Working-afhdr-niger-malawi
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- Figure 17 - Niger: lagged weekly millet price and admissions to MSF feeding centers in Maradi (2005)
- Table 9 - Niger: Regression analysis of admissions of children to MSF feeding centers, Maradi (2002–2005) (dependent variable: log child admissions lagged 5 weeks)
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MSF feeding centers in Maradi (2005) Source: Cornia and Deotti (2008) Models 2 and 3 implicitly assume that the opening of new centres is a random variable, possibly causing in this way a problem of circularity and endogeneity (i.e. the number of admissions depends on the ‘supply’ of places in feeding centres which in turn allows a growing ‘demand’ for admissions to be satisfied, thus increasing the number of admissions and the number of feeding centres). To deal with this bias, Model 4 introduces as an instrumental variable the lagged child admissions, and the results confirm to a very large extent the findings of models 1 to 3. In conclusion, the results presented in Table 9 confirm that the rise in child admissions to MSF feeding centres in Maradi during 2005 was explained to a considerable extent by an abnormal rise of millet price (Pf) and parallel drop in that of goats and cows (Pj). While the lagged opening of new feeding centres contributed to the rise in admissions, its impact was less important than that due to the changes in millet, cow and goat prices which explain between 55 and 72 percent of the admissions. As for the underlying causes of nutritional crisis which hit Niger in 2005, it appears that more than by a decline in domestic millet production the crisis was due to a Sahelian and domestic ‘market failure’ signalled by the drop in food imports and an increase in trade margins which raised wholesalers’ profits in a period of crisis. The decline in the prices of various entitlements (goats, cows, firewood, cash crops, and wage rate of casual labour) was also major factor in precipitating the rise in child malnutrition. The crisis would also have been less severe had different food security policies, a comprehensive monitoring system, and adequate domestic and international aid relief been in place. The 2010 food crisis
September 2009 harvest, which dropped by 29.1 percent compared to 2008. The cereal deficit was estimated at 410,000 tons of cereals (against 600.000 in 2004-5). At the same time, the 2009/2010 season recorded the highest fodder deficit (67 percent of national needs) of the last 10 years (WFP 2010) and fodder prices more than doubled in relation to the previous years in some departments (FEWS NET March 2010).
5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 W 1 w 4 w 7 w 1 0 w 1 3 w 1 6 w 1 9 w 2 2 w 2 5 w 2 8 w 3 1 w 3 4 w 3 7 w 4 0 w 4 3 w 4 6 w 4 9 w 5 2 C F A p e r 1 0 0 k g o f m il le t 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 n u m b e r o f a d m is s io n s Maradi millet prices retarded by 5 weeks admissions Maradi 35
(2002–2005) (dependent variable: log child admissions lagged 5 weeks) Notes: *, **, *** indicate that the parameters are significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent probability level; / b The three price ranges were identified on the basis of a Chow test which shows that the slope of the relation between millet prices and lagged child admissions was affected by two structural brakes. Source: Authors’ calculations. Yet, contrary to what happened in 2005, the fall in millet production was limited to Niger, as weather conditions did not deteriorate in the rest of the region. As a result, regional food imports compensated much of the domestic output shortfall. Already in February 2010, each week Niger imported 10.000 tons of cereals, though this flow slowly declined due to a 10 per cent appreciation of NAIRA/FCFA exchange rate since November 2009 and growing demand in northern Nigeria (WFP 2010). According to SIMA, both cereals and fodder were available in the market, due to important difference in the prices between trans-border markets, which persisted after taking into account transport costs and taxes (WFP et al. 2010). In addition, the response to the food crisis was far more positive than in 2005 (De Sardan 2011). While in 2005 President Tandja consistently denied the existence of a crisis, the new government did not conceal the gravity of the 2010 crisis and immediately appealed for food aid. The domestic response also improved, as free food distributions took place right at the onset of the crisis. In turn, child malnutrition was monitored closely, more effective treatment protocols were developed, aid programs were decentralized, and a better coordination mechanism between international organizations, NGOs and the government was put in place (ibid). As a result, while millet prices increased by 97 percent between October 2004 and August 2005, the rise during the same months of 2009/10 was of only 27 percent (Figure 18). The slower increase in the price of millet during the 2010 lean season (and the more favorable dynamics in the price of goats, cows and onions, as compared to 2004-5) caused
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Model 4 Constant 94.360*** 54.289*** 50.920*** 62.293*** Log admission – 6
0.306*** Log price range 1 millet b
- 0.151 - 0.391** 0.109 - 0.046
Log price range 2 millet b
1.018*** 0.782*** 0.841*** 1.071*** Log price range 3 millet b
2.556*** 2.255*** 2.184*** 1.875*** Log cow price - 2.919*** - 0.034 0.071
-2.121*** Log goat price - 5.652*** - 4.869*** -5.032*** -3.535*** Dummy 1
0.373***
Dummy 2
0.555*** Dummy 3
Dummy 4
Log number of centers
0.726***
R2 adjusted 0.852 0.879
0.878 0.872
Durbin – Watson 0.874
0.813 0.835
0.829 F statistics 232.96*** 243.70*** 158.90*** 343.51*** Numb. Of obs 208
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