There are perhaps some artificial languages which are wholly of choice and entirely arbitrary,
as that of China is believed to have been, or as those of George Dalgamo and the late Mr.
Wilkins, bishop of Chester. 16
In a letter to Father Bouvet (1703), Leibniz is bent on distinguishing the Egyptian, popular,
sensory, allegorical writing from the Chinese, philosophical, and intellectual writing:
... Chinese characters are perhaps more philosophical and seem to be built upon more
intellectual considerations, such as are given by numbers, orders, and relations; thus there are
only detached strokes that do not culminate in some resemblances to a sort of body.
This does not prevent Leibniz from promising a script for which the Chinese would be only a
blueprint:
This sort of plan would at the same time yield a sort of universal script, which would have the
advantages of the Chinese script, for each person would under-stand it in his own language,
but which would infinitely surpass the Chinese,
xxx fotnote start xxx
•
Speech is to give the sign of one’s thought with an articulated voice. Writing is to do
it with permanent characters on paper. The latter need not be referred back to the voice, as is
obvious from the characters of the Chinese script.
xxx fotnote slutt xxx
((80))
in that it would be teachable in a few weeks, having characters perfectly linked according to
the order and connection of things, whereas, since Chinese script has an infinite number of
characters according to the variety of things, it takes the Chinese a lifetime to learn their script
adequately.17
The concept of Chinese writing thus functioned as a sort of European hallucination. This
implied nothing fortuitous: this functioning obeyed a rigorous necessity. And the hallucination
translated less an ignorance than a misunderstanding. It was not disturbed by the knowledge
of Chinese script, limited but real, which was then available.
At the same time as the “Chinese prejudice,” a “hieroglyphist prejudice” had produced the
same effect of interested blindness. The occultation, far from proceeding, as it would seem,
from ethnocentric scorn, takes the form of an hyperbolical admiration. We have not finished
verifying the necessity of this pattern. Our century is not free from it; each time that
ethnocentrism is precipitately and ostentatiously reversed, some effort silently hides behind
all the spectacular effects to consolidate an inside and to draw from it some domestic benefit.
The astonishing Father Kircher thus devoted his entire genius to opening the West to
Egyptology, 18 but the very excellence that he recognized in a “sublime” script forbade any
scientific deciphering of it. Evoking the Prodromus coptus sive aegyptiacus (1636), M. V.-
David writes:
This work is, in some of its parts, the first manifesto of Egyptological research, since in it the
author determines the nature of the ancient Egyptian language —the instrument of discovery
having been furnished him from elsewhere.* The same book however pushes aside all
projects of deciphering the hieroglyphs. * cf. Lingua aegyptiaca restituta. 19
Here the process of nonrecognition through assimilation is not, as in Leibniz, of a rationalistic
and calculating kind. It is mystical:
According to the Prodromus, hieroglyphs are indeed a script, but not a script composed of
letters, words, and determined parts of speech that we generally use. They are a far finer and
more sublime script, closer to abstractions, which, by an ingenious linking of symbols, or its
equivalent, proposes at once (uno intuitu) to the intelligence of the scholar a complex
reasoning, elevated notions, or some mysterious insignia hidden in the breast of nature or the
Divinity 20
Between rationalism and mysticism there is, then, a certain complicity. The writing of the
other is each time invested with a domestic outline. What one might, following Bachelard,
call an “epistemological breach,” is brought about above all by Fréret and Warburton. One can
make out the laborious process of disentanglement by which both prepared their decision, the
former using the Chinese and the latter the Egyptian example.
((81))
With much respect for Leibniz and the project for a universal script, Fréret cuts to pieces the
representation of the Chinese script that is im-plied therein: “Chinese script is indeed not a
philosophical language which leaves nothing to be desired. . . . The Chinese have never had
anything like it.” 21
But, for all that, Fréret is not free of the hieroglyphist prejudice, which Warburton destroys by
violently criticizing Father Kircher. 23 The apologetic purpose that animates this critique does
not make it ineffectual.
It is in the theoretical field thus liberated that the scientific techniques of deciphering were
perfected by the Abbé Barthélemey and then by Champollion. Then a systematic reflection
upon the correspondence between writing and speech could be bom. The greatest difficulty
was already to conceive, in a manner at once historical and systematic, the organized
cohabitation, within the same graphic code, of figurative, symbolic, abstract, and phonetic
elements. 24
Science and the Name of Man
Had grammatology entered upon the assured path of a science? To be sure, techniques of
deciphering went on progressing at an accelerated pace. 25 But the general histories of
writing, wherein devotion to systematic classification always oriented simple description,
were to be governed for a long time by theoretical concepts that are clearly not commensurate
with the great discoveries—discoveries that should have shaken the most assured foundations
of our philosophical conceptuality, entirely commanded by a situation determined by the
relationships between logos and writing. All the great histories of writing open with an
exposition of a classificatory and systematic project. But today one could transpose to the
domain of writing what Jakobson says of languages since Schlegel’s typological attempts: