25
The growth rate of GDP stagnated for twenty years, traditional livelihoods were eroded and
inequality among smallholders increased. It was also clear that the inability of government to
put in place proactive policies depended also on a lack of a well defined food security
strategy. In the 1990s, ad hoc social policy and food security measures were introduced
within the context of the Social Action Fund (Chinsinga 2007). Furthermore, the government
launched an Agricultural Sector Adjustment Program with the aim of improving food crop
productivity through targeted subsidies, the adoption of high yielding varieties and crop
diversification. The achievement of food security was hampered, however, by the droughts of
1992 and 1994 that led to the collapse of the Smallholder Credit Association; by the reduced
role of ADMARC in remote areas abandoned by the private sector; and by the removal of
subsidies which raised fertiliser prices and discouraged maize production (Sahley et al. 2005,
Zant 2005). In 1999, under the pressure of donors, the Strategic Grain Reserve was taken over
by the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA), an independent body financed and managed
by donors and working on a cost-recovery basis (Zant 2005) with the role of stabilising the
supply and prices of staples.
The situation was made worse by discrepancies in opinions between government and
donors. The former targeted national maize self-sufficiency by stimulating production and
productivity through subsidised inputs, while the UN agencies aimed at ensuring household
food security through safety nets, and the World Bank and USAID advocated a fast
liberalization. As a result, by the end of the 1990s, Malawi became heavily donor dependent:
official development assistance was 25 percent the GDP, and donors provided almost all the
development budget. In 2000 Malawi qualified for relief under the HIPC Program. Despite
these different views in 1998
,
the government introduced with the support of some donors a
free agricultural inputs distribution programme, the Starter Pack, aimed at increasing
productivity in agriculture, raising the use of fertilizers and promoting food security through
interest free credit packages directed to well-to-do farmers (Zant 2005). In the 2000s, the
fertiliser subsidy program was broadened so as to support poor farmers without funds for
buy fertilizers (Africa Research institute 2007, Dorward et al. 2008). In 2008, the government
reinstalled the ban over private trade of maize whose market returned to be fully controlled
by ADMARC. The 2000s witnessed also the lunch of many programs focused on agricultural
development and food security that aimed at strengthening food security by supporting
subsistence farmers, feeding programmes for malnourished children, public works initiatives
and direct transfer programmes. Despite this and other efforts, the
high prices of fertilisers
(see above)
and of maize (see next section) compromised the country’s objective
to achieve
food security.
Food prices
The 2000s were characterised by a clear upward trend of maize prices with spikes in
2001/2002, 2005/2006, 2007/2008, 2008/2009 (Figure 11). It is likely therefore that failure to
increase in a stable way food output affected food security through a steady increase in
prices.
26
Figure 11 - Malawi: nominal average price of maize (kwacha per kg) and its trend component -
monthly data (2000-2010)
0
20
40
60
80
J
a
n
-0
0
J
a
n
-0
1
J
a
n
-0
2
J
a
n
-0
3
J
a
n
-0
4
J
a
n
-0
5
J
a
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-0
6
J
a
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-0
7
J
a
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-0
8
J
a
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-0
9
J
a
n
-1
0
Maize price MWK
Trend
. Note: the long-term trend was computed with the Hodrick-Prescott Filter.
Source: authors’ calculation on FEWSNet
Long term trends in nutritional status
Due to the lack of an effective agricultural and food policy, by the mid-1980s, even if self-
sufficient in maize production, Malawi recorded a child stunting rate of 45-65 percent which
was a clear reflection of the dramatic rise of households poverty and food insecurity (Quinn
1986). In addition, the frequency of food security hazards increased over time while the
ability of the population to cope with such hazards declined (Ministry of Agriculture and
Food Security Republic of Malawi 2010). However, despite the quasi-stagnation in
GDP/capita signaled by the national accounts (Table 2), the incidence of poverty (based on
household surveys) declined during the last 6-7 years, suggesting that food consumption
poverty may have also declined slowly – though remaining still above the 50 percent mark
(Table 7).
Table 7- Malawi: Incidence of poverty and ultra-poverty (2004-2009)
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Poor
52
50
45
40
40
39
Ultra- poor
22
21
17
15
15
15
Source: authors’ calculations on NSO data
Though child malnutrition depends on several factors (feeding and care practices, parental
education, knowledge of food processing, access to quality health care services, disease
incidence, cultural beliefs, capacity to implement nutritional programs and so on), the
reduction in the incidence of poverty (and improvements in vaccination rates) seems to be
behind the steady gains in all DHS based indicators of child malnutritional illustrated in
Figure 12.