23
We measured district demographics by the percent of student who are black and the
percent that are eligible for free- and reduced-priced lunch. We also include the percent of
resident students enrolled in charter schools. We measured district financial status in three ways:
•
number of consecutive years in deficit (in 2012),
•
3-year trend in deficit relative to general fund revenues (2009 to 2012),
20
and
•
fund balance as a percentage of general fund revenue.
As indicated in Table 8, the deficit districts in which the state intervened were
significantly different from deficit districts in which it did not intervene on each of the
demographic characteristics examined. They had significantly higher shares of African-
American students (86% versus 40%), and significantly higher shares of low-income students
(85% versus 67%). Districts in which the state intervened also had significantly higher charter
penetration (29% versus 11% of resident students).
[Table 8 about here]
On two of the three measures of district financial status (fund balance as a percentage of
general fund revenues and the 3-year deficit trend), the six districts in which the state intervened
were in significantly worse shape than those in which it did not.
On one measure of district financial status, the number of consecutive years in deficit in
2012, there was no significant difference between the districts in which the state did and did not
undertake emergency intervention.
21
Clearly the districts in which the state has undertaken various forms of emergency
intervention are significantly blacker and poorer than other financially troubled districts in
20
We measure this as (FB/General fund revenue)
i
2012
* 100 - (FB/General fund revenue)
i
2009
* 100
21
The tests reported in Table 8 were also conducted for the same set of school districts for 2011. The pattern of
significant and insignificant differences between the intervention and non-intervention groups was unchanged for all
district characteristics.
24
Michigan. The question of whether these districts are also in significantly worse financial shape
yields mixed results depending on the measure of financial status. But by at least two important
measures, the intervention districts were indeed significantly worse off.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Given states’ constitutional obligation to provide education services to all students, it is
appropriate for them to oversee and support local district operations and to intervene when
serious problems arise. In recent years, the State of Michigan has taken over and suspended
traditional democratic governance arrangements in, or dissolved, several predominantly African-
American and poor school districts. Such actions have been implemented only in poor, African-
American districts. Although these districts were not performing well on academic metrics, the
grounds for this emergency intervention under state law are strictly financial. State policy
presumes that local district fiscal distress is caused by local officials’ poor decision-making and
management, and therefore it seeks to shift administrative authority to other parties.
Our findings, however, indicate that state school finance and choice policies significantly
contribute to the financial problems of Michigan’s most hard-pressed districts. Most of the
explained variation in district fund balances is due to changes in districts’ state funding,
enrollment changes including those associated with school choice policies, and special education
students whose required services are inadequately reimbursed by the state.
Michigan participated in one of the most important transformations in American K-12
education over the last half century by shifting most funding responsibility from local districts to
the state government. The conventional wisdom holds that a larger revenue raising role for states
renders funding less stable (since state revenue sources are more cyclically sensitive than local
25
property taxes), but an expansion of the state’s funding role is generally viewed as increasing
school funding equity (Ladd & Hansen, 1999).
After 20 years, Michigan’s centralized funding system is generating outcomes at odds
with standard conceptions of improved equity. Between 1994 and 2002, Proposal A did indeed
narrow (but not eliminate) funding inequities among districts, thus improving horizontal equity.
The system, however, took slight account of local cost variations, especially for high-cost special
needs students, so it fares less well against the standard of vertical equity. Moreover, after rising
steadily for eight years following Proposal A’s passage, total real per-pupil funding has declined
sharply since 2002, increasing fiscal stress in districts statewide as a growing number of districts
fell into deficit.
During this period of statewide fiscal retrenchment, differences in district enrollment
trajectories have generated large variations in revenue growth or decline and fiscal stress.
Michigan’s declining-enrollment districts have faced the greatest fiscal pressures. Our results
show that the state’s school choice policies powerfully exacerbate the financial pressures of
declining-enrollment districts, particularly those with sustained high levels of charter school
penetration. Despite the long-term decline of school-age children in Michigan cities, charter
schools now represent a large and growing parallel system of schools that operate alongside
traditional public schools. With no coordination of the total supply of schools, some urban areas
are characterized by a chaotic excess supply of public schools (Coalition for the Future of Detroit
Schoolchildren, 2015).
While most variation in district fiscal stress is explained by factors largely outside local
decision-makers’ control, local decision-making does matter. Our results indicate several ways
in which local resource allocation decisions (larger class size, lower teacher salaries, lower
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