vero pertinaci mente velut exsultant in de-

lictis suis, ferri patienter dicendi sunt.’ This does not

seize very successfully the distinction, which is not one

merely of degree. Rather the a]noxh< is temporary, tran-

sient: we may say that, like our ‘truce,’ it asserts its

own temporary, transient character; that after a certain

lapse of time, and unless other conditions intervene, it

will pass away. This, it may be urged, is true of p,atcpo-

qumi no less; above all, of the divine makroqumi (Luke

xiii. 9). But as much does not lie in the word; we may

conceive of a makroqumi, though it would be worthy of

little honour, which should never be exhausted; while (a]noxh<

implies its own merely provisional character. Fritzsche

(on Rom. ii. 4) distinguishes the words: [ h[ a]noxh< indul-



gentiam notat qua, jus tuum non cont nuo exequutus, ei

qui to laeserit spatium des ad resipiscendum; h[ makro-



qumi clementiam significat qua irae temperans delictum

non statim vindices, sed ei qui peccaverit poenitendi locum

relinquas;' elsewhere (Rom. iii. 26) he draws the matter

still better to a point: ‘Indulgentia [h[ a]noxh<] eo valet, ut

200 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LIV.
in aliorum peccatis conniveas, non lit alicui peccata con-

dones, quod clementiae est.' It is therefore most fitly used

at Rom. iii. 26 in relation to the pawhich

found place before the atoning death of Christ, as con-

trasted with the a@fesij a[marti, which was the result of

that death (see back, p. 114). It is that forbearance or

suspense of wrath, that truce with the sinner, which by no

means implies that the wrath will not be executed at the

last; nay, involves that it certainly will, unless he be

found under new conditions of repentance and obedience

(Luke xiii. 9; Rom. ii. 3-6). The words are distinguished,

but the difference between them not very sharply defined,

by Jeremy Taylor, in his first Sermon On the Mercy of the

Divine Judgments, in init.
* liv. strhnia.
IN all these words lies the notion of excess, of wanton,

dissolute, self-indulgent, prodigal living, but in each case

with a difference.

Strhnia occurs only twice in the N. T. (Rev. xviii. 7,

9), strh?noj once (Rev. xviii. 3; cf. 2 Kin. xix. 28), and

the compound katastrhnia as often (I Tim. v. 11). It

is a word of the New or Middle Comedy, and is used by

Lycophron, as quoted in Athenaeus (x. 420 b); by Sophilus

(ib. 100 a); and Antiphanes (ib. iii. 127 d); but re-

jected by the Greek purists—Phrynichus, indeed, affirm-

ing that none but a madman would employ it, having



trufa?n at his command (Lobeck, Phrynichus, p. 381).

This last, which is thus so greatly preferred, is a word of

solitary occurrence in the N. T. (Jam. v. 5); e]ntrufa?n

(2 Pet. ii. 13) of the same; but belongs with trufh< (Luke

vii. 25; 2 Pet. ii. 13) to the best age and most classical

writers in the language. It will be found on closer in-

spection that the words do different work, and that often-

times one could not be employed in room of the other.

§ LIV. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 201
In strhnia?n (=a]taktei?n, Suidas; dia> to>n plou?ton u[bri,

Hesychius), is properly the insolence of wealth, the wan-

tonness and petulance from fulness of bread; something

of the Latin ‘lascivire.’ There is nothing of sybaritic

effeminacy in it; so far from this that Pape connects

strh?noj with ‘strenuus’; see too Pott, Etymol. Forsch.

ii. 2. 357; and there is ever the notion of strength, vigour,

the German ‘Uebermuth,’ such as that displayed by the

inhabitants of Sodom (Gen. xix. 4-9), implied in the word.

On the other hand, effeminacy, brokenness of spirit through

self-indulgence, is exactly the point from which trufh< and



trufa?n (connected with qru
and qru) start; thus

trufh< is linked with xlidh< (Philo, De Mere. Mer. 2); with

polute (Plutarch, Marc. 3); with malaki (Quom. Adul.

