421
a useful way of thinking about institutional rules is to conceptualize what
part of an action situation is affected by a rule (see figure 4).
conceptualizing seven broad types of rules (rather than one or two) has
been upsetting to scholars who wanted to rely on simple models of interac-
tions among humans. in addition to finding seven broad types of rules, how-
ever, we also found multiple variants of each type. for example, we found
27 boundary rules described by case study authors as used in at least one
common-pool resource setting (e. ostrom 1999: 510). some rules specified
diverse forms of residence, organizational memberships, or personal attri-
butes that are ascribed or acquired. similarly, we found 112 different choice
rules that were usually composed of two parts – an allocation formula specify-
ing where, when, or how resource units could be harvested and a specific ba-
sis for the implementation of the formula (such as the amount of land held,
historical use patterns, or assignment through lottery) (ibid.: 512).
E. Long-Surviving Resource Institutions
after working for several years with colleagues to code cases of successful
and failed systems, i thought my next task would be to undertake careful
statistical analysis to identify which specific rules were associated with suc-
cessful systems. i had not yet fully absorbed the incredible number and
diversity of rules that the team had recorded. in 1988, i spent a sabbatical
leave in a research group organized by reinhard selten at the center for
interdisciplinary research at Bielefeld University. i struggled to find rules
that worked across ecological, social, and economic environments, but the
specific rules associated with success or failure varied extensively across sites.
finally, i had to give up the idea that specific rules might be associated with
successful cases.
Figure 4. rules as exogenous variables directly affecting the elements of an action situation.
source: adapted from e. ostrom, 2005: 189.
422
Moving up a level in generality, i tried to understand the broader insti-
tutional regularities among the systems that were sustained over a long pe-
riod of time and were absent in the failed systems. i used the term “design
principle” to characterize these regularities. i did not mean that the fishers,
irrigators, pastoralists, and others overtly had these principles in their minds
when they developed systems that survived for long periods of time. My effort
was to identify a set of core underlying lessons that characterized the long
sustained regimes as contrasted to the cases of failure (e. ostrom 1990).
5
since the design principles are described extensively in e. ostrom (1990,
2005), i will list only a brief updated list as developed by cox, arnold, and
villamayor-tomás (2009):
1a. User Boundaries: clear and locally understood boundaries between
legitimate users and nonusers are present.
1B. resource Boundaries: clear boundaries that separate a specific common-
pool resource from a larger social-ecological system are present.
2a. congruence with local conditions: appropriation and provision rules
are congruent with local social and environmental conditions.
2B. appropriation and Provision: appropriation rules are congruent with
provision rules; the distribution of costs is proportional to the
distribution of benefits.
3. collective-choice arrangements: Most individuals affected by a resource
regime are authorized to participate in making and modifying its
rules.
4a. Monitoring Users: individuals who are accountable to or are the
users monitor the appropriation and provision levels of the users.
4B. Monitoring the resource: individuals who are accountable to or are
the users monitor the condition of the resource.
5. Graduated sanctions: sanctions for rule violations start very low but
become stronger if a user repeatedly violates a rule.
6. conflict-resolution Mechanisms: rapid, low-cost, local arenas exist for
resolving conflicts among users or with officials.
7. Minimal recognition of rights: the rights of local users to make their
own rules are recognized by the government.
8. nested enterprises: When a common-pool resource is closely connected
to a larger social-ecological system, governance activities are organized
in multiple nested layers.
the design principles appear to synthesize core factors that affect the prob-
ability of long-term survival of an institution developed by the users of a re-
source. cox, arnold, and villamayor-tomás (2009) analyzed over 100 studies
by scholars who assessed the relevance of the principles as an explanation of
the success or failure of diverse common-pool resources. two-thirds of these
5 the term “design principle” has confused many readers. Perhaps i should have used the term “best
practices” to describe the rules and structure of robust institutions.
423
studies confirm that robust resource systems are characterized by most of
the design principles and that failures are not. the authors of some studies
that found the design principles inadequate tended to interpret them very
rigidly and felt that successful systems were characterized by more flexibility.
in three instances, the initial wording of the design principles was too gen-
eral and did not distinguish between ecological and social conditions. thus,
i have adopted the improvements to principles 1, 2, and 4 suggested by cox
and coauthors.
5. condUctinG exPeriMents to stUdy coMMon-Pool
resoUrce ProBleMs
the existence of a large number of cases where users had overcome social
dilemmas in order to sustain long-term use of common-pool resources suc-
cessfully challenged the presumption that this was impossible. Many variables
simultaneously affect these outcomes in the field. developing game-theoreti-
cal models of common-pool resource situations (Weissing and ostrom 1993;
e. ostrom and Gardner 1993) has been one strategy we have used to assess
the theoretical outcomes of a set of variables we have observed in the field.
We have also thought it was important to examine the effect of precise com-
binations of variables in an experimental setting.
A. Common-Pool Resource Experiments in University Laboratories
roy Gardner and James Walker joined me in an extended effort to build and
test well-specified, game-theoretical models consistent with the iad frame-
work (see e. ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992; e. ostrom, Gardner, and
Walker 1994). the initial cPr experiments started with a static, baseline situ-
ation that was as simple as could be specified without losing crucial aspects
of the appropriation problems facing harvesters in the field. We used a qua-
dratic payoff production function based on Gordon’s (1954) classic model.
the initial resource endowment
ω for each of eight subjects was a set of
tokens that the subject could allocate between Market 1 (which had a fixed
return) and Market 2 (which functioned as a common-pool resource with
a return affected by the actions of all subjects in the experiment). subjects
received aggregated information so they did not know each individual’s
actions. each subject i could invest a portion x
i
of his/her endowment in
the common resource (Market 2) and the remaining portion would then be
invested in Market 1. the payoff function we used (e. ostrom, Gardner, and
Walker 1994: 110) was:
u
i
(x) = we
if x
i
= 0
(1)
u
i
(x) = w(e – x
i
) + (x
i
/
Σx
i
)F(
Σx
i
)
if x
i
> 0.
(2)
the baseline experiment was a commons dilemma in which the game-
theoretic outcome involved substantial overuse of a resource while a much
better outcome could be reached if subjects were to reduce their joint
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