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NOTES TO PP. 414-421 □ 563

 

100.  Elie Faure, Medieval Art, vol. 2 of History of Art, trans. Walter Pach (Garden City, 

N.Y.: Garden City Publishing, 1937), pp. 12-14. 

101.  On these peoples and their mysteries, see the analyses of V. Gordon Childe, The Pre-

history of European Society, chapter 7 ("Missionaries, Traders and Warriors of Temperate 

Europe"), and The Dawn of European Civilization (New York: Knopf, 1958). 

102.  Maurice Griaule and Germaine Dieterlen, Le renard pale, vol. 1 (Paris: Institut 

d'ethnologie, 1965), p. 376. 

103.  The book by Robert James Forbes, Metallurgy in Antiquity (Leiden: Brill, 1950), 

analyzes the different ages of metallurgy, as well as the types of metallurgists that existed in the 

"ore stage": the "miner," who did the prospecting and mining; the "smelter" [who produced 

the crude metal or alloy]; the "blacksmith" [who manufactured mass products from crude 

metals]; and the "metalworker" [who produced smaller objects; includes gold- and silver-

smiths] (pp. 74-76). The specialization system becomes more complicated in the Iron Age, 

with attendant variations in the nomad-itinerant-sedentary distribution. 

104.  The texts of T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Doubleday, 

Doran, 1935) and "The Science of Guerrilla War," in Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed. 

(1929), vol. 10, pp. 950-953, remain among the most significant works on guerrilla warfare; 

they present themselves as an "anti-Foch" theory and elaborate the notion of the nonbattle. 

But the nonbattle has a history that is not entirely dependent on guerrilla warfare: (1) the 

traditional distinction between the "battle" and the "maneuver" in war; see Raymon Aron, 

Penser la guerre. Clausewitz (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), vol. 1, pp. 122-131; (2) the way in 

which the war of movement places the role and importance of the battle in question (as early 

as Marshal de Saxe, and the controversial question of the battle during the Napoleonic 

Wars); (3) finally, more recently, the critique of the battle in the name of nuclear arms, which 

play a deterrent role, with conventional forces now having a role only in "testing" or "man-

euver"; see the Gaullist conception of the nonbattle, and Guy Brossollet, Essai sur la 

non-bataille (Paris: Belin, 1975). The recent return to the notion of the battle cannot be 

explained simply by technological factors such as the development of tactical nuclear arms, 

but implies political considerations—it is upon these that the role assigned to the battle (or 

nonbattle) in war depends. 

105.  On the fundamental differences between Tamerlane and Genghis Khan, see Rene 

Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes, trans. Naomi Walford (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 

University Press, 1970), pp. 417-419. 

106.  See Armees etfiscalit'e dans le monde antique, ed. A. Chastagnol, C. Nicolet, and 

H. van Effenterre (Paris: CNRS, 1977); this colloquium best covers the fiscal aspect but 

deals with the other two as well. The question of the distribution of land to soldiers and the 

families of soldiers comes up in every State and plays an essential role. In one particular form, 

it lay the foundation for fiefs and feudalism. But it already lay at the basis of "false fiefs" 

around the world, most notably of the clews  and cleruchy in Greek civilization. Claire 

Preaux, L'economie royale des Lagides (Brussels: Ed. de la Fondation Egyptologique Reine 

Elisabeth, 1939), pp. 463ff. 

107.  Clausewitz, On War, especially book 8, and the commentary on these three theses by 

Raymond Aron, Penser la guerre, vol. 1 (particularly pp. 139 ff., "Pourquoi les guerres de la 

deuxieme espece?"). 

