Kristallnacht
) of November 1938 in which Jewish synagogues,
homes and premises were attacked, burned, and looted and a number of Jews
were killed. These measures were in the main initiated by Nazi activists or in
response to pressures for action on the part of party radicals. Public displays of
brutality commanded little general popular support among Germans. But there
was much approval of the aim of ‘removing’ Jews from German society, and the
‘aryanisation’ of Jewish property (including housing) pleased the beneficiaries.
The ‘legalisation’ of the pariah status of Jews in the Nuremberg Laws was
applauded, while the destruction of property and creation of mess in the
Kristallnacht
was not. While it was quite clear that Jews were ‘not wanted’
(
unerwünscht
) in the new Germany of the Thousand-Year Reich, and were to be
excluded from Germany’s glorious future, it was by no means clear in the
peacetime years that the ‘final solution’ to the ‘Jewish question’ which the Nazis
had constructed would ultimately be a policy of mass murder.
There were two areas of policy in which Hitler had quite definite goals:
racial policy, and foreign policy. Hitler wanted to make Germany into a ‘pure’
racial community; and he wanted to expand German ‘living-space’ (
Lebensraum
), achieving first European and then world mastery. Ultimately all else had to be
subordinated to these ends. We must now turn to the radicalisation of the regime
in foreign policy, war and genocide.
FOREIGN POLICY AND WAR
As early as the 1920s, in
Mein Kampf
and the (then unpublished) ‘Second
Book’, Hitler had laid down a programme for his foreign policy. This
programme consisted in revising the Treaty of Versailles, incorporating Austria
and transforming Czechoslovakia and Poland into satellite states, confronting
France before turning to conquer Russia, and finally achieving world
domination, perhaps with Britain as some sort of junior partner which Germany
would help to protect. Evidently at least the first stages of this programme
commanded broad sympathy among conservative nationalist circles in Germany.
Indeed, after 1930 a shift in foreign policy under Brüning’s government away
from Stresemann’s more careful conciliation had been evident. A new, more
confrontationist style went along with moves away from multilateral agreements
towards a system of bilateral political and economic arrangements designed to
extend Germany’s influence in south-eastern and eastern Europe. When Hitler
came to power in 1933, there were certain continuities with these trends,
although the pace quickened and the ultimate aims were rather more ambitious.
Nevertheless the compromise with the old elites which had brought Hitler to
power was sustained, with some tensions and frictions, until the winter of 1937–
8.
Hitler’s general strategy in the 1930s was to achieve as much as possible by
diplomatic means while energetically pursuing policies of rearmament.
Rearmament had been secretly pursued, and different means of expanding the
army canvassed, since the later 1920s. Hitler made his intentions explicit in
speeches to the generals and to his cabinet within ten days of coming to power.
Initially, rearmament was disguised, as with the issue of so-called ‘Mefo Bills’ in
1933, and in Krupp’s euphemistically named ‘agricultural tractor programme’
which produced tanks from July 1933. By 1934 explosives, ships and aircraft
were in production – all against the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, but
approved by the army. In March 1935 the existence of a German air force and of
general rearmament, as well as the introduction of conscription, were finally
announced to the outside world. In the meantime, Hitler had pursued individual
agreements with particular countries in place of collective arrangements. He
broke off German participation in the Geneva Disarmament Conference, and
withdrew Germany from the League of Nations, in October 1933. In January
1934 he concluded a ten-year non-aggression pact with Poland (against the
advice of the Foreign Ministry). In March 1935 the Saarland returned to
Germany after a plebiscite in January. German rearmament was censured by the
‘Stresa Front’ of Britain, France and Italy, and by the League of Nations, in April
1935; but Britain and Germany were able to achieve a certain understanding in
the Naval Agreement of June 1935, by which Germany was to increase her navy
to one-third the strength of the British navy. Although there were tensions
between Italy and Germany over Austria (after an attempted coup by Austrian
Nazis in 1934, in which Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered), Hitler was
concerned to improve relations. He admired the Fascist leader Mussolini, and for
a while trod carefully in connection with the Austrian question. In any event, the
Stresa Front itself was less than solid. The preoccupation of Britain and France
with the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935, as well as the mounting
pressure of popular discontent in a worsening economic situation at home,
presented Hitler with the opportunity and impetus for his first really risky step in
foreign policy. In March 1936 German troops remilitarised the Rhineland. This,
despite the relatively limited numbers of German troops, was achieved
successfully, to much popular acclaim at home and little serious criticism abroad.
Germany was, after all, only ‘entering her own back yard’.
In 1936, Hitler announced that Germany must be ready for war within four
years, and a ‘Four-Year Plan’ under Goering was launched. This marked a break
with the previously relatively orthodox management of the economy under the
former President of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht, who subsequently
resigned as Minister of Economics in November 1937 because of conflicts
between his ministry and Goering’s Four-Year-Plan Office. Rearmament was to
be vigorously pursued, but not at the expense of the living standards of
consumers at home; Hitler had a perpetual eye on public opinion in general and
his own popularity in particular. Shifts occurring on the foreign policy front also
contributed to a loosening of ties between Hitler and his conservative nationalist
allies. The Spanish Civil War, which broke out in July 1936, helped to bring
Italy and Germany closer together (in their support of Franco) in the ‘Rome–
Berlin axis’. Ribbentrop, who for some time had been effectively running a Nazi
diplomatic service in rivalry with the Foreign Ministry, and who in 1936 became
Germany’s Ambassador to Britain, failed to secure a British alliance with
Germany. In the course of 1937, it became clear to Hitler that he would have to
drop his plans for alliance with Britain, and strengthen his connections with
Italy. In 1938, under Ribbentrop’s influence, Japan became the third member of
the ‘Axis’. It also became increasingly clear that Germany would not be able to
sustain a protracted rearmaments race, and would have to go to war sooner rather
than later.
In the winter of 1937–8 these developments reached the point where a split
between Hitler and certain old conservatives was inevitable. A meeting in
November 1937 with leaders of the army, navy, air force, as well as the Foreign
Minister and the War Minister, which was reported in a memorandum by Hitler’s
military adjutant Colonel Hossbach, was the occasion for a lengthy harangue by
Hitler on at least some of his plans for achieving German
Dostları ilə paylaş: |