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not all of them observed certain gentlemen agreements. Turkmenbashi, for example, as
soon as he named himself “The Leader of Turkmens”, did not require any external legiti-
mization any longer. He was building the Eastern satrapy and was more likely to perceive
any external legitimation as a threat.
The logic of the CIS preservation demanded some transformation of its main func-
tion - “legalization of divorce”. Such a prospective became relevant as soon as post-Soviet
leaders were faced with a problem of “inheritance” (i.e. the preservation of the acquired
capitals): either in the form of elimination of “successors” or in the form of direct pro-
longation of presidential powers. Mainly Minsk - in a situation of an aggravated conflict
with the Consulting-Observing Group of the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (COG OSCE) on the eve of the presidential elections in 2001 [6] – was the
one to introduce a slight “technical” innovation. However, it had been thought over as
a full-fledge function of the CIS. The “crisis of the CIS” was sure to be talked over for
the first time, when some of those who signed the Alma-Ati declaration (on December
21st, 1991) – Karimov, Nazarbayev and Akayev - performed their duties for two average
presidential terms but failed to find themselves a successor. Generally speaking, almost all
post-Soviet leaders had some problems with the institutes of the OSCE, representatives of
which could not understand that elections on the territory of the Commonwealth are un-
believably “fair”, very “transparent” and absolutely “voluntary”. Why was Lukashenko the
first to ring the bell? The reason is that he faced these, if one may say so, double standards
already in the autumn of 1996. He decided to introduce some changes into the Constitu-
tion, into the part which contained the description of his responsibilities. The Belarusian
referendum was not recognized by the OSCE, but it was approved by the CIS. It was the
main reason for the creation of the institute of CIS observers.
This idea was formulated in Minsk on June 1st, 2001 when the summit of the CIS lead-
ers took place (three months prior to the presidential elections in Belarus); the idea was
approved unanimously. The CIS de facto was reorganized: the institution was guaranteed
the monopoly of legitimate nomination as (let us cite the definition introduced by Bour-
dieu) an “official - explicit and public - blessing of a legitimate vision of the social world”
[7]. This authority is of great power. It is only the CIS members and the “external” institu-
tions, which have the sole right to determine what is right and what is wrong.
In any case, none of the authorized bodies of the CIS did not dare to declare openly
up to 2001 that there was “the eastern democracy” in addition to the “western” one. The
chairperson of the Central Election Commission of Russia, being also the head of the
temporary mission of the CIS observers, A. Veshnyakov, promised to work out a specific
“convention on standards of free and democratic elections on the territory of the CIS”
though spies began to spy in the, so to say, regime of permanent credit (which means:
positive decisions in the morning, standards - in the evening). The mechanism started to
work: presidential, parliamentary elections and the referendum in Belarus, elections in
Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and even the presidential elections in the Chechen
Republic were recognized as “legitimate”. The ultimatum of 2004, according to which an
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Buffer Forms: to Europe Through Denial of Europe
immediate “reform” was required, was the climax of the whole situation. It was sent to the
OSCE leaders for the consideration of the CIS leaders [8].
Meanwhile, “the second” formation of the Commonwealth is done partially under the
cover of misunderstandings. They are triggered by the fact that problematic and ambigu-
ous structures of a post-Soviet, secular and national state can be described using special
terminology, mainly law terms that tend to be universal but not “specific” (for example,
Belarus). These terms give a different basis and predetermine the way such misunder-
standings will be coped with.
If perceived in an adequate way, these misunderstandings let us realize that “unex-
pected” revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, and then in Kirghizia haven’t come out of a
sudden. When it comes to Moldova, we do not talk about the revolution; we understand
that it is the adaptation of the system that has learnt from the Orange crisis. The target
chosen by Voronin and his counterparts in order to make a pre-election attack is itself
indicative. They are representatives of the temporary mission of the nongovernmental
elections monitoring organization (CIS/EMO) that recognized Victor Yanukovych’s vic-
tory at presidential elections in the autumn of 2004 in Ukraine as legal.
Finally, Mr. Saakashvili, Yushchenko and Voronin do not owe anything to the CIS
any longer as the legality and legitimacy of their authority do not rely on the orthopedic
center of legitimacy such as the Kremlin or the Commonwealth. Both the legality and
legitimacy are partially correlated with the recognition of a much bigger community than
the CIS (though let us remind that the CIS countries are also a part of this community).
Thus, “color revolutions” serve as a limit, after which, actually, “the European choice” is
made up.
Thus, favorite “transit” arguments of the Commonwealth cease to operate within the
Commonwealth. Everyone used to say that “we are not mature enough”, that we have
“a special space”, etc.; now it is declared that there is no “quorum”. Why was the Com-
monwealth so beneficial? The matter is that it was a superstructure (or the basis) “for
everyone” and “for the sake of everyone”: the power of unanimity means much more than
any individual and casual will of the people. Though now Mr. Lukashenko declares that
the West has claims on him because of his friendship with Russia. Then why isn’t Ukraine
criticized because of its friendship with Russia? Finally, the matter is that recent events in
Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, to a certain extent, shed light on the basic, though also
unwritten, mission of the CIS. The success of the symbolical (ideological) manufacture of
the CIS in the form of “observations” and “nominations” was mostly determined by the
fact that its main function remained unnoticed (due to a very simple reason: something is
more efficient without the control of consciousness).
The fundamental paradox of the CIS could be formulated as follows: being a guarding
“screen” against democracy, the CIS – according to the declared purposes – contributes to
the democratization of entering states. The states which are sufficiently emancipated and
have achieved their goals formulated directly in the well-known Agreement on creation
of the CIS [9], disaffiliate with the Commonwealth. The basic logic of the Commonwealth
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