Poet. 4); with r[aqumi (Marcellus, 21); cf. Suicer, Thes.

s. v. ; and note the company which it keeps elsewhere

( Plato, 1 Alcib. 122 b); and the description of it which

Clement of Alexandria gives (Strom. ii. 20) ti< ga>r e!teron



h[ trufh<, h} filh pleonasmo>j perij

h[dupa; It only runs into the notion of the

insolent as a secondary and rarer meaning; being then

united with u[brij (Aristophanes, Ranae, 21, Strabo, vi. I);

trufa?n with u[bri (Plutarch, Praec. Ger. Rep. 3); and

compare the line of Menander: u[perh



li. It occasionally from thence passes forward

into a good sense, and expresses the triumph and exulta-

tion of the saints of God (Chrysostom, in Matt. Hom. 67,

668; Isai. lxvi. 11; Ezek. xxxiv. 13; xxxv. 9); so,

too, e]ntrufa?n (Isai. lv. 2); while the garden of Eden is

para (Gen. ii. 15).

Spatala?n (occurring only I Tim. v. 6; Jam. v. 5; cf.

Ecclus. xxi. 17; Ezek. xvi. 49; Amos vi. 4; the last two

being instructive passages) is more nearly allied to trufa?n,

with which at Jam. v. 5 it is associated, than with strhnia?n,

but it brings in the further notion of wastefulness (=a]na-

li, Hesychius), which, consistently with its derivation

202 SYNONMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LV.


from spa, is inherent in it. Thus Hottinger:

[trufa?n deliciarum est, et exquisitae voluptatis, spatala?n

luxuriae atque prodigalitatis.’ Tittmann: [trufa?n potius

mollitiam vitae luxuriosae, spatala?n petulantiam et prodi-

galitatem denotat.’ Theile, who takes them in the reverse

order: ‘Componuntur tanquam antecedens et consequens;

diffiuere et dila pidare, luxuriare et lascivire.'

It will follow, if these distinctions have been rightly-

drawn, that the spatala?n might properly be laid to the

charge of the Prodigal, scattering his substance in riotous

living (zw?n a]sw, Luke xv. 13); the trufa?n to the Rich

Man faring sumptuously every day (eu]faino

h[me Luke xvi. 19); the strhnia?n to Jeshurun,

when, waxing fat, he kicked (Deut. xxxii. 15).


§lv. qli?yij, stenoxwri.
THESE words ware often joined together. Thus stenoxwri

occurring only four times in the N. T., is on three of these

associated with qli?yij, (Rom. ii. 9; viii. 35; 2 Cor. vi. 4;

cf. Deut. xxviii. 55; Isai. viii. 22; xxx. 6). So too the

verbs qli and stenoxwrei?n (2 Cor. iv. 8; cf. Lucian,

Nigrin. 13; Artemidorus, 79; 37). From the anti-

thesis at 2 Cor. iv. 8, qlibo

and from the fact that, wherever in the N. T. the words

occur together, stenoxwri always occurs last, we may

conclude that, whatever be the difference of meaning,

stenoxwri is the stronger word.

They indeed express very nearly the same thing, but

not under the same image. qli?yij (joined with ba

at Ezek. xii. 18, and for which we have the form qlimmo,

Exod. 9; Deut. xxvi. 7) is properly pressure, ‘pres-

sura,’ ‘tribulatio’ —which last word in Church-Latin, to

which alone it belongs, had a metaphorical sense,—that

which presses uison or burdens the spirit; I should have

said ‘angor,’ the more that Cicero (Tusc. iv. 8) explains

LV. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 203


this ‘aegritudo premens,' but that the connexion of ‘angor’

with ‘Angst,’ ‘enge’ (see Grimm, Worterbuch, s. v. Angst;

and Max Muller, On the Science of Language, i 861, vol. i.

p. 366), makes it better to reserve this for stenoxwri.

