(see
1 Macc. i. 37) is in like manner associated with ei]likri
(2 Cor. 12), with a]kaki (Philo, Opif. 41); the two
words being used indiscriminately in the Septuagint to
render the Hebrew which we translate now ‘integrity’
(Ps. vii. 8; Prov. xix. I); now ‘simplicity’ (2 Sam. xv.
11); again with megaloyuxi (Josephus, Antt. vii. 13. 4),
with a]gaqo (Wisd. I). It is opposed to poikili
(Plato, Rep. 404 e), to polutropi, to kakourgi (Theophy-
lact), to kakoh (Theodoret), to do, (Aristophanes,
Plut. 1158). It may further be observed that MtA (Gen.
xxv. 27), which the Septuagint renders a@plastoj, Aquila
has rendered a[polou?j. As happens to at least one other
word of this group, and to multitudes besides which ex-
press the same grace, fro comes often to be used of a
foolish simplicity, unworthy of the Christian, who with all
his simplicity should be fro as well (Matt. x. 16;
Rom. xvi. 19). It is so used by Basil the Great (Ep. 58);
but nowhere in biblical Greek.
]Ake (not in the Septuagint) occurs only three times
in the N. T. (Matt. x. 16; Rom. xvi. 19 ; Phil. ii. 15). A
mistaken etymology, namely, that it was= a]ke, and
derived from a] and ke (cf. kerai~zein, ‘laedere'; kerati
206 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LVI.
LXX.), without horn to push or hurt,—one into which even
Bengel falls, who at Mat. x. 16 has this note: [ake:
sine cornu, ungula, dente, aculeo,’—has led our Translators
on two of these occasions to render it ‘harmless.’ In each
case, however they have put a more correct rendering,
‘simple’ (Mt. x. 16), 'sincere' (Phil. ii. 15), in the mar-
gin. At Rom. xvi. 19 all is reversed, and ‘simple’ stands
in the text, with ‘harmless’ in the margin. The funda-
mental notion of a]ke, as of a]kh, which has the
same derivation from a] and kera, is the absence of
foreign admixture: o[ mh> kekrame
kai> a]poi (Etym. Mag.). Thus Philo, speaking of a
boon which Caligula granted to the Jews, but with harsh
conditions a hexed, styles it a xa, with
manifest reference to this its etymology (De Leg. ad Cai.
42): o!mwj, me th>n xa
a]ll ] a]nami. Wine unmingled
with water is a]ke (Athenaeus, ii. 45). To unalloyed
metal the same epithet is applied. The word is joined by
Plato with a]blabh(Rep. i. 342 b), and with o]rqo (Polit.
268 b); by Plutarch with u[gih (Adv. Stoic. 31); set over
against taraktiko (De Def. Orac. 51); by Clement of Rome
(I Ep. § 2) with ei]likrinh. That, we may say, is a]ke,
which is in its true and natural condition (Polybius, ii. 100.
4; Josephus, Antt. i. 2. 2) ‘integer’; in this bordering on
o[lo, although completeness in all the parts is there
the predominant idea, and not, as here, freedom from dis-
turbing elements.
The word which we have next to consider, a@kakoj,
appears only twice in the N. T. (Heb. vii. 26; Rom. xvi.
18). There are three stages in its history, two of which
are sufficiently marked by its use in these two places; for
the third we must seek elsewhere. Thus at Heb. vii. 26
the epithet challenges for Christ the Lord that absence of
all evil which implies the presence of all good; being asso-
ciated there with other noblest epithets. The Septuagint,
LVI. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW ESTAMENT. 207
which knows all uses of a@kakoj, employs it sometimes in
this highest sense: thus Job is described as a@nqrwpoj
a@kakoj, a]lhqino(Job
ii. 3); while at Job viii. 20, the a@kakoj is opposed to the
a]sebh and at Ps. xxiv. 21 is joined to the eu]qh, as by
Plutarch (Quom. in Virt. Prof. 7) to the sw. The word
at its next stage expresses the same absence of all harm,
but now contemplated more negatively than positively: thus
a]rni (Jer. xi. 19); paidi (Plutarch,
Virt. Mul. 23); a@kakoj kai> a]pra (Demosthenes, Oral.
