Zentral-Arbeits-Gemeinschaft
(Central Work Community,
ZAG), with a strategy of partnership between unions and employers, and state
intervention as arbitrator if necessary. In 1920 the Works Council Act laid the
foundation of the German tradition of co-determination, and in the later 1920s
there were discussions of economic democracy. In the period of stabilisation
after 1924, there were extensions of social policy, including social housing
construction and the 1927 Law on Unemployment Insurance. Yet it was not
entirely a simple history of progress in industrial relations and social policy. In
the crisis year of 1923 employers dropped certain agreements, including the
eight-hour day; and the failure of the ZAG led to the official resignation of the
main German trade union body, the ADGB, in January 1924. From 1923
onwards, unions began to lose members, funds, power and credibility. Weak and
essentially defensive unions had repeatedly to rely on state intervention to coerce
employers on disputed issues. Yet employers, feeling equally defensive, from
1923 onwards mounted an attack on the Weimar system which sustained this
compromise, which was ultimately to prove an overwhelming attack on the
Republic itself. In the Ruhr iron strike of 1928, the intention of industrialists to
get rid of an interventionist social state became explicit. Moreover, even in these
‘good years’ of the Republic, its economic foundations were fragile. The German
economy was to a considerable degree reliant on short-term loans and
investment from America; if the latter’s economy were to falter, Germany’s
would fall too.
Nor, despite the apparent stabilisation of the Weimar Republic from 1924,
had many people become genuinely committed to the new political form. The
election of an ageing nationalist military hero, Field-Marshal Hindenburg, as the
new President to replace Friedrich Ebert after his premature death in 1925 was
indicative of widespread yearnings for the old days of Imperial Germany. From
1925–6 onwards, in conjunction with General Kurt von Schleicher (de facto
leader of the army from 1926), Hindenburg was positively considering plans for
the development of a right-wing, authoritarian form of government excluding
parliamentary and social-democratic influence. Moreover, there were continuing
difficulties with party government. The system of proportional representation
and a multiplicity of small parties meant that no single party was able to attain
an overall majority; but the radically diverging views of the main parties led to
great difficulty in forming viable coalition governments. While agreements
could be reached on domestic policies between the Catholic Centre party, the
liberal DVP and the conservative DNVP, they could not agree on foreign policy;
but conversely, while a ‘grand coalition’ from the SPD through the Centre to the
DVP (but excluding the DNVP) could agree on foreign policy, they could not
agree on domestic issues. The only alternative was to have a minority cabinet,
necessitating toleration, if not support, from either left or right. In these
circumstances, with a rapid succession of cabinets and frequent interventions by
the President, party politics and parliamentary government lost what little
credibility they had ever been able to muster among large sections of the German
people.
It is debatable whether, given the difficult circumstances of its birth, the
harsh legacies of the early years, and the fragility of its social and political
foundations, the Weimar Republic could have survived in the long term under
favourable conditions. In the event, from 1929 onwards Weimar democracy was
subjected to a series of onslaughts in a set of circumstances from which it could
not hope to survive unscathed. From 1930 onwards, the question increasingly
narrowed to that of what particular form the collapse of democracy would take.
THE COLLAPSE OF WEIMAR DEMOCRACY
Even before the Wall Street Crash of October 1929, there were plans afoot to
dismantle parliamentary democracy in Weimar Germany. But the way in which
the collapse of democracy took place was highly affected by the economic crises
unleashed by world recession, which had particularly harsh reverberations in
Germany. Following the relative success of the SPD in the 1928 elections, a
‘grand coalition’ under SPD chancellor Hermann Müller had been formed. This
survived initial splits in the SPD over money for a battleship as well as wider
crises over adoption of the Young Plan. But the Wall Street Crash had peculiarly
serious implications, given the dependence of the German economy on short-
term loans from abroad which were rapidly withdrawn. Unemployment rose
rapidly, from 1.3 million in September 1929 to over 3 million by September
1930, reaching over 6 million – one in three of the working population – by the
beginning of 1933. With official under-estimation of the true figure, as well as
widespread short-time working, perhaps half the families in Germany were
affected by the slump; and many more experienced fear of financial catastrophe,
verging on panic. These circumstances had a variety of implications. They
directly led to the downfall of Müller’s government, which became deadlocked
over the question of what to do about unemployment insurance in a situation
where rising numbers out of work could no longer be supported by declining
numbers in work at the levels agreed in 1927. No compromise could be reached
between alternative schemes, with unions, employers, and members of the
different parties all having very different positions on the matter, characterised
by varying degrees of intransigence. In March 1930 the attempt to ensure that
government had party-political support in parliament was abandoned: the first
presidential cabinet was appointed, to rule without serious regard for democracy.
The Brüning cabinet of 1930 had already been planned for in 1929 as part of
a strategy to remove power from parliament and restore it to the old elites –
army, bureaucracy, and economic elites – under a presidential, authoritarian
regime. After 1930 increasing use was made of Article 48 to promulgate
emergency decrees, while parliamentary sittings and parliamentary legislation
decreased. Brüning pursued deflationary policies, combined with a policy of
fulfilling reparations payments, consciously exacerbating the deterioration of
Germany’s financial and employment situation with the aim of achieving a
fundamental revision of the reparations question. This he did indeed achieve – at
the expense of the suffering of millions of Germans – with the Hoover
Moratorium ultimately leading to the end of reparations in 1932. But in the
meantime fundamental upheavals were occurring in an already highly labile
domestic political situation. In the years from 1930 to 1933 two factors
coincided, which in conjunction doomed Weimar democracy: the attacks on
parliamentary government by the old elites, which in essence had predated the
economic crisis, coincided with the rise of a new mass movement mobilising, in
periods of crisis, a large proportion of the population seduced by the appeals of a
charismatic leader figure, Adolf Hitler.
Hitler had emerged from his period of detention to refound the NSDAP in
1925. During the later 1920s and 1930s the party sought to widen its appeal,
from its early Bavarian base, across the different regions of Germany and across
a range of social groups. While its predominant social basis remained among
petty middle-class, Protestant, rural and small-town voters, particularly in
northern and eastern Germany, it was able to gain support also among educated,
upper middle-class and professional groups, as well as, to a more limited degree,
among some sections of the less well-organised working class. (Although
percentages were small, given the size of the working class overall numbers of
working-class Nazi supporters were not inconsiderable.) In the 1928 elections,
the NSDAP achieved only 2.6 per cent of the vote, giving them twelve
parliamentary seats. The campaign against the Young Plan in 1929, in which the
NSDAP cooperated with the DNVP under the right-wing press baron
Hugenberg, gave the Nazis tremendous free publicity as well as an aura of
respectability by virtue of their association with right-wing establishment
nationalists. The electoral breakthrough for the NSDAP came with the elections
of September 1930, in which the NSDAP became the second largest party in the
Reichstag (after the SPD) with 107 deputies. With the collapse of the parties of
the ‘bourgeois middle’, and the rise in votes for extremist parties – the KPD
increased its mandate to seventy-seven seats – there was no basis for a
parliamentary majority in support of any viable coalition cabinet. The SPD,
however, fearful of the likely consequences of further elections, chose to
‘tolerate’ the Brüning presidential cabinet. And, although the financial support of
business circles was negligible as a factor in the NSDAP’s success before 1930,
and was not even very important thereafter, industrialists began to perceive the
NSDAP as important in the destruction of the parliamentary system and were to
become influential, particularly in 1932–3, in persuading Hindenburg that Hitler
could be of some use in this project.
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