The proper meaning of stenoxwri is narrowness of

room, confined space, ‘angustiae,’ and then the painfulness

of which this is the occasion: a]pori; and stenoxwri

occurring together, Isai. viii. 22. It is used literally by

Thucydides, vii. 70: being sometimes exchanged for dus-

xwri: by Plutarch (Symp. v. 6) set over against a@nesij:

while in the Septuagint it expresses the straitness of a siege

(Deut. xxviii. 53, 57.) It is once employed in a secondary

and metaphorical sense in the 0. T. (stenoxwri,

Wisd. v. 3); this being the only sense which it knows in

the New. The fitness of this image is attested by the

frequency with which on the other hand a state of joy is

expressed in the Psalms and elsewhere as a bringing into

a large room (platusmo, Ps. cxvii. 5; 2 Sam. xxii. 20;

Ecclus. xlvii. 12; Clement of Rome, I Ep. § 3; Origen,



De Orat. 30; eu]ruxwri, Marcus Antoninus, ix. 32); so that

whether Aquinas intended an etymology or not, and most

probably he did, he certainly uttered a truth, when he

said, ‘laetitia est quasi latitia.’

When, according to the ancient law of England, those

who wilfully refused to plead had heavy weights placed on

their breasts, and were so pressed and crushed to death,

this was literally qli?yij. When Bajazet, vanquished by

Tamerlane, was carried about by him in an iron cage, if

indeed the story be true, this was stenoxwri: or, as we

do not know that any suffering there ensued from actual

narrowness of room, we may more fitly adduce the oubli-



ettes in which Louis XI. shut up his victims; or the ‘little-

ease’1 by which, according to Lingard, the Roman Catho-


1 The word ‘little-ease’ is not in our Dictionaries, but grew in our

early, English to a commonplace to express any place or condition of

extreme discomfort.
204 SYNONYM OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LVI.
lies in Queen Elizabeth's reign were tortured; ‘it was of

so small dimensions and so constructed, that the prisoners

could neither stand, walk, sit, nor lie in it at full length.’

For some consider Lions on the awful sense in which qli?yij

and stenoxwri shall both, according to St. Paul's words

(Rom. ii. 9), be the portion of the lost, see Gerhard, Loc.



Theoll. xxxi. 6. 5
§ lvi. a[plou?j, a]ke.
IN this group of words we have some of the rarest and

most excellent graces of the Christian character set forth;

or perhaps, as it may rather prove, the same grace by aid

of different image, and with only slightest shades of real

difference.

[Aplou?j occur, only twice in the N. T. (Matt. vi. 22;

Luke xi. 34); but a[plo seven times, or perhaps eight,

always in St. Pau 's Epistles; and a[plw?j once (Jam. i. 5).

It would be quite impossible to improve on ‘single’1 by

which our Translators have rendered it, being as it is from

a[polo, ‘expand,’ ‘explico,’ that which is spread out, and

thus without folds or wrinkles; exactly opposed to the



polu
of Jo v. 13; compare ‘simplex’ (not ‘with-

out folds’; but ‘one-folded,’ ‘semel,’ not ‘sine,’ lying in

its first syllable, ‘einfaltig,’ see Donaldson, Varronianus,

p. 390), which is its exact representative in Latin, and a

word, like it, in honorable use. This notion of singleness,

simplicity, absence of folds, which thus lies according to

its etymology in a[plou?j, is also predominant in its use-

'animus alienus a versutia, fraude, simulatione, dolo malo,

et studio nocendi aliis' (Suicer); cf. Herzog, Real-Encyclop.

art. Einfalt, vol. ii . p. 723.

That all this 1ies in the word is manifest from those


1 See a good note n Fritzsche, Commentary on the Romans, vol. iii.

p. 64, denying that a[polo has ever the meaning of liberality, which

our Translators have so often given to it.

§ LVI. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 205


with which we find it associated, as a]lhqh (Xenophon,

Anab. ii. 6. 22; Plato, Legg. v. 738 e, and often); a]po

(Theophrastus); gennai?oj, (Plato, Rep. 361 b); a@kratoj

(Plutarch, De Comm. Not. 48); monoeidh (De Proc. Anim.

21); a]su (=’incompositus,’ not put together, ib.;

Basil, Adv. Eunom. i. 23); mono (Hom. in Prin.



