Microsoft Word Deleuze, Guattari- a thousand Plateaus
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NOTES TO PP. 439-443 □ 567
26. [
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"Ophelimity" (from the Greek for "useful," "serviceable") was introduced by Vilfredo Pareto in his Cows d'economie politique (1896), ed. G.-H. Bousquet and G. Busino (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1964), pp. 2-16. The first portion of this discussion is translated in Vilfredo Pareto, Sociological Writings, ed. and intro. S. E. Fine, trans. Derick Mirtin (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 97-102.] 27. David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy, in The Works and Correspon- dence of David Ricardo, vol. 1, ed. Piero Sraffa (London: Cambridge University Press, 1962), chapter 2. See also Marx's analysis of the two forms of "differential rent," Capital, vol. 3, part 6. 28. Of course, the least fertile land is also in theory the most recent or the last in a series (which allows many commentators to say that Ricardo prefigured marginalism in his theory of rent). But this is not even a rule, and Marx shows that an "increasing sequence" is just as possible as a "decreasing sequence" and that a better soil can "take the lowest place instead of that which was formerly the worst." Capital, vol. 3, p. 798. 29. [ TRANS
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30. Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy, p. 75: "If air, water, the elasticity of steam, and the pressure of the atmosphere, were of different qualities; if they could be appro- priated, and each quality existed only in moderate abundance, they, as well as the land, would afford a rent, as the successive qualities were brought into use." 31. The two forms of differential rent are based on comparison. But Marx maintains the existence of another form, unknown to the theorists (Ricardo), but with which the practition- ers, he says, are quite familiar: absolute rent, based on the special character of landed property as monopoly. In effect, land is not a commodity like the others because it is not reproducible at the level of a determinable aggregate. There is therefore monopoly, which is not the same as "monopoly price" (monopoly price, and the eventual corresponding rent, are totally different questions). In the simplest terms, differential rent and absolute rent can be distinguished in the following manner: since the price of the product is calculated on the basis of the worst soil, the entrepreneur with the best soil would have a surplus profit if the latter were not trans- formed into differential rent accruing to the landowner; but on the other hand, since agricul- tural surplus value is proportionally greater than industrial surplus value (?), the agricultural entrepreneur in general would have a surplus profit if the latter were not transformed into absolute rent accruing to the landowner. Rent is thus a necessary element in the equalization and adjustment of profit: whether it be the equalization of the agricultural profit rate (differ- ential rent), or the equalization of this rate and the rate of industrial profit (absolute rent). Certain Marxist economists have proposed an entirely different schema of absolute rent, but one that maintains Marx's necessary distinction, [ TRANS
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On absolute rent, see Marx, Capital, vol. 3, part 6, chapter 45, pp. 895-899.] 32. Bernard Schmitt, Monnaie, salaires et profit (Paris: Castella, 1980), pp. 289-290, distinguishes between two forms of capture or "harnessing," which correspond moreover to the two principal figures of the hunt, waiting and pursuit. Rent would be a residual or waiting kind of capture because it depends on external forces and operates by transfer; profit would be a capture of pursuit or conquest because it derives from a specific action and requires a force of its own or a "creation." This holds true, however, only in relation to differ- ential rent; as Marx noted, absolute rent represents the "creative" aspect of landed property (Capital, vol. 3, p. 889). 33. Edouard Will, Korinthiaka (Paris: Ed. De Boccard, 1955), pp. 470ff, analyzes a late, but exemplary, case, that of the tyrant Cypselos's reform in Corinth: (1) a portion of the land belonging to the hereditary aristocracy was confiscated and distributed to the poor peasants; (2) but at the same time a metallic stock was constituted, through seizure of the property of proscribed persons; (3) this money itself was distributed to the poor, but in order for them to 568 □ NOTES TO PP. 443-449
give it to the old owners as an indemnity; (4) the old owners from then on paid their taxes in money, so as to ensure a circulation or turnover of the currency, and an equivalence between money, goods, and services. We already find analogous figures directly inscribed in the archaic empires, independently of the problems of private property. For example, land is dis- tributed to the functionaries in their capacity as functionaries, and they exploit or lease it. But if the functionary thereby receives a rent in labor or in kind from it, he owes the emperor a tax payable in money. Hence the necessity of "banks," which, under complex conditions, ensure the equivalence, conversion, and circulation of goods-money throughout the economy; see Guillaume Cardascia, "Armee et fiscalite dans la Babylone achemenide," in Armees et fiscalit'e dans le monde antique (Paris: CNRS, 1977).
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On these three forms of rent, see Marx, Capital, vol. 3, part 6, chapter 47, pp. 925-938.] 35. Authors like Will and Gabriel Ardant have demonstrated that the commercial func- tion does not account for the origin of money, tied to ideas of "payment," "settlement," "tax- ation." Will proves this in particular for the Greek and Western worlds; but even in the oriental empires, we think that the monopoly over monetarized trade assumes monetary taxation. See Edouard Will, "Reflexions et hypotheses sur les origines du monnayage,"
tion also gave rise to money." 36. On this aspect of indirect taxation, see Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange, trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 1-2, 228-236 (in relation to for- eign trade). Concerning the relations taxation-trade, a particularly interesting case is that of mercantilism, analyzed by Eric Alliez (Capital et pouvoir, unpublished manuscript). 37. [ TRANS
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Marx presents his trinity formula (capital-profit, land-ground rent, labor-wages) in Capital, vol. 3, chapter 48.] 38. Bernard Schmitt, Monnaie, salaires et profits. 39. Marx often emphasizes the following points, particularly in his analysis of primitive accumulation: (1) Primitive accumulation precedes the mode of production and makes it pos- sible. (2) It therefore implies specific action by the State and the law, which are not opposed to violence but, on the contrary, promote it ("These methods depend in part on brute force.... But they all employ the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of society."
lawful violence appears first in its raw form but ceases to be conscious to the degree that the mode of production becomes established; it seems to be a fact of nature pure and simple ("direct extra-economic force is still of course used, but only in exceptional cases"; ibid., p. 899). (4) A movement such as this is explained by the particular character of this violence, which is in no case reducible to theft, crime, or illegality (see Notes surAdolph Wagner in Oeu-vres de Karl Marx, "Pleiade" edition, vol. 2, ed. Maximilien Rubel [Paris: Gallimard, 1968]): what is taken away from the worker is not something surface level; the capitalist "does not limit himself to taking away or stealing, but extorts the production of a surplus value, in other words, he first contributes to the creation of that from which he takes away.... A part of the value created without the labor of the capitalist can be appropriated legally by the capitalist, in other words, without violating the corresponding right to the exchange of commodities." 40. Jean Robert thoroughly demonstrates, in this context, that primitive accumulation implies the violent construction of a homogenized, "colonized" space ("Decoloniser l'espace," unpublished manuscript). 41. Ferenc Tokei, "Les conditions de la propriete fonciere dans la Chine de l'epoque Tcheou," Acta Antiqua, vol. 6 (1958), pp. 245-300. Marx and Engels already noted that the Roman plebs (partially composed of freedmen) alone had the right to the "transfer of property
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