Therefore I admit the necessity of going through the concept of the arche-trace. How does that
necessity direct us from the interior of the linguistic system? How does the path that leads
from Saussure to Hjelmslev forbid us to avoid the originary trace?
In that its passage through form is a passage through the imprint. And the meaning of
differance in general would be more accsessible to us if the unity of that double passage
appeared more clearly.
In both cases, one must begin from the possibility of neutralizing the phonic substance.
On the one hand, the phonic element, the term, the plenitude that is called sensible, would not
appear as such without the difference or opposition which gives them form. Such is the most
evident significance of the appeal to difference as the reduction of phonic substance. Here the
appearing and functioning of difference presupposes an originary synthesis not preceded by
any absolute simplicity. Such would be the originary trace. Without a retention in the minimal
unit of temporal experience, without a trace retaining the other as other in the same, no
difference would do its work and no meaning would appear. It is not the question of a
constituted difference here, but rather, before all determination of the content, of the pure
movement which produces difference. The (pure) trace is differance. It does not depend on
any sensible plentitude, audible or visible, phonic or graphic. It is, on the contrary, the
condition of such a plenitude. Although it does not exist, although it is never a being-present
outside of all plenitude, its possibility is by rights anterior to all that one calls sign
(signified/signifier, content/expression, etc.), concept or opeartion, motor or sensory. This
differance is therefore not more sensible than intelligible and it permits the articulation of
signs among themselves within the same ab-
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stract order—a phonic or graphic text for example—or between two orders of expression. It
permits the articulation of speech and writing—in the colloquial sense—as it founds the
metaphysical opposition between the sensible and the intelligible, then between signifier and
signified, expression and content, etc. If language were not already, in that sense, a writing, no
derived “notation” would be possible; and the classical problem of relationships between
speech and writing could not arise. Of course, the positive sciences of signification can only
describe the work and the fact of differance, the determined differences and the determined
presences that they make possible. There cannot be a science of differance itself in its opera-
tion, as it is impossible to have a science of the origin of presence itself, that is to say of a
certain nonorigin.
Differance is therefore the formation of form. But it is on the other hand the being-imprinted
of the imprint. It is well-known that Saussure distinguishes between the “sound-image” and
the objective sound (p. 98) [p. 66]. He thus gives himself the right to “reduce,” in the
phenomenological sense, the sciences of accoustics and physiology at the moment that he
institutes the science of language. The sound-image is the structure of the appearing of the
sound [l’apparaître du son] which is anything but the sound appearing [le son apparaissant].
It is the sound-image that he calls signifier, reserving the name signified not for the thing, to
be sure (it is reduced by the act and the very ideality of language), but for the “concept,”
undoubtedly an unhappy notion here; let us say for the ideality of the sense. “I propose to
retain the word sign [signe] to designate the whole and to replace concept and sound-image
respectively by signified [sign fie] and signifier [sign fiant].” The sound-image is what is
heard; not the
sound heard but the being-heard of the sound. Being-heard is structurally phe-
nomenal and belongs to an order radically dissimilar to that of the real sound in the world.
One can only divide this subtle but absolutely decisive heterogeneity by a phenomenological
reduction. The latter is there-fore indispensable to all analyses of being-heard, whether they
be inspired by linguistic, psychoanalytic, or other preoccupations.
Now the “sound-image,” the structured appearing [l’apparaître] of the sound, the “sensory
matter” lived and informed by differance, what Husserl would name the hylè/morphé
structure, distinct from all mundane reality, is called the “psychic image” by Saussure: “The
latter [the sound-image] is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychic
imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our senses [la représentation que nous
en donne le témoignage de nos sens]. The sound-image is sensory, and if I happen to call it
‘material,’ it is only in that sense, and by way of opposing it, to the other term of the associa-
tion, the concept, which is generally more abstract” (p. 98) [p. 66]. Al-
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though the word “psychic” is not perhaps convenient, except for exercising in this matter a
phenomenological caution, the originality of a certain place is well marked.
Before specifying it, let us note that this is not necessarily what Jakobson and other linguists
could criticize as “the mentalist point of view”:
In the oldest of these approaches, going back to Baudouin de Courtenay and still surviving,
the phoneme is a sound imagined or intended, opposed to the emitted sound as a
“psychophonetic” phenomenon to the “physiophonetic” fact. It is the psychic equivalent of an
exteriorized sound. 29
Although the notion of the “psychic image” thus defined (that is to say according to a
prephenomenological psychology of the imagination) is indeed of this mentalist inspiration, it
could be defended against Jakob-son’s criticism by specifying: (I) that it could be conserved
without necessarily affirming that “our internal speech . . . is confined to the distinctive
features to the exclusion of the configurative, or redundant features;” (2) that the qualification
psychic is not retained if it designates exclusively another natural reality, internal and not
external. Here the Husserlian correction is indispensable and transforms even the premises of
the debate. Real (reell and not real) component of lived experience, the hyle/morphé structure
is not a reality (Realität). As to the intentional object, for example, the content of the image, it
does not really (reall) belong either to the world or to lived experience: the nonreal com-
ponent of lived experience. The psychic image of which Saussure speaks must not be an
internal reality copying an external one. Husserl, who criticizes this concept of “portrait” in
Ideen I * shows also in the Krisis (pp. 63 f.) ** how phenomenology should overcome the
naturalist opposition—whereby psychology and the other sciences of man survive—between
“internal” and “external” experience. It is therefore indispensable to pre-serve the distinction
between the appearing sound [le son apparaissant] and the appearing of the sound
[l’apparaître du son] in order to escape the worst and the most prevalent of confusions; and it
is in principle possible to do it without “attempt[ing] to overcome the antinomy between
invariance and variability by assigning the former to the internal and the latter to the external
experience” (Jakobson, op. cit., p. 112) [p. 12]. The difference between invariance and
variability does not separate the two domains from each other, it divides each of them within
itself. That gives enough indication that the essence of the phonè cannot be read di-