Prov. 7); safh (Alexis, in Meineke's Fragm. Com. Graec.

p. 750); a@kakoj (Diodorus Siculus, xiii. 76); u[gih (De-

mosthenes, Orat. xxxvii. 969). But it is still more appa-

rent from those to which it is opposed; as poiki (Plato,



Theaet. 146 d); polueidh; (Phraedrus, 270 d); polu

(Hipp. Min. 364 e); peplegme (Aristotle, Poet. 13); dip-



lou?j (ib.); e]pi (Xenophon, Mem. iii. i. 6); pantoda-

po (Plutarch, Quom. Adul. ab Arnic. 7). [Aplo (see

1 Macc. i. 37) is in like manner associated with ei]likri

(2 Cor. 12), with a]kaki (Philo, Opif. 41); the two

words being used indiscriminately in the Septuagint to

render the Hebrew which we translate now ‘integrity’

(Ps. vii. 8; Prov. xix. I); now ‘simplicity’ (2 Sam. xv.

11); again with megaloyuxi (Josephus, Antt. vii. 13. 4),

with a]gaqo (Wisd. I). It is opposed to poikili

(Plato, Rep. 404 e), to polutropi, to kakourgi (Theophy-

lact), to kakoh (Theodoret), to do, (Aristophanes,

Plut. 1158). It may further be observed that MtA (Gen.

xxv. 27), which the Septuagint renders a@plastoj, Aquila

has rendered a[polou?j. As happens to at least one other

word of this group, and to multitudes besides which ex-

press the same grace, fro comes often to be used of a

foolish simplicity, unworthy of the Christian, who with all

his simplicity should be fro as well (Matt. x. 16;

Rom. xvi. 19). It is so used by Basil the Great (Ep. 58);

but nowhere in biblical Greek.

]Ake (not in the Septuagint) occurs only three times

in the N. T. (Matt. x. 16; Rom. xvi. 19 ; Phil. ii. 15). A

mistaken etymology, namely, that it was= a]ke, and

derived from a] and ke (cf. kerai~zein, ‘laedere'; kerati

206 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LVI.
LXX.), without horn to push or hurt,—one into which even

Bengel falls, who at Mat. x. 16 has this note: [ake:

sine cornu, ungula, dente, aculeo,’—has led our Translators

on two of these occasions to render it ‘harmless.’ In each

case, however they have put a more correct rendering,

‘simple’ (Mt. x. 16), 'sincere' (Phil. ii. 15), in the mar-

gin. At Rom. xvi. 19 all is reversed, and ‘simple’ stands

in the text, with ‘harmless’ in the margin. The funda-

mental notion of a]ke, as of a]kh, which has the

same derivation from a] and kera, is the absence of

foreign admixture: o[ mh> kekrame

kai> a]poi (Etym. Mag.). Thus Philo, speaking of a

boon which Caligula granted to the Jews, but with harsh

conditions a hexed, styles it a xa, with

manifest reference to this its etymology (De Leg. ad Cai.

42): o!mwj, me th>n xa

a]ll ] a]nami. Wine unmingled

with water is a]ke (Athenaeus, ii. 45). To unalloyed

metal the same epithet is applied. The word is joined by

Plato with a]blabh(Rep. i. 342 b), and with o]rqo (Polit.

268 b); by Plutarch with u[gih (Adv. Stoic. 31); set over

against taraktiko (De Def. Orac. 51); by Clement of Rome

(I Ep. § 2) with ei]likrinh. That, we may say, is a]ke,

which is in its true and natural condition (Polybius, ii. 100.

4; Josephus, Antt. i. 2. 2) ‘integer’; in this bordering on

o[lo, although completeness in all the parts is there

the predominant idea, and not, as here, freedom from dis-

turbing elements.

The word which we have next to consider, a@kakoj,

appears only twice in the N. T. (Heb. vii. 26; Rom. xvi.

18). There are three stages in its history, two of which

are sufficiently marked by its use in these two places; for

the third we must seek elsewhere. Thus at Heb. vii. 26

the epithet challenges for Christ the Lord that absence of

all evil which implies the presence of all good; being asso-

ciated there with other noblest epithets. The Septuagint,

LVI. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW ESTAMENT. 207


which knows all uses of a@kakoj, employs it sometimes in

this highest sense: thus Job is described as a@nqrwpoj



a@kakoj, a]lhqino(Job

ii. 3); while at Job viii. 20, the a@kakoj is opposed to the



a]sebh and at Ps. xxiv. 21 is joined to the eu]qh, as by

Plutarch (Quom. in Virt. Prof. 7) to the sw. The word

at its next stage expresses the same absence of all harm,

but now contemplated more negatively than positively: thus



a]rni (Jer. xi. 19); paidi (Plutarch,

Virt. Mul. 23); a@kakoj kai> a]pra (Demosthenes, Oral.

xlvii. 1164). The N. T. supplies no example of the word

at this its second stage. The process by which it comes

next to signify easily deceived, and then too easily de-

ceived, and a]kaki, simplicity running into an excess

(Aristotle, Rhet. 12), is not difficult to trace. He who

himself means no evil to others, often times fears no evil

from others. Conscious of truth in is own heart, he

believes truth in the hearts of all: a noble quality, yet in a

world like ours capable of being pushed too far, where, if

in malice we are to be children, yet in understanding to

be men (I Cor. xiv. 20); if "simple concerning evil," yet

"wise unto that which is good" (Rom. vi. 19; cf. Jeremy

Taylor's Sermon On Christian Simplicity, Works, Eden's

edition, vol. iv. p. 609). The word, as employed Rom.

xvi. 18, already indicates such a confidence as this be-

ginning to degenerate into a credulous readiness to the

being deceived and led away from the truth (qaumastikoi>,

kai> a@kakoi, Plutarch, De Rect. Rat. Aud. 7; cf. Wisd. iv.

12; Prov. i. 4 [where Solomon declares the object with

which his Proverbs were written, i!na d&? a]ka

gi]; viii. 5; xiv. 15, a@kakoj pisteu lo).

For a somewhat contemptuous use of a@kakoj, see Plato,



Timtaeus, 91 d, with Stallbaum's note; and Plutarch (Dem.

i): th>n a]peiri<% tw?n kakw?n kallwpizome



e]painou?sin [oi[ sofoi], a]ll ] a]belteri a@g-

noian w$n mali: out above all, the

208 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LVI.


words which the author of the Second Alcibiades puts into

the mouth of Socrates (140 c): tou>j me>n plei?ston au]th?j

[a]frosu] mej d ] o]li<-

gon e@llaton h]liqi e]mbronth e]n eu]fhmota

o]non megaloyu

de> eu]h a]ka a]pei e]neou. But

after all it is in the mouth of the rogue Autolycus that

Shakespeare put the words, ‘What a fool Honesty is, and

Trust, his sworn brother, a very simple gentleman’ (Win-



ter's Tale, act iv. sc. 3).

The second and third among these meanings of a@kakoj

are separated by so slight and vanishing a line, oftentimes.

so run into one another, that it is not wonderful if some

find rather two stages in the word's use than three; Basil

the Great, for example, whose words are worth quoting

(Hom. in Princ. Prov. II): dittw?j noou?men th>n a]kaki

ga>r th>n a]po> th?j a[marti

me dia> makra?j a]llotri

me dia> makra?j prosoxh?j kai> mele

oi$o ste

pantelh?, th>n tou? a]ka

e]sti>n h[ mh< pw tou? kakou? e]mpeiri neo

bij e]pith

diakeime

ou]k ei]doj e]mporikaj kakourgi ta>j e]n dikasthri<&

diaplokaj toiou

proaire

pei?ran th?j ponhra?j e!cewj a]gifgm. From all this it will

be seen that a@kakoj has in fact run the same course, and

has the same moral history as xrhsto,

with which it is often joined (as by Diodorus Siculus, v.

66), ‘bon’ (thus Jean le Bon=l’etourdi), ‘bonhomie,’

‘silly,’ ‘simple,’ ‘daft,’ ‘einfaltig,’ ‘gutig,’ and many

more.