xlvii. 1164). The N. T. supplies no example of the word
at this its second stage. The process by which it comes
next to signify easily deceived, and then too easily de-
ceived, and a]kaki, simplicity running into an excess
(Aristotle, Rhet. 12), is not difficult to trace. He who
himself means no evil to others, often times fears no evil
from others. Conscious of truth in is own heart, he
believes truth in the hearts of all: a noble quality, yet in a
world like ours capable of being pushed too far, where, if
in malice we are to be children, yet in understanding to
be men (I Cor. xiv. 20); if "simple concerning evil," yet
"wise unto that which is good" (Rom. vi. 19; cf. Jeremy
Taylor's Sermon On Christian Simplicity, Works, Eden's
edition, vol. iv. p. 609). The word, as employed Rom.
xvi. 18, already indicates such a confidence as this be-
ginning to degenerate into a credulous readiness to the
being deceived and led away from the truth (qaumastikoi>,
kai> a@kakoi, Plutarch, De Rect. Rat. Aud. 7; cf. Wisd. iv.
12; Prov. i. 4 [where Solomon declares the object with
which his Proverbs were written, i!na d&? a]ka
gi]; viii. 5; xiv. 15, a@kakoj pisteu lo).
For a somewhat contemptuous use of a@kakoj, see Plato,
Timtaeus, 91 d, with Stallbaum's note; and Plutarch (Dem.
i): th>n a]peiri<% tw?n kakw?n kallwpizome
e]painou?sin [oi[ sofoi], a]ll ] a]belteri a@g-
noian w$n mali: out above all, the
208 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LVI.
words which the author of the Second Alcibiades puts into
the mouth of Socrates (140 c): tou>j me>n plei?ston au]th?j
[a]frosu] mej d ] o]li<-
gon e@llaton h]liqi e]mbronth e]n eu]fhmota
o]non megaloyu
de> eu]h a]ka a]pei e]neou. But
after all it is in the mouth of the rogue Autolycus that
Shakespeare put the words, ‘What a fool Honesty is, and
Trust, his sworn brother, a very simple gentleman’ (Win-
ter's Tale, act iv. sc. 3).
The second and third among these meanings of a@kakoj
are separated by so slight and vanishing a line, oftentimes.
so run into one another, that it is not wonderful if some
find rather two stages in the word's use than three; Basil
the Great, for example, whose words are worth quoting
(Hom. in Princ. Prov. II): dittw?j noou?men th>n a]kaki
ga>r th>n a]po> th?j a[marti
me dia> makra?j a]llotri
me dia> makra?j prosoxh?j kai> mele
oi$o ste
pantelh?, th>n tou? a]ka
e]sti>n h[ mh< pw tou? kakou? e]mpeiri neo
bij e]pith
diakeime
ou]k ei]doj e]mporikaj kakourgi ta>j e]n dikasthri<&
diaplokaj toiou
proaire
pei?ran th?j ponhra?j e!cewj a]gifgm. From all this it will
be seen that a@kakoj has in fact run the same course, and
has the same moral history as xrhsto,
with which it is often joined (as by Diodorus Siculus, v.
66), ‘bon’ (thus Jean le Bon=l’etourdi), ‘bonhomie,’
‘silly,’ ‘simple,’ ‘daft,’ ‘einfaltig,’ ‘gutig,’ and many
more.
