Sonderweg
), with
all the teleological and evolutionary assumptions embodied in these views, to
realise that no successful balance was struck between the interests of different
classes in Imperial Germany. But its successor, the Weimar Republic, met with
no greater success. The failure to resolve conflicting social, political and
economic interests in the context of parliamentary democracy paved the way for
a more radical attempt at resolving domestic tensions: the essential abdication of
the old elites, and the handing of power to Hitler and the Nazi party in the hope
that a demagogic mass movement could both incorporate the people and be
manipulated by the elites. Tragically, this last turn in the spiral of mounting
tensions proved the most fatal.
6
Democracy and dictatorship, 1918–45
◈
In November 1918, a parliamentary republic was proclaimed in Germany. The
Weimar Republic, as it came to be known after the town in which its constitution
was developed, was associated with a progressive political system, and a set of
social compromises including a relatively advanced welfare state. Yet it was
born out of turmoil and defeat, under near civil-war conditions; it was hampered
by a harsh peace settlement, and an unstable economy; it was consistently
subjected to attacks from both left and right, as large numbers of Germans
rejected democracy as a form of government; and little over fourteen years after
its inception, the Weimar Republic was ended when Adolf Hitler, as a
constitutionally appointed chancellor, inaugurated one of the worst regimes
known in human history. The disastrous demise of Weimar democracy has cast
an inevitable shadow over interpretations of its course: whatever one may make
of long-term interpretations of German history, it is in the Weimar Republic that
the immediate causation of Hitler’s rise to power has to be sought. Some
accounts tend to suggest Weimar democracy was foredoomed from the start;
others place far greater weight on the mistakes and decisions of individuals in
the closing months in 1932–3, or on the effects of the slump after 1929. Some
historians emphasise the contribution of individuals; others stress the importance
of constraining, structural factors, and the limitations placed on freedom of
manoeuvre and decision-making, particularly in the closing stages. Where to lay
the responsibility for Hitler’s rise to power, given the consequences of the Nazi
regime, will continue to be hotly debated.
While the Republic’s early years were characterised by instability and
strife, there was a period of apparent stabilisation between 1924 and 1928. The
evident weaknesses of the years from 1929 to 1933 were however not purely
contingent, an ‘accidental’ effect of economic depression set off by the Wall
Street crash, but rather were rooted in pre-existing tendencies, weaknesses,
strains and attitudes. Yet this did not necessarily pre-determine the exact course
of events taken in the closing years, nor the specific outcome in the appointment
of Hitler as chancellor. Nor can any one factor alone explain the rise of Nazism.
Simply to invoke Hitler’s oratorical powers, which supposedly seduced an
apolitical German people, is misguided; the story of the development and
collapse of Weimar democracy is a highly complex one, with a multiplicity of
factors interacting under very specific historical circumstances to produce the
final outcome. In a sense, this very complexity – while making the story more
difficult to grasp – is a blessing. For in response to the frequently heard question
of ‘whether it could ever happen again’, the answer must be that it is highly
unlikely that such a unique combination of a range of different factors under
particular circumstances could ever occur in precisely that mixture again.
Whenever, for example, extreme right-wing and racialist movements have arisen
in post-war Germany, they have arisen under quite different conditions and with
quite different implications.
THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC: ORIGINS AND EARLY YEARS
It was clear in the summer of 1918, even to the most ardent militarists and
nationalists, that Germany had lost the war. The attempted deflection of social
tensions at home into imperialist adventures abroad had failed; and defeated
Germany was to face an exacerbation, rather than resolution, of the social
tensions which had fed into the origins of the war. During the war previous
tendencies towards the concentration of capital had increased, with large cartels
monopolising prices and markets and squeezing out small businesses and small
traders: the lower middle classes were more threatened than before, the large
capitalists stronger. Yet at the same time the strength of the organised working
class had also increased. In the desire to avoid strikes and disruption of
production in the economic mobilisation for total war, industry and government
had made concessions to organised labour, with improvements in working
conditions and the recognition of unions as legitimate representatives of labour.
