Working-afhdr-niger-malawi
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- Figure 6 - Niger: millet price (CFA per kg) and its trend, monthly data (January 2000 - December 2010)
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grains from Niger’s border area, exacerbating in this way its production deficit (CILSS et al, 2008). This asymmetric integration is particularly marked with Nigeria, a country with a GDP twenty times that of Niger. Unofficial cereal exports to Northern Nigeria may occur even in food crisis years if prices in Nigeria and Naira/CFAF make selling in that market more attractive (as observed after the poor 2001 and 2004 harvests). Policies to encourage food production As indicated in section (i), in Niger attempts at raising land yields and cereal production per capita generated limited results. Public policy in this field changed drastically over time. In the early days, the state cereal marketing and food security board OPVN managed most food trade at a price set by the state, stabilized food prices, maintained a food security reserve, and provided subsidized inputs to farmers. Import taxes were abolished and the focus of the new food security policy was on increasing agricultural productivity through a combined distribution of subsidized inputs and agricultural loans, support to basic food crops production and strengthening of institutions for their commercialisation (Republique du Niger, 2000). As a result, the production level and producer prices for cereals, cowpeas and groundnuts increased considerably between 1973 and 1983 (Hamadou 2000).
As in other African countries, this policy - in which both the input and output prices differed from free market prices - was abandoned in the early 1980s following the introduction of structural adjustment programs (SAP) which focused on ‘getting the prices right’ and on improving allocative efficiency. This change in policy started as an autonomous decision taken in 1982 by the government to face the unbearable burden resulting from 10 years of high public investments and was then endorsed by the International Institutions in 1983 (Mas & Naudet 1992). The reforms of the 1980s and the 1990s had important implications for the functioning of Niger’s agro-food sector (World Bank 2009). With the signature of the 1983 IMF Standby agreement, the role of OPVN was drastically reduced. The number of its marketing outlets was cut, its price stabilisation role was abolished and only the task preserved was that of managing a much reduced food security reserve. In 1986, fertilizers subsidies were cut, and private trade and food prices were liberalized, while in 1993 and 1995 veterinary services were privatized and the trade in veterinary products was completely liberalised ( FAO 2010c). The abolition of trade restrictions and distorted producer subsidies and the increase in producer prices were expected to stimulate production and raise incomes in the agricultural sector (Balassa 1986). In reality, however, these measures did not always translate into higher producer prices (Tollens 2009) and, even where they did, the price elasticity of aggregate food supply turned out to be very low (Binswanger 1989). Thus, these policies broadly failed in Niger as well as in other SSA countries affected by severe market imperfections, inadequate infrastructure, and – particularly - lack of investments in agricultural research. Indeed, in such places, output is more responsive to non-price factors, such as technology improvements (Chibber 1989, Binswanger 1989) than to price incentives. Thus, despite these attempts at confronting the structural weakness of Niger’s agriculture, the dependence of the country on climatic factors, backward farming techniques, limited input use and extreme price fluctuations did not decrease, while the liberalisation of agricultural trade and prices did not succeed in stimulating production. As a result, agricultural production per capita decreased by 20 percent during the 1980s, cereal imports rose to 7.8 percent of total consumption (Tinguiri 1992), while between 1979-1981 and 1990-1992 the daily caloric intake dropped by 5.6 percent and the consumption of meat/person/day fell from 64 to 53 grams (Blein et al. 2008).
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and fertilizers subsidies which worsened the terms of trade of agriculture and delayed the application of more input-intensive techniques (FAO 2010c, Marou Dodo 2005). No major policy change has occurred since the late 1990s in terms of output diversification through the development of dry-season crops, which require better access to modern inputs, labour-intensive water-conservation techniques and – as a precondition for these increased investments – security of land tenure. A recent survey shows that the rate of adoption of improved seeds in some areas in Niger decreased from an average of 69 % between 1997 and 2001 to 48 % in 2002, as a result of the increasing costs and inadequate supply of improved seeds and fertilizers (Sani and Bagna 2007). To this day, the use of modern inputs and especially fertilizers (the lowest in CEDEAO after Sierra Leone, Blein et al. 2008) remains a major problem (Table 2). Similarly, agricultural R&D spending 13 decreased from 15.6 percent per year during the 1970s (Mazzucato & Ly 1993) to 3.0 percent between 1981 and 1993 (Stads et al. 2004). In 2001, Niger invested only 0.17 USD per every 100 USD of agricultural output, one of the lowest ratios in Africa (ibid.) and lower than the value recorded in 1981 (0.37) and 1995 (0.64). Food prices The price of millet rose slowly during the first half of the 2000s (Figure 6). However, between 2006 and 2010 millet prices showed a steady upward trend despite the surplus harvests recorded in 2007, 2008 and 2009 14 . On the other hand, starting from 2007 the inter-annual volatility has fallen (see later). Figure 6 - Niger: millet price (CFA per kg) and its trend, monthly data (January 2000 - December 2010) 0 50 100 150
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J a n -0 0 J a n -0 1 J a n -0 2 J a n -0 3 J a n -0 4 J a n -0 5 J a n -0 6 J a n -0 7 J a n -0 8 J a n -0 9 J a n -1 0 Millet price CFA Trend .
Source: Authors’ calculation on FewsNet data
13 In 2001, the National Agricultural Research Institute of Niger (INRAN) accounted for three-quarters of the country’s total agricultural research staff and close to 60 percent of agricultural research spending. Between 1991–2003, over half of the budget of INRAN was generated from a World Bank loan, 30 percent was contributed by the Nigerien government and the rest was provided by donors and public and private enterprises (Stads et al. 2004)
14 The progressive specialization of Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali in non-food cash crops (especially cotton) raised their cereal import needs and reduced cereal-trading opportunities within the Sahel. For Niger this has meant higher costs, and greater dependence from outside Sahel to satisfy domestic needs. Yüklə 0,84 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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