The last word of this beautiful group, a@doloj, occurs
only once in the N. T. (I Pet. ii. 2), and is there beauti-
fully translated ‘sincere,’—"the sincere milk of the word;
§ LVII. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 209
see the early English use of 'sincere' as unmixed, unadul-
terated; and compare, for that ‘milk of the word’ which
would not be ‘sincere’ 2 Cor. iv. 2. It does not appear
in the Septuagint, nor in the Apocrypha, but a]do once
in the latter (Wisd. vii. 13). Plato joins it with u[gih (Ep.
viii. 355 e); Philemo with gnh (Meineke, Fragm. Graec.
Com. p. 843). It is difficult, indeed impossible, to vindi-
cate an ethical province for this word on which other of
the group have not encroached, or, indeed, preoccupied
already. We can only regard it as setting forth the same
excellent grace under another image, or on another side.
Thus if the a@kakoj has nothing of the serpent's tooth, the
a@doloj has nothing of the serpent's guile; if the absence of
willingness to hurt, of the malice of or fallen nature, is
predicated of the a@kakoj, the absence of its fraud and
deceit is predicated of the a@doloj, the Nathanael "in whom
is no guile" (John i. 48). And finall to sum up all, we
may say, that as the a@kakoj (='innocens') has no harm-
fulness in him, and the a@doloj, (=’sincerus’) no guile, so
the a]ke (‘integer’) no foreign admixture, and the
a[plou?j (= ‘simplex ') no folds.
§ lvii. xro
SEVERAL times in the N. T. but always in the plural,
xro kairoi<, are found together (Acts 7; 1 Thess.
v. I); and not unfrequently in the Septuagint and the
Apocrypha, Wisd. vii. 18; viii. 8 (both instructive passages);
Dan. ii. 21; and in the singular, Eccles 1; Dan. vii. 12
(but in this last passage the reading is doubtful). Grotius
(on Acts i. 7) conceives the difference between them to
consist merely in the greater length of the xroas com-
pared with the kairoi<, and writes: [xrosunt majora
temporum spatia, ut anni; kairoi< minora, ut menses et
dies.' Compare Bengel: [xropartes kairoi<.' This
210 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LVII.
distinction, if not inaccurate, is certainly insufficient, and
altogether fails to reach the heart of the matter.
Xro is time, contemplated simply as such; the suc-
cession of moments (Matt. xxv. 19; Rev. x. 6; Heb. iv. 7);
ai]w?noj ei]kw>n kinhth<, as Plato calls it (Tim. 37 d; compare
Hooker, Eccles. Pol. v. 69); dia
sewj, as Philo has it (De Mund. Op. 7). It is the German
‘Zeitraum,’ as distinguished from ‘Zeitpunkt;’ thus com-
pare Demosthenes, 1357, where both the words occur;
and Severianus (Suicer, Thes. s. v.): xro
kai?roj eu]kairi, derived from kei, as ‘tempus’
from ‘temno,’ is time as it brings forth its several births;
thus kairo>j qerismou? (Matt. xiii. 30); kairo>j su(Mark
xi. 13); Christ died kata> kairo (Rom. v. 6); and above all
compare, as constituting a miniature essay on the word,
Eccles. iii. 1–8: see Keil, in loco. Xro, it will thus
appear, embraces all possible kairoi<, and, being the larger,
more inclusive term, may be often used where kairo would
have been equally suitable, though not the converse; thus
xro, the time of bringing forth (Luke i. 57);
plh (Gal. iv. 4), the fulness, or the ripe-
ness, of the time for the manifestation of the Son of God,
where we should before have rather expected tou? kairou?,
or tw?n kairw?n, his last phrase actually occurring at Ephes.
i. 10. So, too, we may confidently say that the xro
a]pokatasta (Acts iii. 21) are identical with the kairoi<,
a]nayu which had just been mentioned before (ver. 19).
Thus it is possible to speak of the kairo>j xro, and
Sophocles (Elect. 1292) does so:
xror a@n soi kairo>n e]cei,
but not of the xro. Compare Olympiodorus
(Suicer, Thes. s. v. xro): xro dia
kaq ] o[ praj de> o[ e]pith
xron xro kairo>j ei#nai du
kairo>j ou] xro§ LVII. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 211
ginomeAmmonius: o[ me>n kairo>j dhloi? poio
xro poso. In a fragment of Sosipatros, quoted
by Athenaeus, ix. 22, eu@kairoj xro occurs.
From what has been said, it will appear that when the
Apostles ask the Lord, "Wilt Thou at this time restore
again the kingdom to Israel?" and He makes answer, "It
is not for you to know the times or the seasons " (Acts i.
6, 7), ‘the times’ (xro) are, in Augustine's words, ‘ipsa
spatia temporum,’ and these contemplated merely under
the aspect of their duration, over which the Church's history
should extend; but ‘the seasons’ (kairoi<) are the joints
or articulations in these times, the critical epoch-making
periods fore-ordained of God (kairoi> protetagme, Acts
xvii. 26; cf. Augustine, Conf. xi. 13: ‘Deus operator
temporum'); when all that has been slowly, and often
without observation, ripening through long ages is mature
and comes to the birth in grand decisive events, which
constitute at once the close of one period and the com-
mencement of another. Such, for example, was the passing
away with a great noise of the old Jewish dispensation;
such, again, the recognition of Christianity as the religion
of the Roman Empire; such the conversion of the Germanic
tribes settled within the limits of the Empire; and such
again the conversion of those outside; such the great
revival which went along with the first institution of the
Mendicant Orders; such, by still better right, the Reforma-
tion; such, above all others, the second coming of the
Lord in glory (Dan. vii. 22).
The Latin had no word by which adequately to render
kairoi<. Augustine complains of this (Ep. cxcvii. 2):
‘Graece legitur xro. Nostri utem utrumque
hoc verbum tempora appellant, sive xro, sive kairou,
cum habeant haec duo inter se non negligendam differen-
tiara: kairou quippe appellant Graece tempora quaedam,
non tamen quae in spatiorum voluminibu transeunt, sed
qua in rebus ad aliquid opportunis vel importunis senti-
212 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LVIII.
untur, sicut messis, vindemia, calor, frigus, pax, bellum,
et si qua simi lia; xro autem ipsa spatia temporum
vocant.' It will be seen that he does not recognize ‘tem-
pestivitas,’ which, however, is used by Cicero. Bearing
out this complaint of his, we find in the Vulgate the most
various renderings of kairoi<, as often as it occurs in combi-
nation with xro, and cannot therefore be rendered by
‘tempora,’ which xro, has preoccupied. Thus 'tempora
et momenta' (Acts 7; 1 Thess. v. I), ‘tempora et aetates’
(Dan. ii. 21), ‘tempora et saecula’ (Wisd. viii. 8); while a
modern Latin commentator on the N. T. has ‘tempora et
articuli'; Bengel, ‘intervalla et tempora.’ It might be
urged that ‘tempora et opportunitates’ would fulfil all
necessary conditions. Augustine has anticipated this
suggestion, but only to demonstrate its insufficiency, on
the ground tha ‘opportunitas’ (=’opportunum tempus’)
is a convenient, favourable season (eu]kairi); while the
kairo may be the most inconvenient, most unfavourable of
all, the essential notion of it being that it is the critical
nick of time; tut whether, as such, to make or to mar,
effectually to help or effectually to hinder, the word deter-
mines not at all (‘sive opportuna, sive importuna sint
tempora, kairoi<, dicuntur'). At the same time it is oftener
the former: kairo>j ga>r o!sper a]ndra
panto (Sophocles, Electra, 75, 76). On the
distinction between xro and ai]w, see Schmidt,
Synonymik, vol. ii. p. 54 sqq.
§ lviii. fe.
ON the distinction between these words Lobeck (Phry-
nichus, p. 585) h s the following remarks: ‘Inter fe et
fore hoc interesse constat, quod illud actionem simplicem
et transitoriam, hoc autem actionis ejusdem continua-
tionem significa; verbi causa a]ggeli