There had also been a certain politicisation of sections of the population, as
women and young people were brought into areas of the labour force from
which they had formerly been excluded, with a war-time labour shortage.
Psychologically, people’s horizons and perceptions had been changed by war-
time experiences in a variety of ways, whether through shell-shock and
disorientation, with difficulties in adapting to and reentering civilian life, or
whether through increased dependence on, and expectations of, the state, by
virtue of state pensions or allowances.
There was increasing domestic unrest in Germany towards the end of the
war. It was evident that things would have to change – not only because of
American President Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’ indicating that domestic reforms
in Germany would be necessary for negotiating a modified peace treaty, but also
because of pressures from below – and because of the desire of the army to
evade responsibility for a ‘dishonourable’ peace. By the end of September it
appeared opportune to army leaders to hand over power to a civilian government
which could then take the opprobrium of accepting defeat; the reforms of
October were not simply a ‘revolution from above’, in that parliamentary parties
had for some time, with lesser or greater degrees of energy, been pushing for
reforms. In October 1918, Prince Max von Baden became chancellor, and
constitutional reforms were introduced. These included reform of the suffrage
(including abolition of the Prussian three-class voting system), ministerial
responsibility to parliament, and the control of the armed forces by the civilian
government and not the monarchy. In effect, Emperor William II consented to
what amounted to a constitutional monarchy; but the one thing he refused to do –
and which might have saved the monarchy as an institution – was to abdicate in
favour of one of his sons. However, these reforms – which were intended largely
as a holding operation pending a return to authoritarian government – were to be
overtaken by more radical developments.
At the end of October, navy leaders ordered a last – suicidal – attack on the
British to redeem German honour, and on 28 October the Wilhelmshaven fleet
was ordered out. Not surprisingly, a majority of sailors decided that in this hour
of German defeat they would rather salvage their own lives than German honour,
and they mutinied. On 3 November, demonstrations in Kiel sparked off a more
general mutiny. In the first days of November all over Germany, from the north
right down to Kurt Eisner’s socialist government in Bavaria, there were
revolutionary upheavals, and the setting up of ‘councils’ of soldiers, sailors and
workers to replace existing local government. Berlin, too, was a centre of unrest,
with shop stewards and members of the USPD debating whether there should be
an armed uprising, a notion which was opposed by moderates in the SPD. By 9
November, it was clear that the emperor must abdicate. Prince Max von Baden’s
government resigned and William II – who had already fled Berlin – left
Germany for Holland.
In this revolutionary situation, with the collapse of government under
pressure of military defeat, in an industrialised state with a large, politically
organised working class, conditions were surely ripe for a classic Marxist
revolution. Yet, in contradiction to Marxist theory, it was in relatively backward
Tsarist Russia in 1917 that a communist revolution succeeded, whereas what
developed in Germany in 1918–19 was a series of fudges and compromises,
satisfying neither left nor right, and embodying a set of legacies that were to
prove liabilities for Germany’s first attempt at democracy. These compromises
were already symbolised in arrangements made in the first few days after 9
November. While apparently stabilising in the short term, they tended to paper
over, rather than resolve, tensions which erupted all the more powerfully in the
longer run. Furthermore, the so-called revolution of 1918 in effect amounted to
little more than a political and constitutional revolution, from Empire to
Republic, but it – crucially – failed to effect radical changes in the
socioeconomic structure of Germany, nor did it reform key elites. Army,
bureaucracy, judiciary, educational and religious establishments, retained their
positions of power and influence – and used them to speak and act in the main
against the new Republic.
