416
these are also the internal working parts of an action situation as shown
in figure 3. as discussed below, using a common framework across a wide
diversity of studies has enabled a greater cumulation of understanding of
interactions and outcomes in very complex environments. the iad frame-
work overtly embeds a particular situation of interest in a broader setting of
external variables, some of which can be self-consciously revised over time.
figure 3. the internal structure of an action situation. source: adapted from e. ostrom,
2005: 33.
4. are rational individUals helPlessly traPPed in social
dileMMas?
the classic assumptions about rational individuals facing a dichotomy of or-
ganizational forms and of goods hide the potentially productive efforts of in-
dividuals and groups to organize and solve social dilemmas such as the over-
harvesting of common-pool resources and the underprovision of local public
goods. the classic models have been used to view those who are involved in
a Prisoner’s dilemma game or other social dilemmas as always trapped in the
situation without capabilities to change the structure themselves. this ana-
lytical step was a retrogressive step in the theories used to analyze the human
condition. Whether or not the individuals who are in a situation have capaci-
ties to transform the external variables affecting their own situation varies
dramatically from one situation to the next. it is an empirical condition that
varies from situation to situation rather than a logical universality. Public in-
vestigators purposely keep prisoners separated so they cannot communicate.
the users of a common-pool resource are not so limited.
When analysts perceive the human beings they model as being trapped
inside perverse situations, they then assume that other human beings ex-
ternal to those involved – scholars and public officials – are able to analyze
417
the situation, ascertain why counterproductive outcomes are reached, and
posit what changes in the rules-in-use will enable participants to improve out-
comes. then, external officials are expected to impose an optimal set of rules
on those individuals involved. it is assumed that the momentum for change
must come from outside the situation rather than from the self-reflection
and creativity of those within a situation to restructure their own patterns of
interaction. as sugden has described this approach:
Most modern economic theory describes a world presided over by a
government (not, significantly, by governments), and sees this world
through the government’s eyes. the government is supposed to have
the responsibility, the will and the power to restructure society in
whatever way maximizes social welfare; like the Us cavalry in a good
Western, the government stands ready to rush to the rescue whenever
the market ‘fails’, and the economist’s job is to advise it on when and
how to do so. Private individuals, in contrast, are credited with little or
no ability to solve collective problems among themselves. this makes
for a distorted view of some important economic and political issues.
(sugden 1986: 3; emphasis in original)
Garrett hardin’s (1968) portrayal of the users of a common-pool resource
– a pasture open to all – being trapped in an inexorable tragedy of overuse
and destruction has been widely accepted since it was consistent with the pre-
diction of no cooperation in a Prisoner’s dilemma or other social dilemma
games. it captured the attention of scholars and policymakers across the
world. Many presumed that all common-pool resources were owned by no
one. thus, it was thought that government officials had to impose new exter-
nal variables (e.g., new policies) to prevent destruction by users who could
not do anything other than destroy the resources on which their own future
(as well as the rest of our futures) depended.
A. Scholars from Diverse Disciplines Examine Whether Resource Users are Always
Trapped
dramatic incidents of overharvested resources had captured widespread at-
tention, while studies by anthropologists, economic historians, engineers,
historians, philosophers, and political scientists of local governance of small
to medium-scale common-pool resources over long periods of time were not
noticed by many theorists and public officials (see netting 1972; Mccay and
acheson 1987; coward 1980). cumulation of the knowledge contained in
these studies did not occur, due to the fact that the studies were written by
scholars in diverse disciplines focusing on different types of resources located
in many countries.
fortunately, the national research council (nrc) established a commit-
tee in the mid-1980s to assess diverse institutional arrangements for effective
conservation and utilization of jointly managed resources. the nrc com-
mittee brought scholars from multiple disciplines together and used the
418
iad framework in an effort to begin to identify common variables in cases
where users had organized or failed to organize (oakerson 1986; nrc 1986).
finding multiple cases where resource users were successful in organizing
themselves challenged the presumption that it was impossible for resource
users to solve their own problems of overuse. the nrc report opened up the
possibility of a diversity of studies using multiple methods. the nrc effort
also stimulated an extended research program at the Workshop that involved
coding and analyzing case studies of common-pool resources written by
other scholars.
B. Meta-Analyses of Common-Pool Resource Cases
in an effort to learn more than just the existence of multiple cases where
resource users had self-organized, colleagues at the Workshop undertook
a meta-analysis of existing case studies that were identified as a result of the
activities of the nrc panel.
2
Because of our prior studies of complex urban
systems and the development of a framework and common language for link-
ing the parts of complex systems, we could use the framework to help orga-
nize our efforts. the iad framework became the foundation for designing a
coding manual that was used to record a consistent set of variables for each
common-pool resource study.
this was an immense effort. More than two years was devoted to develop-
ing the final coding manual (e. ostrom et al. 1989). a key problem was the
minimal overlap of variables identified by case study authors from diverse dis-
ciplines. the team had to read and screen over 500 case studies in order to
identify a small set of cases that recorded information about the actors, their
strategies, the condition of the resource, and the rules-in-use.
3
a common
set of variables was recorded for 44 subgroups of fishers who harvested from
inshore fisheries (schlager 1990, 1994) and 47 irrigation systems that were
managed either by farmers or by a government (tang 1992, 1994).
of the 47 irrigation systems included in the analysis, 12 were managed by
governmental agencies of which only 40 percent (n = 7) had high perfor-
mance. of the 25 farmer-managed, over 70 percent (n = 18) had high perfor-
mance (tang 1994: 234). rule conformance was a key variable affecting the
adequacy of water over time (ibid.: 229). none of the inshore fishery groups
analyzed by schlager were government-managed and 11 (25 percent) were
not organized in any way. the other 33 subgroups had a diversity of informal
rules to define who was allowed to fish in a particular location and how har-
vesting was restricted (schlager 1994: 260).
2 this meta-analysis effort is described in chapter 4 of Poteete, Janssen, and ostrom (2010).
3 scholars across disciplines tend to use very different vocabularies and theoretical frameworks when they
describe empirical settings. other scholars, who have used metaanalysis, have also needed to screen many
publications to obtain consistent data about human used resource systems. Pagdee, kim, and daugherty
(2006) report screening over 100 articles in order to analyze 31 cases related to forest management. rudel
(2008) reported that he had screened nearly 1,200 studies for a meta-analysis of 268 cases of tropical forest
cover change.
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