but not identical transgression of all philosophemes,
thought is here for me a perfectly neutral
name, the blank part of the text, the necessarily indeterminate index of a future epoch of
differance. In a certain sense, “thought” means nothing. Like all openings, this index belongs
within a past epoch by the face that is open to view. This thought has no weight. It is, in the
play of the system, that very thing which never has weight. Think-ing is what we already
know we have not yet begun; measured against the shape of writing, it is broached only in the
epistémè.
Grammatology, this thought, would still be walled-in within presence.
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II. Nature, Culture, Writing
I felt as if I had been guilty of incest.—The Confessions of Jean Jacques Rousseau
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Introduction to the “Age of Rousseau”
In the voice we have an organ answering to hearing; we have no such organ answering to
sight, and we do not repeat colours as we repeat sounds. This supplies an additional means
of cultivating the ear by practising the active and passive organs one with the other.—Emile
If one had faith in the organization of a classical reading, one would perhaps say that I had
just proposed a double grid: historical and systematic. Let us pretend to believe in this
opposition. Let us do it for the sake of convenience, for I hope that the reasons for my
suspicion are by now clear enough. Since I am about to deal with what, using the same
language and with as much caution, I call an “example,” I must now justify my choice.
Why accord an “exemplary” value to the “age of Rousseau”? What privileged place does
Jean-Jacques Rousseau occupy in the history of logocentrism? What is meant by that proper
name? And what are the relationships between that proper name and the texts to which it was
underwritten? I do not profess to bring to these questions anything more than the beginning of
an answer, perhaps only the beginning of an elaboration, limited to the preliminary
organization of the question. This work will present itself gradually. I cannot therefore justify
it by way of anticipation and preface. Let us nevertheless attempt an overture.
If the history of metaphysics is the history of a determination of being as presence, if its
adventure merges with that of logocentrism, and if it is produced wholly as the reduction of
the trace, Rousseau’s work seems to me to occupy, between Plato’s Phaedrus and Hegel’s
Encyclopaedia, a singular position. What do these three landmarks signify?
Between the overture and the philosophical accomplishment of phonologism (or
logocentrism), the motif of presence was decisively articulated. It underwent an internal
modification whose most conspicuous index was the moment of certitude in the Cartesian
cogito. Before that, the identity of presence offered to the mastery of repetition was
constituted under the “objective” form of the ideality of the eidos or the substantiality of
ousia. Thereafter, this objectivity takes the form of representation, of the idea as the
modification of a self-present substance, conscious and certain of itself at the moment of its
relationship to itself. Within its most general form, the mastery of presence acquires a sort of
infinite assurance. The
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power of repetition that the eidos and ousia made available seems to acquire an absolute
independence. Ideality and substantiality relate to themselves, in the element of the
res
cogitans, by a movement of pure auto-affection. Consciousness is
the experience of pure auto-
affection. It calls itself infallible and if the axioms of natural reason give it this certitude,
overcome the provocation of the Evil Spirit, and prove the existence of God, it is because they
constitute the very element of thought and of self-presence. Self-presence is not disturbed by
the divine origin of these axioms. The infinite alterity of the divine substance does not
interpose itself as an element of mediation or opacity in the transparence of self-relationship
and the purity of auto-affection. God is the name and the element of that which makes
possible an absolutely pure and absolutely self-present self-knowledge. From Descartes to
Hegel and in spite of all the differences that separate the different places and moments in the
structure of that epoch, God’s infinite understanding is the other name for the logos as self-
presence. The logos can be infinite and self-present, it can be produced as auto-affection, only
through the voice: an order of the signifier by which the subject takes from itself into itself,
does not borrow outside of itself the signifier that it emits and that affects it at the same time.
Such is at least the experience—or consciousness—of the voice: of hearing (understanding)-
oneself-speak [s’entendre-parler]. That experience lives and proclaims itself as the exclusion
of writing, that is to say of the invoking of an “exterior,” “sensible,” “spatial” signifier
interrupting self-presence.
Within this age of metaphysics, between Descartes and Hegel, Rous-seau is undoubtedly the
only one or the first one to make a theme or a system of the reduction of writing profoundly
implied by the entire age. He repeats the inaugural movement of the Phaedrus and of De
interpretations but starts from a new model of presence: the subject’s self-presence within
consciousness or
feeling. What he excluded more violently than others must, of course, have
fascinated and tormented him more than it did others. Descartes had driven out the sign—and
particularly the written sign —from the cogito and from clear and distinct evidence; the latter
being the very presence of the idea to the soul, the sign was an accessory abandoned in the
region of the senses and of the imagination. Hegel reappropriates the sensible sign to the
movement of the Idea. He criticizes Leibniz and praises phonetic writing within the horizon of
an absolutely self-present logos, remaining close to itself within the unity of its speech and its
concept. But neither Descartes nor Hegel grappled with the problem of writ-ing. The place of
this combat and crisis is called the eighteenth century. Not only because it restores the rights
of sensibility, the imagination, and the sign, but because attempts of the Leibnizian type had
opened a breach within logocentric security. We must bring to light what it was that, right
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from the start, within these attempts at a universal characteristic, limited the power and extent
of the breakthrough. Before Hegel and in explicit terms, Rousseau condemned the universal