On this subject, what does the most massive, most recent, and least contestable information
teach us? First, that for structural or essential reasons, a purely phonetic writing is impossible
and has never finished reducing the nonphonetic. The distinction between phonetic and non-
phonetic writing, although completely indispensable and legitimate, re-
((89))
mains very derivative with regard to what may be called a synergy and a fundamental
synesthesia. It follows that not only has phoneticization never been omnipotent but also that it
has always already begun to under-mine the mute signifier. “Phonetic” and “nonphonetic” are
therefore never pure qualities of certain systems of writing, they are the abstract
characteristics of typical elements, more or less numerous and dominant within all systems of
signification in general. Their importance owes less to their quantitative distribution than to
their structural organization. The cuneiform, for example, is at the same time ideogrammatic
and phonetic. And, indeed, one cannot say that each graphic signifier belongs to such and
such a class, the cuneiform code playing alternately on two registers. In fact, each graphic
form may have a double value—ideographic and phonetic. And its phonetic value can be
simple or complex. The same signifier may have one or various phonic values, it may be
homophonic or
polyphonic. To this general complexity of the system is added yet another
subtle recourse to categorical determinatives, to phonetic complements useless in reading, to a
very irregular punctuation. And Labat shows that it is impossible to understand the system
without going through its history. 39
This is true of all systems of writing and does not depend upon what is sometimes hastily
considered to be levels of elaboration. Within the structure of a pictographic tale for example,
a representation-of-a-thing, such as a totemic blazon, may take the symbolic value of a proper
name. From that moment on, it can function as apellation within other series with a phonetic
value. 40 Its stratification may thus become very complex and go beyond the empirical
consciousness linked to their immediate usage. Going beyond this real consciousness, the
structure of this signifier may continue to operate not only on the fringes of the potential
consciousness but according to the causality of the unconscious.
Thus the name, especially the so-called proper name, is always caught in a chain or a system
of differences. It becomes an appellation only to the extent that it may inscribe itself within a
figuration. Whether it be linked by its origin to the representations of things in space or
whether it remains caught in a system of phonic differences or social classifications
apparently released from ordinary space, the proper-ness of the name does not escape spacing.
Metaphor shapes and undermines the proper name. The literal [propre] meaning does not
exist, its “appearance” is a necessary function—and must be analyzed as such—in the system
of differences and metaphors. The absolute parousia of the literal meaning, as the presence to
the self of the logos within its voice, in the absolute hearing-itself-speak, should be situated as
a function responding to an indestructible but relative necessity, within a system that
encompasses it. That amounts to situating the metaphysics or the ontotheology of the logos.
((90))
The problem of the picture-puzzle (rébus à transfert) brings together all the difficulties. As
pictogram, a representation of the thing may find itself endowed with a phonetic value. This
does not efface the “pictographic” reference which, moreover, has never been simply
“realistic.” The signifier is broken or constellated into a system: it refers at once, and at least,
to a thing and to a sound. The thing is itself a collection of things or a chain of differences “in
space;” the sound, which is also inscribed within a chain, may be a word; the inscription is
then ideogrammatical or synthetic, it can-not be decomposed; but the sound may also be an
atomic element itself entering into the composition: we are dealing then with a script
apparently pictographic and in fact phonetico-analytical in the same way as the alpha-bet.
What is now known of the writing of the Aztecs of Mexico seems to cover all these
possibilities.
Thus the proper name Teocaltitlan is broken into several syllables, rendered by the following
images: lips (tentli), road (otlim), house (calli), and finally tooth (tla.nti). The procedure is
closely bound up with that . . . of suggesting the name of a person by images of the beings or
things that go into the making of his name. The Aztecs achieved a greater degree of
phoneticism. By having recourse to a truly phonetic analysis, they succeeded in rendering
separate sounds through images 41
The work of Barthel and Knorosov * on the Mayan glyphs do not lead to harmonious results,
their progress remains very slow, but the presence of phonetic elements now seems almost
certain. And the same is true of the writing of the Easter Islands. 42 Not only is the latter
picto-ideo-phonographic, but in the very interior of its non-phonetic structures, equivocity and
overdetermination can give rise to metaphors taken over by a true graphic rhetoric, if this
absurd expression may be risked.
We shall now discover the complexity of this structure in the so-called “primitive” scripts and
in cultures believed “without writing.” But we have known for a long time that largely
nonphonetic scripts like Chinese or Japanese included phonetic elements very early. They
remained structurally dominated by the ideogram or algebra and we thus have the testimony
of a powerful movement of civilization developing outside of all logocentrism. Writing did
not reduce the voice to itself, it incorporated it into a system:
This script had more or less recourse to phonetic borrowings, certain signs being used for
their sound independently of their original meaning. But this phonetic
xxx fotnote start xxx
•
For Thomas S. Barthel, see note 42. Among the many works by Ju. V. Knorozov on
the Maya script are Kratkie itogi izucenija dervnej pis’-mennosti Majja v Sovetskom sojuze: .
. ./ A Short Survey of the Study of the Ancient Maya script of the Soviet Union/
Ceskoslavenska Etnografie (Praha) IV, 1956, 309 C. Loukotka; “New Data on the Mayan
Written Language,” Journal de la Société des Americanistes, Nouvelle série (Paris, 1956), pp.
209—17; “Le Problème du déchiffrement de l’écriture maya,” Diogène 40 (1962) : 121-28.
xxx fotnote slutt xxx
((91))
use of signs could never become extensive enough to corrupt Chinese writing in principle and
lead it onto the path of phonetic notation. . . . Writing in China, never having
reached a
phonetic analysis of language, was never felt to be a more or less faithful transference
[décalque] of speech, and that is why the graphic sign, symbol of a reality singular and
unique like itself, has retained much of its primitive prestige. There is no reason for believing