organisation
and politics, as well as patterns of church–state relations.
It was Max Weber again who, in an essay on sects, suggested that the
egalitarianism of early congregational churches and sects may have played a role
in the origins of liberal democracy, particularly in seventeenth-century America.
Undoubtedly of major importance, however, is the connection between
confessionalisation and state-building, with interesting differences between the
consequences of the English and German Reformations.
These differences lie less in the area of belief stressed in older interpretations
(which emphasise the supposed quietism and passivity of German Lutheranism)
than in differences in political structure and organisation. In England, a national
Reformation served simultaneously to enhance the status of the national
monarchy in a unitary state and to strengthen the position, economically,
culturally, and politically, of the landed estates who benefited from secularised
church wealth and attained powers of church patronage. In the German
territories, the situation varied tremendously from one area to another. In some
states, such as Württemberg, the post-Reformation church to a considerable
degree managed to retain its wealth and power, in contrast to the myth of the
inevitably weak and subservient territorial state church; in other areas, the
church was less fortunate. Only the compilation and synthesis of a large number
of local studies will help to elucidate the different factors involved. It is in any
case clear that there was a close relationship between processes of
confessionalisation and state-building at the territorial level in Germany.
Regional studies such as that of Lippe and Lemgo by Heinz Schilling have
shown variations on, and even complete reversals of, presumed contrasts
between subservient Lutheran state churches and rebellious Calvinist
bourgeoisies. It appears to have been less the
content
of the variant belief system
than the political
form
of appropriate heterodoxy that was important in processes
of self-definition and cultural-political demarcation. Schilling has suggested that
the territorial monopolisation of the church in the German Reformation was both
earlier than, and a precondition for, the later military and tax monopolies stressed
by scholars such as Nobert Elias.
An indubitably valid generalisation that can be made about the German
Reformation is that the one thing it did
not
foster was the cause of a wider
German unity. Notoriously, the Empire itself was politically split, with a
Catholic Emperor having to recognise religious disunity. Confessionalisation
was an important factor in the development of territorial states in early modern
Germany. It played a key role in the political and military conflicts of the century
after 1555, which themselves fostered the growth of armies and bureaucracies.
Religious differences became decreasingly important as political factors in the
kaleidoscope of cross-cutting conflicts involved in the Thirty Years War, and
were effectively removed as a major factor from political conflicts after 1648.
Insofar as religion was a political issue in the later seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, it was generally a case of conflict
within
, rather than
between
, states.
Territorial state-building had by then progressed beyond the initial stage of
socioreligious legitimation.
GERMANY IN THE AGE OF COUNTER-REFORMATION
Catholics were by no means content to accept the status quo of 1555. Following
the Council of Trent (1545–63) a reinvigorated Catholicism sought to win back
ground it had lost. The Society of Jesus, or Jesuits (founded by the Spaniard
Ignatius Loyola) pursued a vigorous campaign in Germany, building up a
network of zealous proselytisers through their schools, seminaries and
universities, as well as at court. The Capuchin order based in Vienna was
similarly vigorous. Both Austria and Bavaria were particularly energetic centres
of the Counter-Reformation, in official attempts to suppress reforming
inclinations among members of the south German and Austrian nobilities.
Meanwhile, Protestantism was far from united, with developing differences in
what has been called the ‘second Reformation’. Calvinism in particular became
more important in the later sixteenth and early seventeeth centuries, starting with
the conversion of the Palatinate and later including the rulers of Brandenburg
and Hesse-Cassel. In Strasbourg, Martin Bucer influenced a distinctive form of
Reformation, while elsewhere there continued to be differences among shades of
Lutheran, Melanchthonian and other persuasions.
In all territories, of whichever religious complexion, the later sixteenth
century saw religion as a vehicle for cultural demarcation from neighbouring
territories, and increased state control of individual conduct. There were
measures to promote public welfare, in such areas as education and care of the
poor, and to instil social discipline, reduce illegitimacy rates, and regulate
relations between the sexes. Church discipline and home visits by members of
the clergy were obviously effective means of social control. Religious
differences also promoted educational initiatives, with a second wave of
university foundations. Ingolstadt, about fifty miles north of the Bavarian capital
of Munich, was an important Jesuit institution. The universities of Marburg
(1529), Königsberg (1544) and others were Protestant foundations; Würzburg,
Salzburg and others were founded in response as Catholic universities. These
institutions trained the secular bureaucrats for developing state administrations,
as well as priests, theologians and other academics. While the Reformation
undoubtedly also promoted the spread of primary schooling, it seems less likely
than earlier supposed that it fostered the spread of mass literacy: rote learning
was generally preferred at this time.
Economy and society were changing in a variety of ways in sixteenth-
century Germany. There was a general expansion of the European economy.
Overseas exploration, and particularly the opening up of the Americas, meant
not only an influx of precious metals (particularly silver) and consequent
inflation, but also a shifting of international economic relationships. There was a
reorientation of European trade towards the Atlantic seaboard, with the rise of
England as a significant naval power and increasing importance for the
kingdoms of Spain and France. A diversification of the European economy
developed, with changing relations between more developed and less developed
areas, shifting locations of centre and periphery. In Germany, some towns on the
Baltic and on internal overland trade routes began to decline in importance.
Many towns in the later sixteenth century began to shrink within their late
mediaeval walls. The declining importance of some towns was partly economic
and partly political in nature. The increased price of grain meant a rising status
for the agrarian nobility at the expense of urban manufacturers and traders. In the
colonial territories of the east, many nobles were able to buy out peasants and
even whole villages, establishing themselves as lords over large estates and
subjugated peasants. The towns were also losing out to territorial princes,
particularly in the western and south-western areas of Germany. After the
international economic, political, cultural and intellectual significance they had
enjoyed in the late middle ages, many German towns entered a period of
provincialism in the later sixteenth century. There were of course notable
exceptions, such as the trading city of Hamburg.
After the mid-sixteenth century, the German population expansion came to
an end. The 1590s were a decade of recession, followed by a general down-turn
in the European economy in the 1610s and 1620s. In late sixteenth-century
Germany, social and political tensions erupted in renewed peasants’ revolts, as
well as social unrest in the towns. In the early seventeenth century there was
general expectation of war in Europe, with a preparatory raising of armies and
building of protective walls and cities. Mannheim was actually constructed as a
fortified princely seat in 1606. In the early seventeenth century a fall in solar
energy was associated with a drop in average temperatures, reduced crop seasons
and reduced agricultural production in what has been termed a ‘little Ice Age’ –
captured well in the icy winter scenery of Brueghel’s paintings. Starvation,
destitution and even infanticide were not uncommon, as well as pogroms against
Jews. Social tensions probably also contributed – whatever other factors were
involved – to the scale and intensity of witchcraft persecutions in the sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries. Women were singled out as the scapegoat for a
range of ills – theft, the failure of the harvest, illness of beasts or humans – as
well as the focus of sexual fantasies and prejudices. Intellectual life combined
the astronomy of Tycho Brahe and Johannes Kepler (both at the Imperial court at
Prague) with belief in alchemy. For all the supposed ‘modernity’ of the
Reformation period there was much that would seem very strange to people of
the twentieth century.
|