108.  Erich Ludendorff, Der totale Krieg (Munich: Ludendorff Verlag, 1935), notes that 

the evolution has been toward attributing more and more importance to the "people" and 

"domestic policies" in war, whereas Clausewitz still puts the emphasis on armies and foreign 

policy. This criticism is true overall, despite certain texts of Clausewitz. The same criticism is 

also made by Lenin and the Marxists (although they obviously have a totally different concep-

tion of the people and domestic policy than Ludendorff). Certain authors have convincingly 

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564 □ NOTES TO PP. 421-428

 

demonstrated that the proletariat is as much of military origin, naval in particular, as of indus-

trial origin; see, for example, Virilio, Speed and Politics, pp. 38, 40-41, 134-35.

 

109.  As John Ulric Nef shows, it was during the great period of "limited war" (1640-1740) 

that the phenomena of concentration, accumulation, and investment emerged—the same 

phenomena that were later to determine "total war." See War and Human Progress (New 

York: Norton, 1968). The Napoleonic code of war represents a turning point that brought 

together the elements of total war: mobilization, transport, investment, information, etc. 

110.  On this "transcending" of fascism, and of total war, and on the new point of inversion 

of Clausewitz's formula, see Virilio's entire analysis in L'insecurit'e du terhtoire, especially 

chapter 1. 

111.  Guy Brossollet, Essai sur la non-bataille, pp. 15-16. The axiomatic notion of the 

"unspecified enemy" is already well developed in official and unofficial texts on national 

defense, on international law, and in the judicial or police spheres. 

13. 7000 B.C.: Apparatus of Capture

 

1.  The principal book in this respect is Mitra-Varuna (Paris: Gallimard, 1948) (it also 

contains the analysis of the "One-Eyed" and the "One-Armed" gods). 

2.  The theme of the Binder-God and the magic knot has been the object of general stud-

ies in mythology, notably Mircea Eliade, Images and Symbols, trans. Philip Mairet (Kansas 

City: Sheed, Andrews, and McMeel, 1961), chapter 3. But these studies are ambiguous 

because they use a syncretic and archetypal method. Dumezil's method, on the other hand, is 

differential: the theme of capture or of the bond only groups various data together under a dif-

ferential trait, which is constituted precisely by political sovereignty. On the opposition 

between these two methods, one can refer to Edmond Ortigues, Le discours et le symbole 

(Paris: Aubier, 1962). 

3.  Dumezil, Mitra- Varuna, pp. 113-114, 151, 202-203. 

4.  Ibid., p. 150: "There are many ways of being a god of war, and Tiwaz defines one that is 

very badly expressed by the labels warrior god, god of combat... . Tiwaz is something else: the 

jurist of war, and at the same time a kind of diplomat" (the same applies for Mars). 

5.  Ibid., pp. 124-132. 

6.  Ernst Junger, The Glass Bees, trans. Louise Bogan and Elizabeth Mayer (New York: 

Noonday Press, 1960), p. 112 [translation modified to agree with the French translation cited 

by the authors]. 

7.  Marcel Detienne, Les maitres de verite dans la Grece archaique (Paris: Maspero, 

1973), and "Le phalange, problemes et controverses," in Problemes de la guerre en Grece 

ancienne (Civilisations et societes, no. 11), ed. Jean-Pierre Vernant (The Hague: Mouton, 

1968). See also Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (Ithaca, N. Y: Cornell Uni-

versity Press, 1982). 

8.  Jacques Harmand cites an "enterprise using extensive manpower exceptionally 

directed by a functionary, Ouni, under the Pharaoh Pepi I toward 1400 B.C."; La guerre 

antique (Paris: PUF, 1973), p. 28. Even the military democracy Morgan described does not 

explain, but presupposes, an archaic State of the imperial type (the work of Detienne and 

Vernant establishes this). This imperial State itself functions first with jailers and police, and 

not warriors: see Dumezil, Mitra- Varuna, pp. 200-204. 

9.  The idea itself of an Asiatic despotic formation appeared in the eighteenth century, 

notably in Montesquieu, but was used to describe an evolved state of the empires and corre-

sponded to absolute monarchy. Entirely different is the viewpoint of Marx, who recreates the 

notion in order to define the archaic empires. The principal texts in this regard are Marx, 

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