sometimes heard M. du Marsais reproached for being a little prolix; and I realize that it is
possible, for example, to give fewer ex-amples of metaphor, and to develop them less
extensively; but who has no wish at all for such a happy prolixity? The author of a dictionary
of language cannot read this article
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on the metaphor without being struck by the astonishing exactitude of our grammarian in
distinguishing the proper meaning from a figurative one, and in assigning to one the
foundation of the other.”
6.On this point, Rousseau’s doctrine is most Cartesian. It is itself interpreted as a justification
of Nature. The senses, which are natural, never deceive us. On the contrary, it is our judgment
that misleads us and plays Nature false. “Nature never deceives us; we deceive ourselves”—a
passage from Emile (p. 237) [p. 166] which the autograph manu-script replaces with the
following: “I say it is impossible for our senses to deceive us because it is always true that we
feel what we feel.” The Epicureans are praised for having recognized this but criticized for
having maintained that “the judgments that we made about our sensations were never false.”
“We sense our sensations, but we do not sense our judgments.”
7.Here again we are reminded of a Viconean text: “The poetic characters, in which the
essence of the fables consists, were born of the need of a nature incapable of abstracting forms
and properties from subjects. Consequently they must have been the manner of thinking of
entire peoples, who had been placed under this natural necessity in the times of their greatest
barbarism. It is an eternal property of the fables always to magnify the ideas of particulars. On
this there is a, fine passage in Aristotle’s Ethics in which he remarks that men of limited ideas
erect every particular into a maxim. The reason must be that the human mind, which is
indefinite, being constricted by the vigor of the senses, cannot otherwise express its almost
divine nature than by thus magnifying particulars in imagination. It is perhaps on this account
that in both the Greek and the Latin poets the images of gods and heroes always appear larger
than those of men, and that in the returned barbarian times the paintings particularly of the
Eternal Father, of Jesus Christ and of the Virgin Mary are exceedingly large” (Scienza Nuova,
3, II: 18, tr. Chaix-Ruy)
[p. 279].
8.II.I, pp. 111–12 [pp. 168, 171]. This is also Warburton’s procedure in the remarkable
paragraphs that he devotes to the “Origin and Progress of Language” (I: 48 f.) [pp. 81 f.].
Thus: “In judging only from the nature of things, and without the surer aid of revelation, one
should be apt to embrace the opinion of Diodorus Siculus (lib.ii) and Vitruvius (lib.ii, cap.I)
that the first men lived for some time in woods and caves, after the manner of beasts, uttering
only confused and indistinct sounds, till, associating for mutual assistance, they came, by
degrees, to use such as were articulate, for the arbitrary signs or marks, mutually agreed on, of
those ideas in the mind of the speaker, which he wanted to communicate to others. Hence the
diversity of languages; for it is agreed on all hands that speech is not innate.” And yet,
“nothing being more evident from scrip-ture, than that language had a different original. God,
we there find, taught the first man religion; and can we think he would not, at the same time,
teach him language?” [Condillac, p. 170].
9.II.I. 2, 3, p. 113 [pp. 172–73]. We have italicized only “frightened” and “mimicked.” The
same examples are reconsidered in the chapter on “The Origin of Poetry:” “For example, in
the mode of speaking by action, to give an idea of a person that had been frightened, they had
no other way than to mimic the cries and natural signs of fear” (S 66, p. 148) [pp. 227–28].
10. “Every object at first received a particular name without regard to genus or species, which
these primitive originators were not in a position to distinguish; . . . so that, the ,narrower the
limits of their knowledge of things, the more copious their dictionary must have been. . . . Add
to this, that general ideas cannot be introduced into the mind without the assistance of words,
nor can the understanding seize them except by means of propositions. This is one of the
reasons why animals cannot form such ideas or ever acquire that capacity for self-
improvement [perfectibilité] which depends on them. . . . We must then make use of [ . . .]
language [parler] in order to form general ideas. For no sooner does the imagination cease to
operate than the understanding proceeds only by the help of words. If then the first inventors
of speech could give names only to ideas they already had, it follows that the first substantives
could be nothing more than proper names” (pp. 149-50. See also the editor’s notes) [pp. 177-
78].
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11. “The present of the infinitive” (edition of 1782) .
12.Vol. I, p. 1174.
13.See Chapter 13 (“On Script”) and especially S 134 of the Essay.
14.II, I, Chap. 13 [pp. 273-74]. See the corresponding pages in Warburton (I: 5) [p. 67] which
take into account what Condillac does not—the “mutual influences” which speech and writing
exercise upon each other. “To explain this mutual Influence in the Manner it deserves, would
require a just Volume” (p. 202) [Warburton, p. 150]. (On the impossibility of a purely
figurative script, cf. Duclos op. cit., p. 421.)
15.H. Gouhier broaches it systematically and in depth (Nature et Histoire dans la pensée de
lean-Jacques Rousseau. Annales J.-J. Rousseau, vol. 33 [1953–55])—To the question of the
Judaeo-Christian model he replies—“Yes and no.” (p. 30).
16.As for this monogeneticism and the economic rationality of this genealogy, Condillac’s
prudence has limits, although the Traité des systèms (1749) is careful enough (Chap. 17) : “If
all the characters in use since the origin of history could have come down to us with a key
which would explain them, we would disentangle this progress in a sensible manner. With
those that are extant, however, we can develop this system, if not in all its detail, at least
sufficiently so as to assure us of the generation of the different types of script. M. Warburton’s
work is a proof of this” (Cf. DE, p. 1oi) .
17.On the problem of boustrophedon writing, cf. J. Février and M. Cohen, op. cit. And on the
relationships among writing, the via rupta, and incest, cf. ”Freud et la scène de l’écriture” in
L’écriture et la di f f érence [FF (op. cit.)].
18.On these questions and their subsequent development, I take the liberty of referring once
again to Speech and Phenomena (op. cit.).