The stream of oral speech, physically continuous, originally confronted the mathematical
theory of communication with a situation “considerably more involved” ([C.E.] Shannon and
[W.] ‘Weaver [The Mathematical Theory of Communication (Urbana, 1949), pp. 74 f., 11z f.])
than in the case of a finite set of discrete constituents, as presented by written speech.
Linguistic analysis, however, came to resolve oral speech into a finite series of elementary
informational units. These ultimate discrete units, the so-called “distinctive features,” are
aligned into simultaneous bundles termed “phonemes,” which in turn are concatenated into
sequences. Thus form in language has a manifestly granular structure and is subject to a
quantal description 32
The hinge [brisure] marks the impossibility that a sign, the unity of a signifier and a signified,
be produced within the plenitude of a present and an absolute presence. That is why there is
no full speech, however much one might wish to restore it by means or without benefit of
psychoanalysis. Before thinking to reduce it or to restore the meaning of the full speech
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which claims to be truth, one must ask the question of meaning and of its origin in difference.
Such is the place of a problematic of the trace.
Why of the trace? What led us to the choice of this word? I have begun to answer this
question. But this question is such, and such the nature of my answer, that the place of the one
and of the other must constantly be in movement. If words and concepts receive meaning only
in sequences of differences, one can justify one’s language, and one’s choice of terms, only
within a topic [an orientation in space] and an historical strategy. The justification can
therefore never be absolute and definitive. It corresponds to a condition of forces and
translates an historical calculation. Thus, over and above those that I have already defined, a
certain number of givens belonging to the discourse of our time have progressively imposed
this choice upon me. The word trace must refer to itself to a certain number of contemporary
discourses whose force I intend to take into account. Not that I accept them totally. But the
word trace establishes the clearest connections with them and thus permits me to dispense
with certain developments which have already demonstrated their effectiveness in those
fields. Thus, I relate this concept of trace to what is at the center of the latest work of
Emmanuel Levinas and his critique of ontology: 33 relationship to the illeity as to the alterity
of a past that never was and can never be lived in the originary or modified form of presence.
Reconciled here to a Heideggerian intention,—as it is not in Levinas’s thought—this notion
signifies, sometimes beyond Heideggerian discourse, the undermining of an ontology which,
in its innermost course, has determined the meaning of being as presence and the meaning of
language as the full continuity of speech. To make enigmatic what one thinks one understands
by the words “proximity,” “immediacy,” “presence” (the proximate [proche], the own [pro
pre], and the pre- of presence), is my final intention in this book. This deconstruction of
presence accomplishes itself through the deconstruction of consciousness, and therefore
through the irreducible notion of the trace (Spur), as it appears in both Nietzschean and
Freudian discourse. And finally, in all scientific fields, notably in biology, this notion seems
currently to be dominant and irreducible.
If the trace, arche-phenomenon of “memory,” which must be thought before the opposition of
nature and culture, animality and humanity, etc., belongs to the very movement of
signification, then signification is a priori written, whether inscribed or not, in one form or
another, in a “sensible” and “spatial” element that is called “exterior.” Arche-writing, at first
the possibility of the spoken word, then of the
“graphie” in the narrow sense, the birthplace
of “usurpation,” denounced from Plato to Saussure, this trace is the opening of the first
exteriority in general, the enigmatic relationship of the living to its other and of an inside to an
outside: spacing. The outside, “spatial” and “objective” exteriority which we believe we
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know as the most familiar thing in the world, as familiarity itself, would not appear without
the grammè, without differance as temporalization, without the nonpresense of the other
inscribed within the sense of the present, without the relationship with death as the concrete
structure of the living present. Metaphor would be forbidden. The presence-absence of the
trace, which one should not even call its ambiguity but rather its play (for the word
“ambiguity” requires the logic of presence, even when it begins to disobey that logic), carries
in itself the problems of the letter and the spirit, of body and soul, and of all the problems
whose primary affinity I have recalled. All dualisms, all theories of the immortality of the soul
or of the spirit, as well as all monisms, spiritualist or materialist, dialectical or vulgar, are the
unique theme of a metaphysics whose entire history was compelled to strive toward the
reduction of the trace. The subordination of the trace to the full presence summed up in the
logos, the humbling of writing beneath a speech dreaming its plenitude, such are the gestures
required by an onto-theology determining the archeological and eschatological mean-ing of
being as presence, as parousia, as life without differance: another name for death, historical
metonymy where God’s name holds death in check. That is why, if this movement begins its
era in the form of Platon-ism, it ends in infinitist metaphysics. Only infinite being can reduce
the difference in presence. In that sense, the name of God, at least as it is pronounced within
classical rationalism, is the name of indifference itself. Only a positive infinity can lift the
trace, “sublimate” it (it has recently been proposed that the Hegelian Au f hebung be translated
as sublimation; this translation may be of dubious worth as translation, but the juxtaposition is
of interest here) . We must not therefore speak of a “theological prejudice,” functioning
sporadically when it is a question of the plenitude of the logos; the logos as the sublimation of
the trace is theological. Infinitist theologies are always logocentrisms, whether they are
creationisms or not. Spinoza himself said of the understanding—or logos—that it was the
immediate infinite mode of the divine substance, even calling it its eternal son in the Short
Treatise.* It is also to this epoch, “reaching completion” with Hegel, with a theology of the
absolute concept as logos, that all the noncritical concepts accredited by linguistics belong, at
least to the extent that linguistics must confirm—and how can a science avoid it?—the Saus-
surian decree marking out “the internal system of language.”
It is precisely these concepts that permitted the exclusion of writing: image or representation,
sensible and intelligible, nature and culture, nature and technics, etc. They are solidary with
all metaphysical conceptuality and particularly with a naturalist, objectivist, and derivative
determination of the difference between outside and inside.
xxx fotnote start xxx
•
Spinoza, Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well Being, tr. A. Wolf (New York,
1967).
xxx
fotnote slutt xxx
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