Plate 31.
The Kapp Putsch. Soldiers march into Berlin, March 1920.
In the early summer of 1919 the harsh terms of the Versailles peace treaty
were revealed. Scheidemann’s cabinet resigned and was succeeded by the Bauer
cabinet, which sent a delegation to sign the Versailles Treaty on 28 June.
Germany was to lose large areas of land: Alsace-Lorraine was to be returned to
France, West Prussia, Upper Silesia and Posen were to go to the newly
reconstructed Poland, Danzig was to become a free city under League of Nations
supervision, with the ‘Polish Corridor’ separating East Prussia from the rest of
Germany. Germany was deprived of colonies, and any union of Germany and
Austria was forbidden. The army was limited to 100,000 men, and the left bank
of the Rhine was to be demilitarised under Allied supervision, with Allied
occupation to be phased out over a period of time. In the notorious ‘war guilt
clause’ Germany was burdened with responsibility for the war. Reparations were
as yet to be determined; when they were finally announced in the Paris
conference of January 1921, they were to provoke as much indignation as the
other provisions of the Versailles Treaty.
Undoubtedly it was a harsh set of peace terms, and the contrast with the
settlement in the aftermath of the Second World War was, as we shall see, very
marked. But even more was made of the Versailles Treaty by its critics than
realities warranted. Already in August 1918 the myth of the ‘stab in the back’
had been propagated, asserting that domestic enemies (such as Jews and
socialists) had brought down an army which was undefeated abroad but betrayed
from within. This myth was inflated in the autumn of 1919 to become common
currency in circles opposing the Republic. The years from 1919 to 1923 saw a
series of attacks on the Republic and attempted putsches on the right, as well as
continued strikes and revolutionary movements on the left, in the context of
mounting economic problems. While right-wing extremists were generally
treated leniently by a highly conservative judiciary, left-wingers were subjected
to harsh sentences, including disproportionate use of the death penalty. In March
1920, Kapp and Lüttwitz organised a march of Free Corps units on Berlin, and
Ebert’s government was forced to flee to Stuttgart, since the army, under General
von Seeckt, refused to fight the Free Corps soldiers. Nevertheless, at this time a
general strike was sufficient to defeat the Kapp putsch. A more limited rightist
coup brought to power a right-wing government, under Kahr, in Bavaria. In 1921
and again in 1923 communists unsuccessfully attempted insurrection in Saxony.
There were also continued strikes, particularly in the Ruhr, in 1919 and 1920.
Largely spontaneous demands for ‘nationalisation’ of the mines were not part of
a coherent political programme, but rather for immediate economic
improvements: control over improved working conditions and better wages.
While the KPD and the USPD did not initiate these protests, they attempted to
gain control of them; misjudging the mood of grass-roots workers, in the main
they failed. More crucially, the SPD miscalculated badly, and, fearing what they
now viewed as a ‘Bolshevist threat’ to the new Republic, overreacted and instead
of responding to the causes of distress attempted to suppress the symptoms by
force. While the regular army had been unwilling to fight against insurgent Free
Corps units in the Kapp putsch, it was only too willing to cooperate with these
against the ‘Red Army’ in the Ruhr and Rhine areas. Under the leadership of von
Seeckt, the Army was effectively sustaining the pre-republican, Prussian
tradition of being a ‘state within a state’. This ‘apolitical’ stance, refusing to
support the Republic since to do so would be ‘political’, later proved no barrier
to markedly political actions serving to undermine the Republic. Meanwhile,
splits among the left-wing parties continued. Some regrouping took place with
the disbanding of the USPD in 1922 and the reabsorption of its leaders and some
of its members into the SPD while most of the grass-roots joined the KPD. But
the fundamental gulf between the SPD and KPD – with theoretical roots
reaching back to pre-war debates, exacerbated by strategic differences, and
inflamed by the bitterness arising from Liebknecht’s and Luxemburg’s deaths –
became essentially unbridgeable.
In the Reichstag elections of June 1920, the ‘Weimar coalition’ parties –
SPD, Centre and DDP – lost votes and there was a swing to the extremes of both
right and left. (The KPD had not contested the 1919 election.) National politics
were particularly complicated by mounting economic and political difficulties
connected with the reparations question. When the extremely high level of
reparations was finally revealed, there was consternation about how an already
weak German economy could deal with repayments. Germany’s economic
problems were partly rooted in methods of financing the war – through loans and
bonds rather than the raising of taxes – and the roots of inflation were already
present before the reparations question exacerbated matters. Inflation was,
however, wildly fuelled by the so-called ‘policy of fulfilment’ pursued by
Wirth’s government in 1921–2 – a policy attacked in many quarters as
capitulation to the demands of the victorious powers, but in fact designed to
show that Germany could not fulfil reparations payments. As one commentator
has put it, Germany’s currency difficulties were presented as reparations
payments difficulties. Meanwhile, France under Poincaré was pursuing
revisionist policies of its own, aiming to gain control of the left bank of the
Rhine. Crises reached a peak under the Cuno government of November 1922–
August 1923 (in which the SPD refused to participate, opposing the inclusion of
the right-wing DVP, the German People’s Party). The French used the shortfall
in German wood and coal deliveries as a pretext for ‘supervising’ production in
the Ruhr area, backed up by ‘protective’ armed forces (including Belgian troops)
which marched into the Ruhr area in January 1923 and by the summer months
had reached a total of 100,000 troops –equivalent to the total permitted strength
of the German Army. The Germans responded by an official policy of passive
resistance, refusing to co-operate with the French occupation and also ceasing
economic production – which hurt the German economy more than the French.
The only apparent solution for Germany was the printing of paper money, which
sent the already existing inflation spiralling totally out of control. By August
1923, bank notes were being simply stamped over to increase their value by
thousands; payments were being made by the waggon-load, and money became
effectively worthless. Millions of people found themselves in severe difficulties
or financial ruin, particularly those on fixed incomes (such as pensions) and
many of the self-employed and lower middle classes. A few large industrialists
were able to make profits. The general outcome was a widespread total loss of
confidence in the Republic, fear and panic, and a wave of strikes and riots. The
experience of 1923 left an imprint with reverberations carrying right on well into
post-war West German history.
The situation was finally brought under control by the Stresemann
government of August–November 1923. A combination of currency reform,
introducing the Rentenmark, and termination of passive resistance in the Ruhr,
dealt with the immediate economic crises and led to a reconsideration of the
reparations question. Leftwing putsch attempts (mainly communist in
inspiration) in Saxony, Thuringia and Hamburg were firmly put down.
Meanwhile, in the right-wing haven of Bavaria a complex set of plans were
being laid by a group of nationalists, including army officers, as well as one
Adolf Hitler, leader of the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers’ Party),
one of many small nationalist
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