2.that other ellipsis of the metaphysics or onto-theology of the logos (par excellence in its
Hegelian moment) as the powerless and oneiric effort to master absence by reducing the
metaphor within the absolute parousia of sense. Ellipsis of the originary writing within
language as the irreducibility of metaphor, which it is necessary here to think in its possibility
and short of its rhetorical repetition. The irremediable absence of the
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proper name. Rousseau no doubt believed in the figurative initiation of language, but he
believed no less, as we shall see, in a progress toward literal (proper) meaning. “Figurative
language was the first to be bom,” he says, only to add, “proper meaning was discovered last”
(Essay). 5 It is to this eschatology of the proper (grope, proprius, self-proximity, self-
presence, property, own-ness) that we ask the question of the graphein.
The Battle of Proper Names
But how is one to distinguish, in writing, between a man one mentions and a man one
addresses. There really is an equivocation which would be eliminated by a vocative mark—
Essay on the Origin of Languages
Back now from Tristes Tropiques to the Essay on the Origin of Languages, from “A Writing
Lesson” given to the writing lesson refused by the person who was “ashamed to toy” with the
“trifl[ing]” matter of writing in a treatise on education. My question is perhaps better stated
thus: do they say the same thing? Do they do the same thing?
In that Tristes Tropiques which is at the same time The Confessions and a sort of supplement
to the Supplément au voyage de Bougainville,* the “Writing Lesson” marks an episode of
what may be called the anthropological war, the essential confrontation that opens
communication between peoples and cultures, even when that communication is not practiced
under the banner of colonial or missionary oppression. The entire “Writing Lesson” is
recounted in the tones of violence repressed or deferred, a violence sometimes veiled, but
always oppressive and heavy. Its weight is felt in various places and various moments of the
narrative: in Lévi-Strauss’s account as in the relationship among individuals and among
groups, among cultures or within the same community. ‘What can a relationship to writing
signify in these diverse instances of violence?
Penetration in the case of the Nambikwara. The anthropologist’s affection for those to whom
he devoted one of his dissertations, La vie familiale et sociale des IndiensNambikwara (1948).
Penetration, therefore, into “the lost world” of the Nambikwara, “the little bands of nomads,
who are among the most genuinely ‘primitive’ of the world’s peoples” on “a territory the size
of France,” traversed by a picada (a crude trail whose “track” is “not easily distinguished
from the bush” [p. 262]; one should meditate upon all of the following together: writing as the
possibility of the road and of difference, the history of writing and the history of the road, of
the rupture, of the via rupta, of the path that is broken, beaten, fracta, of the space of re-
versibility and of repetition traced by the opening, the divergence from, and
xxx fotnote start xxx
•
Denis Diderot, Oeuvres complètes, Pléiade edition (Paris, 1935), pp. 993—1032;
“Supplement to Bougainville’s ‘Voyage’,” Rameau’s Nephew and Other Works, ed. Jacques
Barzun and Ralph H. Bowen (Garden City, 1956), pp. 187—239.
xxx fotnote start xxx
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the violent spacing, of nature, of the natural, savage, salvage, forest. The
silva is savage, the
via rupta is written, discerned, and inscribed violently as difference, as form imposed on the
hyle, in
the forest, in wood as matter; it is difficult.to imagine that access
to the possibility of a
road-map is not at the same time access to writing). The territory of the Nambikwara is
crossed by the line of an autochthonic picada. But also by another line, this time imported :
[An abandoned telephone line] obsolete from the day of its completion [which] hung down
from poles never replaced when they go to rot and tumble to the ground. (Sometimes the
termites attack them, and sometimes the Indians, who mistake the humming of the telegraph
wires for the noise of bees on their way to the hive.) [p. 262]
The Nambikwara, whose tormenting and cruelty—presumed or not—are much feared by the
personnel of the line, “brought the observer back to what he might readily, though mistakenly,
suppose to be the childhood of our race” [p. 265]. Lévi-Strauss describes the biological and
cultural type of this population whose technology, economy, institutions, and structures of
kinship, however primitive, give them of course a rightful place within humankind, so-called
human society and the “state of culture.” They speak and prohibit incest. “All were
interrelated, for the Nambikwara prefer to marry a niece (their sister’s daughter), or a
kinswoman of the kind which anthropologists call ‘cross-cousin’: the daughter of their
father’s sister, or of their mother’s brother” [p. 269]. Yet another reason for not allowing one-
self to be taken in by appearances and for not believing that one sees here the “childhood of
our race:” the structure of the language. And above all its usage. The Nambikwara use several
dialects and several systems accord-ing to situations. And here intervenes a phenomenon
which may be crudely called “linguistic” and which will be of central interest to us. It has to
do with a fact that we have not the means of interpreting beyond its general conditions of
possibility, its a priori; whose factual and empirical causes—as they open within this
determined situation—will escape us, and, more-over, call forth no question on the part of
Lévi-Strauss, who merely notes them. This fact bears on what we have proposed about the
essence or the energy of the graphein as the originary effacement of the proper name. From
the moment that the proper name is erased in a system, there is writing, there is a “subject”
from the moment that this obliteration of the proper is produced, that is to say from the first
appearing of the proper and from the first dawn of language. This proposition is universal in
essence and can be produced a priori. How one passes from this a priori to the determination
of empirical facts is a question that one cannot answer in general here. First because, by
definition, there is no general answer to a question of this form.
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It is therefore such a
fact that we encounter here. It does not involve the structural effacement
of what we believe to be our proper names; it does not involve the obliteration that,
paradoxically, constitutes the originary legibility of the very thing it erases, but of a