Except for communicating them “through writing.” And it is an ad-vantage that Descartes
does not fail to recognize:
It is true that if each man uses as primitive words the words of his own language, he will not
have much difficulty, but in that case he will be under-stood only by the people of his own
country unless he writes down what he wants to say and the person who wants to understand
him takes the trouble to look up all the words in the dictionary; and this is too burdensome to
become a regular practice.... So the only possible benefit that I see from his invention would
be in the case of the written word. Suppose he had a big dictionary printed of all the languages
in which he wanted to make himself understood and put for each word a symbol
corresponding to the meaning and not to the syllables, a single symbol, for instance, for
aimer, amare, and
philein: then those who had the dictionary and knew his grammar could
translate what was written into their own language by looking up each symbol in turn. But
this would be no good except for reading mysteries and revelations; in other cases no-one who
had anything better to do would take the trouble to look up all these words in a dictionary. So
I do not see that all this has much use. Perhaps I am wrong.
And with a profound irony, more profound perhaps than ironical, Descartes opines that error
may also result through a possible cause other than non-self-evidence, failure of attention, or
an over-hasty will: a fault of reading. The value of a system of language or writing is not
measured by the yardstick of intuition, of the clarity or the distinction of the idea, or of the
presence of the object as evidence. The system must itself be deciphered:
Perhaps I am wrong; I just wanted to write to you all I could conjecture on the basis of the six
propositions which you sent me. When you have seen the system, you will be able to say if I
worked it out correctly [déchiffrée] .
The profundity draws the irony further than it would go if it merely followed its author.
Further perhaps than the foundation of Cartesian certitude.
After which, in the form of note and postscript, Descartes defines the Leibnizian project very
simply. It is true that he sees the story of philosophy there; only philosophy may write it, for
philosophy depends on it totally, but by the same token, it can never hope “to see such a
language in use.”
((78))
The discovery of such a language depends upon the true philosophy. For without that
philosophy it is impossible to number and order all the thoughts of men or even to separate
them out into clear and simple thoughts, which in my opinion is the great secret for acquiring
true scientific knowledge. . . . I think it is possible to invent such a language and to discover
the science on which it depends: it would make [even] peasants better judges of the truth
about the world than philosophers are now. But do not hope ever to see such a language in
use. For that, the order of nature would have to change so that the world turned into a
terrestial paradise; and that is too much to suggest outside of fairyland .9
Leibniz expressly refers to this letter and to the analytical principle it formulates. The entire
project implies the decomposition into simple ideas. It is the only way to substitute calculation
for reasoning. In that sense, the universal characteristic depends on philosophy for its
principle but it may be undertaken without waiting for the completion of philosophy:
However, although this language depends on the true philosophy, it does not depend on its
perfection. In other words, this language can be established even if philosophy is not perfect;
and as man’s knowledge grows, this language will grow as well. Meanwhile it will be a great
help—for using what we know, for finding out what we lack, for inventing ways of redeeming
the lack, but especially for settling controversies in matters that depend on reasoning. For then
reasoning and calculating will be the same thing.10
To be sure, these are not the only corrections of the Cartesian tradition. Descartes’s
analyticism is intuitionist, that of Leibniz points beyond mani-fest evidence, toward order,
relation, point of view.11
The characteristic economizes on the spirit and the imagination, whose expense must always
be husbanded. It is the principal goal of this great science that I am used to calling
Characteristic, of which what we call Algebra, or Analysis, is only a small branch; for it is
this science that gives speech to languages, letters to speech, numbers to arithmetic, notes to
music; it teaches us the secret of stabilizing reasoning, and of obliging it to leave visible
marks on the paper in a little volume, to be examined at leisure: finally, it makes us reason at
little cost, putting characters in the place of things in order to ease the imagination.12
In spite of all the differences that separate the projects of universal language or writing at this
time (notably with respect to history and language), 13 the concept of the simple absolute is
always necessarily and indispensably involved. It would be easy to show that it always leads
to an infinitist theology and to the logos or the infinite understanding of God.14 That is why,
appearances to the contrary, and, in spite of all the seduction that it can legitimately exercise
on our epoch, the Leibnizian project of a uni-versal characteristic that is not essentially
phonetic does not interrupt logocentrism in any way. On the contrary, universal logic confirms
logo-
((79))
centrism, is produced within it and with its help, exactly like the Hegelian critique to which it
will be subjected. I emphasize the complicity of these two contradictory movements. Within a
certain historical epoch, there is a profound unity among infinitist theology, logocentrism, and
a certain technicism. The originary and pre- or meta-phonetic writing that I am attempting to
conceive of here leads to nothing less than an “overtaking” of speech by the machine.
In an original and non-“relativist” sense, logocentrism is an ethnocentric metaphysics. It is
related to the history of the West. The Chinese model only apparently interrupts it when
Leibniz refers to it to teach the Characteristic. Not only does this model remain a domestic
representation,15 but also, it is praised only for the purpose of designating a lack and to define
the necessary corrections. What Leibniz is eager to borrow from Chinese writing is its
arbitrariness and therefore its independence with regard to history. This arbitrariness has an
essential link with the non-phonetic essence which Leibniz believes he can attribute to
Chinese writing. The latter seems to have been “invented by a deaf man” (New Essays) :
Loqui est voce articulata signum dare cogitationis suae. Scribere est id facere permanentibus,
in charta ductibus. Quos ad vocem referri non est necesse, ut apparet ex Sinensium
characteribus (Opuscules, p. 497). *
Elsewhere: