what has hitherto been practiced by nearly all archeologists, epigraphists, and pre-historians
who have interrogated the world’s scripts.
But the question of origin is at first confounded with the question of essence. It may just as
well be said that it presupposes an onto-phenomenological question in the strict sense of that
term. One must know what writing is in order to ask—knowing what one is talking about and
what the
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question is—where and when writing begins. What is writing? How can it be identified? What
certitude of essence must guide the empirical investigation? Guide it in principle, for it is a
necessary fact that empirical investigation quickly activates reflexion upon essence. 1 It must
operate through “examples,” and it can be shown how this impossibility of beginning at the
beginning of the straight line, as it is assigned by the logic of transcendental reflexion, refers
to the originarity (under erasure) of the trace, to the root of writing. What the thought of the
trace has already taught us is that it could not be simply submitted to the onto-
phenomenological question of essence. The trace is nothing, it is not an entity, it exceeds the
question What is? and contingently makes it possible. Here one may no longer trust even the
opposition of fact and principle, which, in all its metaphysical, ontological, and transcendental
forms, has always functioned within the system of what is. Without venturing up to the
perilous necessity of the question on the arche-question “what is,” let us take shelter in the
field of grammatological knowledge.
Writing being thoroughly historical, it is at once natural and surprising that the scientific
interest in writing has always taken the form of a history of writing. But science also required
that a theory of writing should guide the pure description of facts, taking for granted that this
last expression has a sense.
Algebra: Arcanum and Transparence
The extent to which the eighteenth century, here marking a break-off point, attempted to
comply with these two exigencies, is too often ignored or underestimated. If for profound and
systematic reasons, the nineteenth century has left us a heavy heritage of illusions or
misunderstandings, all that concerns the theory of the written sign at the end of the
seventeenth and during the eighteenth centuries has suffered the consequences. 2
We must learn to reread what has been thus confused for us. Madeleine V.-David, one of those
scholars who, in France, have untiringly kept alive the historical investigations of writing by
watching over the philosophical question, 3 has just collected in a valuable work the pieces
essential for a dossier: of a debate exciting the passions of all European minds at the end of
the seventeenth and all through the eighteenth centuries. A blinding and misunderstood
symptom of the crisis of European consciousness. The first plans for a “general history of
writing” (Warburton’s expression, dating from 1742) 4 were born in a milieu of thought where
proper scientific work had constantly to overcome the very thing that moved it: speculative
prejudice and ideological presumption. Critical work progresses by stages and its entire
strategy can be reconstructed after the fact. It first sweeps away the “theological” prejudice; it
is thus that Fréret qualifies the myth of
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a primitive and natural writing given by God, as Hebrew script was for Blaise de Vigenère; in
his Traité des chi f fires ou secrètes manières d’escrire (1586), he says of these characters that
they are “the most ancient of all, formed indeed by the Lord God’s own finger. * In all its
forms, overt or covert, this theologism, which is actually something other and more than
prejudice, constituted the major obstacle to all grammatology. No history of writing could
come to terms with it. And especially no history of the very script of those whom this
theologism blinded: the alphabet, whether Greek or Hebrew. The element of the science of
writing had to remain in-visible within its history, and especially to those who could perceive
the history of other scripts. Thus there is nothing surprising in the fact that the necessary
decentering followed the becoming-legible of nonoccidental scripts. The history of the
alphabet is accepted only after recognizing the multiplicity of the systems of script and after
assigning a history to them, whether or not one is in the position to determine it scientifically.
This first decentering is, itself, limited. It is recentered upon ahistorical grounds which, in an
analogous way, reconcile the logico-philosophical (blindness to the condition of the logico-
philosophical: phonetic writing) ‘and the theological points of view. 5 It is the “Chinese”
prejudice; all the philosophical projects of a universal script and of a universal language,
pasilaly, polygraphy, invoked by Descartes, outlined by Father Kircher, Wilkins, 6 Leibniz,
etc., encouraged seeing in the recently discovered Chinese script a model of the philosophical
language thus removed from history. Such at any rate is the function of the Chinese model in
Leibniz’s projects. For him what liberates Chinese script from the voice is also that which,
arbitrarily and by the artifice of invention, wrenches it from history and gives it to philosophy.
The philosophical exigency that guided Leibniz had been formulated quite a few times before
him. Among all who inspired him, Descartes him-self comes first. Replying to Mersenne, who
had sent him (from a publication unknown to us) an advertisement boasting a system of six
propositions for a universal language, Descartes begins by declaring all his distrust. 7 He
considers with disdain certain propositions which were, according to him, no more than “sales
talk” and “sales pitch.” And he has a “bad opinion of the word ‘arcanum’:” “as soon as I see
the word arcanum (mystery) in any proposition I begin to suspect it.” To this project he
opposes arguments that are, one will recall, 8 those of Saussure:
... [the] discordant combinations of letters which would often make the sounds unpleasant and
intolerable to the ear. It is to remedy this defect that all the differences in inflexions of words
have been introduced by usage; and it is
xxx fotnote start xxx
•
Quoted in M. V: David, op cit., p. 28n.
xxx fotnote slutt xxx
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impossible for your author to have avoided the difficulty while making his I grammar
universal among different nations; for what is easy and pleasant in our language is coarse and
intolerable to Germans, and so on.
This language would, in addition, require that the “primitive words” of all languages be
learnt; “this is too burdensome.”