40
Table 12 - Niger: Log-log regression of number of child admissions
to feeding centers (2006-10)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
(Dependent
Variable lagged one
month)
Constant
-4.686
-12.384**
-6.496
Log millet price
2.105***
1.887***
1.028**
Log cow price
-3.018***
-1.056
-1.798**
Log goat price
5.725***
3.864***
5.515***
Hunger season
0.411**
0.364**
0.485***
N Feeding centers
0.775***
0.690***
Adj R2
0.63
0.73
0.75
F statistics
26.53***
32.97***
36.16***
Durbin Watson
1.23
1.31
0.97
N.obs
60
60
59
Source: authors’ calculations on data provided
by Unicef- Niamey (child admissions) and FewsNet (millet, goat
and cow price).
Figure 20 - Evolution of global acute malnutrition rate (in %)
among 6-59 months old children (2000-2010)
Source: based on MICS 2000 and 2006, CDC-Unicef 2006, INS 2007-2010
The 2001/2 famine
As noted by Stevens et al. (2002), a food production shock, caused by localized flooding in
the central and southern regions during February and March 2001, reduced maize
production from a record high of 2.5 million tons in 1999/00 to 1.7 million tons in 2000/01
(Figure 21), and created a national maize deficit of 300,000 tons. However, this fall in food
production was preceded in 1999 and 2000 by a record high surplus, so that the 2001 output
level was only a bit below the long term trend.
41
The magnitude of the food gap in 2001/2 was underestimated by the government and
donors due to exaggerated forecasts of roots and tubers production by the Ministry of
Agriculture. This misguided belief – that Malawi had a ‘maize deficit’ but not an overall ‘food
deficit’ and that households would be able to buffer the deficit with carry-over stocks from
the previous bumper harvest – persisted until early 2002, and slowed the public response.
The delayed response was also caused by the fact that, at the start of the consumption year in
April 2001, ADMARC and the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) claimed to hold over
60,000 MT in maize stock. Originally, the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) was managed by
ADMARC but, as noted in section 3.2 (ii), the IMF, EU and other donors felt that the SGR
should be run by an independent entity (the NFRA) on a cost-recovery basis. Lacking its own
resources, the latter had to borrow heavily to purchase 167,000 MT of maize from ADMARC in
1999. By July 2000, food stocks held by ADMARC or the NFRA were near the full storage
capacity of 180,000 MT. However, given the high debt incurred by NFRA and the high level of
grain stock, on IMF advice the NFRA reduced the SGR from 165.000 to 60.000 tons, so as to
service its debt. Thus, the SGR was being gradually emptied on the advice of the IMF, to the
extent that almost no maize was left in reserve by the time decision-makers and donors
finally recognized the scale of the famine in late 2001. The IMF argued that
its advice was
predicated on “wrong information” received about crop production from the Ministry of
Agriculture, and that “the advice would have been correct if the information was correct”
(Devereux 2002).
Figure 21 - Malawi, maize production and trend - metric tons (1980-2002)
Note: The long-term trend was computed with the Hodrick-Prescott Filter
Source: authors’ calculations on FAO data
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
3000000
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Maize production
Trend
42
Tense relations with the donors added to a slow and inconsistent policy response. In 2001-2
the Muluzi government was accused of economic mismanagement, governance failures and
corruption. As a result, in addition to the IMF’s decision to suspend its balance of payment
support, DFID, the EU and USAID froze their development assistance and DANIDA left the
country. It was only after reports of starvation-related deaths had been published by the
media that the donors reversed their hard-line stance and offered food aid without
conditions.
These “failures of information” explain why the government was slow to order food imports.
In June 2001, after it had become clear that there would be a maize deficit, the Government
announced a plan to buy locally (and resell at subsidized prices) 70,000 tons and to procure
150,000 tons on the international market. But the local purchase plan did not work, due to
the low price initially offered by ADMARC. Even after a price adjustment sellers were scarce,
as in the meantime maize prices had jumped 10-fold between harvest time (May 2001) and
January 2002. Furthermore, the import program started only after ADMARC had slowly
purchased the prescribed 50,000 tons locally (Devereux 2002).
Not only was the import plan started late but the actual delivery of maize took much longer
than anticipated. If food stocks had arrived by December 2001, the famine might have been
averted, however unfolding logistical problems led to fatal delays (Devereux 2002). In reality,
imports arrived at an average rate of 15,000 tons/month (instead of the 50.000 projected for
October-November 2001), so that by April 2002, only 94,000 tons of maize had arrived. A first
cause of this delay was the same floods that affected food production. They hindered food
import and distribution programs as roads, bridges, railway lines and other means of
transport were washed away. Handling problems in the Mozambican ports of Beira and
Nacala through which imports were being forwarded contributed to the delay. In this
respect, the fact that Malawi (like Niger) is land-locked makes it particularly vulnerable to
transportation and trade bottlenecks and to increases in transport costs. Thirdly, problems
were encountered also with Malawi’s trucking system, which is a political monopoly. Indeed,
the 2001/2 crisis affected the entire Southern African region which experienced a generalized
increase in maize prices. As a result, some of the Malawian trucks were diverted to richer
Zambia and Zimbabwe, attracted by higher prices and better transport infrastructure.
According to Harrigan (2008), “the events of 2001/02 showed that as a relatively small
country in the sub-region Malawi is acutely exposed whenever a regional food shortage
occurs since its larger neighbors Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe have first call over food
imports by virtue of their greater size and purchasing power and better connections with
South Africa and overseas markets”.
Thus, the vast majority of Malawians in rural areas was affected by sheer lack of food at the
local level, limited penetration of imports in rural areas due to transport problems, and rising
prices. During the famine, 15 percent of households received food assistance from extended
family members and only 19 percent obtained food aid from NGOs (Bryceson & Fonseca
2006). After the declaration of the National Food Crisis by President Muluzi in February 2002,
the government, UN, Humanitarian Agencies, donors and several NGOs worked for the
procurement and distribution of emergency aid by implementing five main activities, i.e. the
Food for Work initiative, the HIV/AIDS programme, the School Feeding programme, the
Supplementary and therapeutic feeding programme and the Direct Transfer programme.
This represent and important shift in the role of donors in implementing food security in
Malawi from funds provision and budget-support to a more oriented project and programme
support.