On 9 November, Prince Max von Baden handed over power, in an act of
apparent legitimacy and continuity, to SPD leader Friedrich Ebert as ‘Imperial
chancellor’. Given the revolutionary tumults in Berlin and rumours of more
radical action, Ebert’s colleague Scheidemann proclaimed a Republic. This
Republic, the exact form of which was by no means clear as yet, faced very
immediate problems and tasks: demobilising soldiers, signing an armistice,
dealing with revolts and uprisings all over Germany, rebuilding the economy and
ensuring an adequate food supply, and – in the context of all these disruptions –
devising an acceptable new constitution for post-Imperial Germany. It was by no
means an easy set of tasks, and retrospectively, historians have had little
difficulty in identifying failures of nerve or vision on the part of those in a
position to affect Germany’s future.
Two very crucial compromises were reached almost immediately. In the
infamous ‘Ebert–Groener pact’, General Groener offered Ebert the support of the
army if Ebert would adopt a moderate course and suppress the more radical
council movements (Groener boasting that this successfully averted the threat of
Bolshevik revolution in Germany); and as time went by, Ebert came more and
more to rely on the powers of the military to suppress uprisings by force, rather
than exploring and responding to the causes of social unrest. Secondly, in the so-
called ‘Stinnes–Legien agreement’, the leader of the labour unions, Carl Legien,
and the industrialist Hugo Stinnes concluded a bargain which consolidated the
position of organised labour, including the introduction of an eight-hour day, and
an employers’ agreement to stop supporting ‘yellow unions’ (or house unions, an
employer’s stooge). The initial government itself was a compromise, with a
‘Council of People’s Representatives’ set up on 10 November consisting of three
SPD and three USPD members. While this was subsequently given some
legitimacy through confirmation by Berlin council delegates, a congress of
council delegates from all over Germany in December saw the first serious splits
between moderate and radical socialists. While the majority of the five hundred
delegates supported the SPD and Ebert’s plans for elections to a National
Constituent Assembly which would draft a new constitution for Germany, a
minority supported the more radical views of the USPD, who criticised Ebert’s
‘government by procrastination’ which refused to undertake socioeconomic
reform before constitutional change, or to reform the army. Ebert’s defence was
that there was little point in ‘nationalising bankruptcy’, and that good relations
with the army were essential for orderly demobilisation and reconstruction, both
points which were queried at the time as well as later. In the event, the USPD
finally broke with the SPD, leaving an all-SPD cabinet; and at the end of
December 1918 the left-wing ‘Spartacist’ group, which like the USPD had
increasing differences with the SPD, formed themselves into the new
Communist Party of Germany, the KPD.
Unrest had by no means simply been quelled by the proclamation of a
Republic. Renewed uprisings in Berlin in January 1919 were suppressed by
army and Free Corps units (volunteer groups financed by industry and organised
by the army), in the course of which radical leaders Rosa Luxemburg and Karl
Liebknecht were murdered. This provoked bitter hostility and resentment among
left-wing critics of the SPD. The split between moderate and radical socialists
was to survive until the collapse of Weimar democracy, when communists
viewed Social Democrats as a greater evil even than Nazis. All over Germany in
the first half of 1919 it appeared as if the Social Democrats were relying on the
forces of the old order to suppress initiatives in favour of the new. In Bavaria,
after Kurt Eisner’s assassination, a second attempt at revolution, with the
proclamation of a Soviet republic in Munich in April 1919, was brutally
suppressed by Free Corps units in May, with over one thousand deaths. Political
violence of all shades was rife, as demobilised soldiers failed to find new roles in
civilian life and sought to continue the comradeship of the trenches in
paramilitary groups, while right-wingers and left-wingers attempted to effect
immediate influence on an uncertain course of political events. Others simply
observed, bewildered and hoping for some form of stabilisation. Meanwhile, the
process of devising a new constitution was underway. Elections on 19 January
1919 – in the wake of the Spartacist uprising in Berlin – gave the SPD only 38
per cent of the vote, necessitating a coalition government. On 6 February the
National Constituent Assembly opened in Weimar. On 11 February Ebert was
elected President, and on 13 February a cabinet under Scheidemann was formed
from the ‘Weimar coalition’ parties of SPD, Catholic Centre, and the liberal DDP
(German Democratic Party).
|