The last word of this beautiful group, a@doloj, occurs



only once in the N. T. (I Pet. ii. 2), and is there beauti-

fully translated ‘sincere,’—"the sincere milk of the word;


§ LVII. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 209
see the early English use of 'sincere' as unmixed, unadul-

terated; and compare, for that ‘milk of the word’ which

would not be ‘sincere’ 2 Cor. iv. 2. It does not appear

in the Septuagint, nor in the Apocrypha, but a]do once

in the latter (Wisd. vii. 13). Plato joins it with u[gih (Ep.

viii. 355 e); Philemo with gnh (Meineke, Fragm. Graec.



Com. p. 843). It is difficult, indeed impossible, to vindi-

cate an ethical province for this word on which other of

the group have not encroached, or, indeed, preoccupied

already. We can only regard it as setting forth the same

excellent grace under another image, or on another side.

Thus if the a@kakoj has nothing of the serpent's tooth, the



a@doloj has nothing of the serpent's guile; if the absence of

willingness to hurt, of the malice of or fallen nature, is

predicated of the a@kakoj, the absence of its fraud and

deceit is predicated of the a@doloj, the Nathanael "in whom

is no guile" (John i. 48). And finall to sum up all, we

may say, that as the a@kakoj (='innocens') has no harm-

fulness in him, and the a@doloj, (=’sincerus’) no guile, so

the a]ke (‘integer’) no foreign admixture, and the



a[plou?j (= ‘simplex ') no folds.
§ lvii. xro
SEVERAL times in the N. T. but always in the plural,

xro kairoi<, are found together (Acts 7; 1 Thess.

v. I); and not unfrequently in the Septuagint and the

Apocrypha, Wisd. vii. 18; viii. 8 (both instructive passages);

Dan. ii. 21; and in the singular, Eccles 1; Dan. vii. 12

(but in this last passage the reading is doubtful). Grotius

(on Acts i. 7) conceives the difference between them to

consist merely in the greater length of the xroas com-

pared with the kairoi<, and writes: [xrosunt majora

temporum spatia, ut anni; kairoi< minora, ut menses et

dies.' Compare Bengel: [xropartes kairoi<.' This

210 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LVII.
distinction, if not inaccurate, is certainly insufficient, and

altogether fails to reach the heart of the matter.



Xro is time, contemplated simply as such; the suc-

cession of moments (Matt. xxv. 19; Rev. x. 6; Heb. iv. 7);



ai]w?noj ei]kw>n kinhth<, as Plato calls it (Tim. 37 d; compare

Hooker, Eccles. Pol. v. 69); dia



sewj, as Philo has it (De Mund. Op. 7). It is the German

‘Zeitraum,’ as distinguished from ‘Zeitpunkt;’ thus com-

pare Demosthenes, 1357, where both the words occur;

and Severianus (Suicer, Thes. s. v.): xro



kai?roj eu]kairi, derived from kei, as ‘tempus’

from ‘temno,’ is time as it brings forth its several births;

thus kairo>j qerismou? (Matt. xiii. 30); kairo>j su(Mark

xi. 13); Christ died kata> kairo (Rom. v. 6); and above all

compare, as constituting a miniature essay on the word,

Eccles. iii. 1–8: see Keil, in loco. Xro, it will thus

appear, embraces all possible kairoi<, and, being the larger,

more inclusive term, may be often used where kairo would

have been equally suitable, though not the converse; thus

xro, the time of bringing forth (Luke i. 57);

plh (Gal. iv. 4), the fulness, or the ripe-

ness, of the time for the manifestation of the Son of God,

where we should before have rather expected tou? kairou?,

or tw?n kairw?n, his last phrase actually occurring at Ephes.

i. 10. So, too, we may confidently say that the xro

a]pokatasta (Acts iii. 21) are identical with the kairoi<,

a]nayu which had just been mentioned before (ver. 19).

