xxx
fotnote start xxx
•
Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie and phänomenologischen Philosophie. I. Buch,
Gesammelte Werke (The Hague, 1950), Band 3;
Ideas: General Introduction to Pure
Phenomenology, tr. W. R. Boyce (New York, 1931).
** Husserliana. Gesammelte Werke, ed. H. L. van Breda (The Hague, 1950-73), vol. 6.
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rectly and primarily in the text of a mundane science, of a psycho-physiophonetics.
These precautions taken, it should be recognized that it is in the specific zone of this imprint
and this trace, in the temporalization of a lived experience which is neither in the world nor in
“another world,” which is not more sonorous than luminous, not more in time than in space,
that differences appear among the elements or rather produce them, make them emerge as
such and constitute the texts, the chains, and the systems of traces. These chains and systems
cannot be outlined except in the fabric of this. trace or imprint. The unheard difference
between the appearing and the appearance [l’apparaissant et l’apparaître] (between the
“world” and “lived experience”) is the condition of all other differences, of all other traces,
and it is already a trace. This last concept is thus absolutely and by rights “anterior” to all
physiological problematics concerning the nature of the engramme [the unit of engraving], or
metaphysical problematics concerning the meaning of absolute presence whose trace is thus
opened to deciphering. The trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in general. Which
amounts to saying once again that there is no absolute origin of sense in general. The trace is
the differance which opens
appearance [l’
apparaître] and signification. Articulating the living
upon the nonliving in general, origin of all repetition, origin of ideality, the trace is not more
ideal than real, not more intelligible than sensible, not more a transparent signification than an
opaque energy and no concept of metaphysics can describe it. And as it is a fortiori anterior to
the distinction between regions of sensibility, anterior to sound as much as to light, is there a
sense in establishing a “natural” hierarchy between the sound-imprint, for example, and the
visual (graphic) imprint? The graphic image is not seen; and the acoustic image is not heard.
The difference between the full unities of the voice remains unheard. And, the difference in
the body of the inscription is also invisible.
The Hinge [La Brisure]
You have, I suppose, dreamt of finding a single word for designating difference and
articulation. I have perhaps located it by chance in Robert[’s Dictionary] if I play on the
word, or rather indicate its double meaning. This word is brisure [joint, break] “—broken,
cracked part. Cf. breach, crack, fracture, fault, split, fragment, [brèche, cassure, fracture,
faille, fente, fragment.]—Hinged articulation of two parts of wood- or metal-work. The hinge,
the brisure
[folding-joint] of a shutter. Cf. joint.”—Roger
Laporte (letter)
Origin of the experience of space and time, this writing of difference, this fabric of the trace,
permits the difference between space and time to be
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articulated, to appear as such, in the unity of an experience (of a “same” lived out of a “same”
body proper [corps propre]) . This articulation there-fore permits a graphic (“visual” or
“tactile,” “spatial”) chain to be adapted, on occasion in a linear fashion, to a spoken
(“phonic,” “temporal”) chain. It is from the primary possibility of this articulation that one
must begin. Difference is articulation.
This is, indeed, what Saussure says, contradicting Chapter VI:
The question of the vocal apparatus obviously takes a secondary place in the problem of
language. One definition of articulated language might confirm that conclusion. In Latin,
articulus means a member, part, or subdivision of a sequence; applied to speech
[langage],
articulation designates either the sub-division of a spoken chain into syllables or the
subdivision of the chain of meanings into significant units. . . . Using the second definition,
we can say that what is natural to mankind is not spoken language but the faculty of con-
structing a language; i.e., a system of distinct signs corresponding to distinct ideas (p. 26;
italics added) [p. ro].
The idea of the “psychic imprint” therefore relates essentially to the idea of articulation.
Without the difference between the sensory appearing [apparaissant] and its lived appearing
[apparaître] (“mental imprint”), the temporalizing synthesis, which permits differences to
appear in a chain of significations, could not operate. That the “imprint” is irreducible means
also that speech is originarily passive, but in a sense of passivity that all intramundane
metaphors would only betray. This passivity is also the relationship to a past, to an always-
already-there that no reactivation of the origin could fully master and awaken to presence.
This impossibility of re-animating absolutely the manifest evidence of an originary presence
refers us therefore to an absolute past. That is what authorized us to call trace that which does
not let itself be summed up in the simplicity of a present. It could in fact have been objected
that, in the indecomposable synthesis of temporalization, protection is as indispensable as
retention. And their two dimensions are not added up but the one implies the other in a strange
fashion. To be sure, what is anticipated in protention does not sever the present any less from
its self-identity than does that which is retained in the trace. But if anticipation were
privileged, the irreducibility of the always-already-there and the fundamental passivity that is
called time would risk effacement. On the other hand, if the trace refers to an absolute past, it
is because it obliges us to think a past that can no longer be understood in the form of a
modified presence, as a present-past. Since past has always signified present-past, the absolute
past that is retained in the trace no longer rigorously merits the name “past.” Another name to
erase, especially since the strange movement of the trace proclaims as much as it recalls:
differance defers-differs [di f f ère] . With the same precaution and under the same erasure, it
may be said that its passivity is also its relationship with
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the “future.” The concepts of present, past, and future, everything in the concepts of time and
history which implies evidence of them—the meta-physical concept of time in general—
cannot adequately describe the structure of the trace. And deconstructing the simplicity of
presence does not amount only to accounting for the horizons of potential presence, indeed of
a “dialectic” of protention and retention that one would install in the heart of the present
instead of surrounding it with it. It is not a matter of complicating the structure of time while
conserving its homogeneity and its fundamental successivity, by demonstrating for example
that the past present and the future present constitute originarily, by dividing it, the form of