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interpretation of the phenomenon to the second queue. Thus, at least, it is easier
to get rid of the semantic self-applicability traps.
What is known today about the phenomenon of the scientific school, if we
generalize all the positions relevant to it, positions?
First of all, the fact that the scientific school is initially formed as 1) an atomic
social network with a leader of opinion at the head and like-minded people
around. Members of this social network:
share an interest in the subject and ways of interpretation within the school;
share the basis or most of the positions of the opinion leader;
form a regular discussion platform;
develop activities in the framework of the main provisions and paradigmatic
attitudes of the school.
The main aspects of the scientific school are:
typical cycles of its existence;
ideological transformations and continuity (related to the first aspect).
Within the framework of the latter, the problems of distortions and discrepancies
affecting the cycle and development of activities within the school are revealed. It
seems that this problem is eternal for any scientific school or system direction of
thought, and here we can recall a lot of examples where such discrepancies were
even central, speaking under the same name: if we leave Grigoriev's situation
aside. Khazin, you can recall the relationship of Schumpeter and Böhm-Bawerk on
the essence of capitalism, Pierce and James on the philosophy of pragmatism or
Fuller and Snelson on the mechanics of Tensegrity. The normality of such
situations in scientific production was pointed out by M. Polany. An example of
another situation in which the process of transformation-continuity does not
reveal the problem of discrepancies-distortions is the development of Scheler's
aesthetics on the ideas of Husserl's phenomenology, as well as a host of other
historical examples that need not be cited here.
One of the key features of the scientific school (in addition to the listed common
places) the authors writing on this topic call 2) the informal nature of the relations
of its participants (M. Polany, K. Lange), even for cases when these participants
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are engaged in formally different institutional institutions of science. In this sense,
in my terminology, the school is a more "university" phenomenon than
"academic" (see the article "History of European technology and neoconomics").
Important differences of scientific schools from other scientific communities are
3) the commonality of the language used – the conceptual apparatus and ways of
interpreting the subject, and 4) the methodology of interaction with the subject,
since different scientific schools working with the same subject may differ in
language and methodological approaches.
If so, neoconomics is already a scientific school at the initial stage of its formation,
and its task is to expand the field of experts adherent to it and deepen integration
into various social structures
5
.
Already on these links you can see that the theme of the phenomenon of a
scientific school seems to be worked out, and the bibliography is extensive.
However, before any acquaintance with it, the question immediately arises of
how much or all of the noted sources take into account the specific practice of
public demand, in response to which scientific schools are created and developed.
This formulation of the question is purely neoconomic, and is expected to
contribute in some way to meeting this demand (again, given the fact that
neoconomics itself claims about science as a whole). This means that with the
task of solving current problems (some, it is not yet clear which, most likely,
connected with the arguments about clusters in the urban environment of O.V.
Grigoriev), representatives of the non-economic school in the field should cope.
But first and foremost – the Center "Neoconomica" itself.
In any case, as a scientific school, neoconomics appears to be an informal
scientific and social system with its intellectual center and periphery of
reproduction; in other words, the system of distribution and development of non-
economic representations, invariably associated with activities based on such
representations. In particular, this means that the conclusions and
recommendations made by the Center "Neoconomics" and neoconomics, as,
5
The bibliography on the topic of scientific schools hangs in one of the first links of the search output and, on the
whole, is meaningfully consistent with the mentioned criteria here:
http://www.prometeus.nsc.ru/science/schools/biblio/general.ssi (for 10.2015), or here:
http://www.prometeus.nsc.ru/science/schools/docs/scisch.ssi (for 10.2015). Separately, it is worth mentioning the
work of E.Z. Mirskaya "Scientific schools as a form of organization of science: Sociological analysis of the problem"
[2].
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respectively, the scientific school and research program, should be somehow
broadcast to the interested parties, and in a clearly substantiated form, and act as
the basis for the activity, that is to be effectively applicable. In terms of the
organization's prospects, it should certainly be a certain structure combining the
organizational components of the ARPA-like "think tank" with the function of the
fund involved in applied issues and the research center itself engaged in the
theoretical work of building and providing the school.
One of the key problems in the translation of the scientific school is the factor of
personal or implicit knowledge, identified by the critic of the concept of rational
science M. Polany (who perceived the ideas of the phenomenologist M. Merlo-
Ponty) – not formalized and able to be received through training or experience
(the concept caused criticism and accusations in the irrationalism of K. Popper).
That is, a person knows more than he can object in the language. In this sense,
the task of the scientific school of neoconomics is to work in the direction of the
consistent objectification of this knowledge (the leader of opinions and its atom)
in its own specific conceptual apparatus, with the simultaneous development of
this apparatus, and the further combination of the results of this objectification
into a single whole. The confused nature of the narrative in O.V. Grigoriev's
lectures is most likely caused by an attempt to define his implicit knowledge: as
requiring new means of describing non-trivial scientific phenomena and
situations, and relating to many years of administrative experience.
According to Polany, the depersonification of knowledge is a false prerequisite for
its objectivity (on the other hand, if it is an objectivity, it makes sense to recall the
criticism of the subject-object paradigm of M. Heidegger). In connection with this
concept, Polanyi proclaims the inadequacy of book science and the requirement
of interpersonal interaction within the scientific community (in fact, he owns the
introduction of the concept of "scientific community" into circulation). In
addition, he proclaims the indispensability of the scientist's personality and the
inadequacy of the presence of faith in a world built on science (which also fully
corresponds to my own maxim that the essence of higher education is a
combination of the culture of faith with the culture of desire, where the culture of
knowledge is only a means). In the sense of the importance of the culture of
scientific faith (here it is worth recalling the words of V.I. Vernadsky about the
fact that Orthodox priests in Russian science did not climb and could not be there
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