Thus it is possible to speak of the kairo>j xro, and

Sophocles (Elect. 1292) does so:
xror a@n soi kairo>n e]cei,
but not of the xro. Compare Olympiodorus

(Suicer, Thes. s. v. xro): xro dia



kaq ] o[ praj de> o[ e]pith

xron xro kairo>j ei#nai du

kairo>j ou] xro§ LVII. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 211


ginomeAmmonius: o[ me>n kairo>j dhloi? poio

xro poso. In a fragment of Sosipatros, quoted

by Athenaeus, ix. 22, eu@kairoj xro occurs.

From what has been said, it will appear that when the

Apostles ask the Lord, "Wilt Thou at this time restore

again the kingdom to Israel?" and He makes answer, "It

is not for you to know the times or the seasons " (Acts i.

6, 7), ‘the times’ (xro) are, in Augustine's words, ‘ipsa

spatia temporum,’ and these contemplated merely under

the aspect of their duration, over which the Church's history

should extend; but ‘the seasons’ (kairoi<) are the joints

or articulations in these times, the critical epoch-making

periods fore-ordained of God (kairoi> protetagme, Acts

xvii. 26; cf. Augustine, Conf. xi. 13: ‘Deus operator

temporum'); when all that has been slowly, and often

without observation, ripening through long ages is mature

and comes to the birth in grand decisive events, which

constitute at once the close of one period and the com-

mencement of another. Such, for example, was the passing

away with a great noise of the old Jewish dispensation;

such, again, the recognition of Christianity as the religion

of the Roman Empire; such the conversion of the Germanic

tribes settled within the limits of the Empire; and such

again the conversion of those outside; such the great

revival which went along with the first institution of the

Mendicant Orders; such, by still better right, the Reforma-

tion; such, above all others, the second coming of the

Lord in glory (Dan. vii. 22).

The Latin had no word by which adequately to render



kairoi<. Augustine complains of this (Ep. cxcvii. 2):

‘Graece legitur xro. Nostri utem utrumque

hoc verbum tempora appellant, sive xro, sive kairou,

cum habeant haec duo inter se non negligendam differen-

tiara: kairou quippe appellant Graece tempora quaedam,

non tamen quae in spatiorum voluminibu transeunt, sed

qua in rebus ad aliquid opportunis vel importunis senti-

212 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LVIII.


untur, sicut messis, vindemia, calor, frigus, pax, bellum,

et si qua simi lia; xro autem ipsa spatia temporum

vocant.' It will be seen that he does not recognize ‘tem-

pestivitas,’ which, however, is used by Cicero. Bearing

out this complaint of his, we find in the Vulgate the most

various renderings of kairoi<, as often as it occurs in combi-

nation with xro, and cannot therefore be rendered by

‘tempora,’ which xro, has preoccupied. Thus 'tempora

et momenta' (Acts 7; 1 Thess. v. I), ‘tempora et aetates’

(Dan. ii. 21), ‘tempora et saecula’ (Wisd. viii. 8); while a

modern Latin commentator on the N. T. has ‘tempora et

articuli'; Bengel, ‘intervalla et tempora.’ It might be

urged that ‘tempora et opportunitates’ would fulfil all

necessary conditions. Augustine has anticipated this

suggestion, but only to demonstrate its insufficiency, on

the ground tha ‘opportunitas’ (=’opportunum tempus’)

is a convenient, favourable season (eu]kairi); while the



kairo may be the most inconvenient, most unfavourable of

all, the essential notion of it being that it is the critical

nick of time; tut whether, as such, to make or to mar,

effectually to help or effectually to hinder, the word deter-

mines not at all (‘sive opportuna, sive importuna sint

tempora, kairoi<, dicuntur'). At the same time it is oftener

the former: kairo>j ga>r o!sper a]ndra

panto (Sophocles, Electra, 75, 76). On the

distinction between xro and ai]w, see Schmidt,



Synonymik, vol. ii. p. 54 sqq.
§ lviii. fe.
ON the distinction between these words Lobeck (Phry-

nichus, p. 585) h s the following remarks: ‘Inter fe et

fore hoc interesse constat, quod illud actionem simplicem

et transitoriam, hoc autem actionis ejusdem continua-

tionem significa; verbi causa a]ggeli


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