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Buffer Forms: to Europe Through Denial of Europe
particular, as they believe in Astana, should be mainly devoted to the problems of drugs
trafficking and terrorism.
Kazakhstan has all reasons to prevail, and, consequently, the CSTO will turn into a
regional system of security within time, sufficiently integrated into the world system. Al-
ready now there are American and Russian bases on the territory of Kirghizia and other
states in Central Asia. It is a significant symptom of the “high modern” epoch. There is no
scandal in such a “neighborhood”: mutual imposition of security systems, their decen-
tralized structure (rhizome passes it best) fosters lessening and minimization of mutual
distrust and fear. Let us say, that contrary to all “figs in pockets”, the CSTO is most likely,
sooner or later, to
achieve its declarative goals; that was a lesson of the Warsaw pact.
Post factum, we ascertain that the historical mission of the Warsaw pact has been
realized, i.e. it has paradoxically coincided with its declarative goal, which is “the creation
of the all-European security system”. Today, 50 years after the WP signing, this (multilay-
ered) system was actually created, namely, all the European countries from the Atlantic
Ocean to the Urals Mountains are the members of the OSCE, the overwhelming majority
of which are members of the NATO or cooperate with the alliance. The CSTO orienta-
tion is still questionable. It is not clear yet, though the concept of “post-Soviet space”
taken from the CSTO’s documents is indicative. First of all, it means that the genome of
“common history” (originated in the USSR) no longer guarantees partner relations in the
military-political sphere. To put differently, it has been secretly admitted that some of the
former Commonwealth states can be considered opponents of the member-countries of
the treaty. Nevertheless, there is no adequate word to replace the term “post-Soviet space”;
it means that everything is not clear when it comes to the unifying principle as well as to
the image of the enemy, the best example of which is still the NATO, the basic partner of
the CSTO.
3. Economic Platform
Similar to the CSTO, the EurAsEc is noted for the well-known vices typical of an
integrated union of such kind (though this time it is a “trade and economic” union and
not a “military-political” one). Just like the CSTO, this organization is viewed in terms of
its own “potential threat” in the form of the World Trade Organization (WTO), entrance
into which is on the agenda. Russia, Belarus and some other countries of the EurAsEC are
members of the WTO. For this reason they are trying to benefit from privileges, prefer-
ences,
a guaranteed favorable market, etc.
As long as the WTO is responsible for the unification norms (customs legislation, tax
codes, banking systems, etc.), the EurAsEC has the right to deal with “the specification” (as
well as the CES, “alterations” in which have stopped for a while because of a “pure instru-
mental” approach of Ukraine), i.e. to define amounts for customs charges, to introduce
restrictive measures for goods produced by member-countries (up to the declaration of a