Plate 28.
The latest in ladies’ bicycling fashion, as illustrated in the popular middle-class magazine,
Die
Gartenlaube.
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE F IRST WORLD WAR
Undoubtedly the fact most influencing interpretations of Wilhelmine Germany is
that it culminated in, and collapsed as a result of, the First World War. Debates
over the causes of this war are as old as the war itself. The Versailles Treaty of
1919 laid primary responsibility on Germany in the infamous ‘war guilt’ clause.
While the following decades witnessed a wide-ranging search for the origins of
the war in pre-war diplomatic relations among the great powers, a rather
different approach was already being expressed in 1928 in an essay by Eckart
Kehr on the ‘primacy of domestic politics’ in the determination of foreign policy.
This sort of approach was resurrected, in rather different ways, in the 1960s, first
as a result of the reopening of the concept of Germany’s war guilt in a
controversial book by Fritz Fischer, and subsequently in the reinterpretations of
domestic politics in Imperial Germany undertaken by scholars such as Hans-
Ulrich Wehler and Volker Berghahn. Most historians would now probably agree
with the verdict of James Joll, that no one factor is alone sufficient in
explanation: an adequate approach must take account of both long-term and
short-range factors, and encompass domestic social and political tensions,
cultural orientations and preconceptions, in addition to international
circumstances, shifting alliances and clashes of foreign policy interest among the
great powers.
A number of elements are important when considering the general context.
First, there is the shift in German foreign policy after Bismarck. There were
debates among proponents of different views, ranging from notions of a strong
middle European position of domination to more ambitious aspirations to world
power status. In the 1890s and 1900s, the latter view gained ground. Imperialism
entailed not only political but also economic considerations: a rapidly
industrialising power needed markets for manufactured goods, and sources of
cheap raw materials, and in this connection also needed to be able to compete
with Britain. There were also cultural considerations, as in the view propounded
by Weber, in his Freiburg inaugural lecture of 1895, that German culture had to
be protected by a powerful nation state on the world stage. Imperialism became a
cultural given, particularly in connection with the navy construction programme.
Secondly, there was the formation of alliances. The ‘Triple Alliance’ between
Germany, Austria and Italy had already been developing in Bismarck’s time
(with Germany signing an alliance with Austria in 1879 and being joined by
Italy in 1882). The ‘Triple Entente’ between France, Russia and Britain
developed more slowly. Between 1891 and 1894 France and Russia developed
an understanding; from 1904, Britain began to align with this (agreements with
France in 1904 and Russia in 1907) after settlement of differences with France in
Egypt, Morocco and the Far East, and with the increasingly apparent weakness
of Tsarist Russia after defeat by Japan in 1904–5 and the revolution of 1905.
These alliances were not clearly fixed, and each country tended to act in its own
interests over particular issues. In 1908–9, for example, Russia failed to get
French and British support in its protests against Austrian annexation of the
provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But the alignment of Britain, France and
Russia provoked in Germany a ‘fear of encirclement’: a fear that Germany was
surrounded by hostile forces, which made the special relationship with Austria
even more important for Germany.
The development of alliances was related to a third factor of importance: an
arms race. There was a general sense that war was looming, and all European
states began a race to be ready for war when it came. Typical of this was German
navy-building; but Russia was equally busy building railways as a rapid means
of troop transport, in addition to manufacturing arms, as were other European
powers. This not only provoked a sense of inevitability about war, but also
influenced strategic thinking about the timing of its outbreak, especially in
Germany. A key role has, for example, been given in some accounts to an
informal war council of 8 December 1912 (at which the chancellor, Bethmann
Hollweg, was not present). The German emperor professed himself to be in
favour of war ‘the sooner the better’, supported by General Moltke, while Tirpitz
argued that the navy could not be ready for at least eighteen months.
It should be noted in this connection that the German chancellor, Bethmann
Hollweg, was generally moderate in his desire to consolidate Germany’s
European position by peaceful means; but his government was without popular
support, given the stalemate in the Reichstag. Great pressure was being exerted
by such groups as the Pan-German League and the Central League of German
Industrialists (
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