Synonyms of the New Testament

De Comm. Not. 11);

a@kairoj (Conj Praec. 14); (a]gennh (De Adul. et Amic. 2);

a@korai?oj (Chariton). Fau?loj, as used in the N. T., has

reached the latest stage of its meaning; and ta> fau?la

pra are set in direct opposition to ta> a]gaqa> poih

tej, and condemned as such to "the resurrection of dam-

nation" (John v. 29; cf. iii. 20; Tit. ii. 8; Jam. iii. 16;

Aristotle, Ethic. Nic. ii. 6. 18; Philo, De Abrah. 3). We

have the same antithesis of fau?la and a]gaqa< elsewhere

(Phalaris, Ep. 144; Plutarch, De Plac. Phil. i. 8); and for

a good note upson the word see Schoeman, Agis et Cleomenes,

p. 71.
§ lxxxv. ei]likrinh.
THE difference between these words is hard to express,

even while one may instinctively feel it. They are con-

§LXXXV. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 319
tinually found in company with one another (Plato, Phileb.

52 d; Eusebius, Praep. Evan. xv. 15. 4), and words asso-

ciated with the one are in constant association with the

other.

Ei]likrinh occurs only twice in the N. T. (Phil. i. 10;

2 Pet. iii. I); once also in the Apocrypha (Wisd. vii. 25);

ei]likri three times (1 Cor. v. 8; 2 Cor. i. 12; ii. 17).

Its etymology, like that of 'sincere,' which is its best

English rendering, is doubtful, uncertainty in this matter

causing also uncertainty in the breathing. Some, as Stall-

baum (Plato, Phaedo, 66 a, note), connect with i@loj, i@lh

(ei@lein, ei]lei?n), that which is cleansed by much rolling and

shaking to and fro in the sieve; ‘volubili agitatiione secre-

turn atque adeo cribro purgatum.' Another more familiar

and more beautiful etymology, if only one could feel suffi-

cient confidence in it, Losner indicates: ‘dicitur de iis

rebus quarum puritas ad solis splendorem exigitur,’ o[ e]n

t^? ei!l^ kekrimme, held up to the sunlight and in that

proved and approved. Certainly the uses of ei]likrinh

so far as they afford an argument, and there is an instinct

and traditionary feeling which lead to the correct use of a

word, long after the secret of its derivation has been

altogether lost, are very much in favour of the former

etymology. It is not so much the clear, the transparent,

as the purged, the winnowed, the unmingled; thus see

Plato, Axioch. 370, and note the words. with which it

habitually associates, as a]migh (Plato, Menex. 24 d;

Plutarch, Quaest. Rom. 26); a@miktoj (De Def. Or. 34; cf. De

Isid. et Os. 61); a]paqh (De Adul. et Amic. 33); a@kratoj

(De An. Proc. 27); a]kraifnh (Philo, De Mund. Opif. 2);

a]ke (Clement of Rome, I Ep. 2); compare Xenophon,

Cyrop. viii. 5. 14; Philo, De Opif. Mun. 8; Plutarch, Adv.

Col. 5: De Fac. in Orb. 16: pa mignu,

ga>r to> ei]likrine. In like manner the the Etym. Mag.;

ei]likrinh>j shmain kaqaro>n kai> a]migh? e[te

an interesting discussion in Plutarch, De Ei ap. Delph. 20.

320 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LXXXV.
Various passages, it is quite true, might be adduced in

which the nation of clearness and transparency predomi-

nates, thus in Philo (Quis Rer. Div. Haer. 61) ei]likrine>j pu?r

is contrasted with the kli, but they are

much the fewer, and may very well be secondary and

superinduced.

The ethical use of ei]likrinh and ei]likri first makes

itself distinctly felt in the N. T.; there are only approxi-

mations to it in classical Greek; as when Aristotle (Ethic.

Nic. x. 6) speaks of some who, a@geustoi o!ntej h[doonh?j ei]li-

krinou?j kai> e]leuqeri ta>j swmatika>j katafeu

Theophylact defines ei]likri well as kaqari

kai> a]dolon e@xousai suneskiasme u!poulon:

and Basil the Great (in Reg. Brev. Int.): ei]likrine>j ei#nai

logi a]mige a@krwj kekaqarme panto>j

e]nanti. It s true to this its central meaning as often

as it is employed in the N. T. The Corinthians must

purge out the old leaven, that they may keep the feast

with the unleavened bread of sincerity (ei]likrinei) and

truth (1 Cor. v. 8). St. Paul rejoices that in simplicity

and in that sincerity which comes of God (e]n ei]likrinei<%

qeou?), not in fleshly wisdom, he has his conversation in

the world (2 Cor. i. 12); declares that he is not of those

who tamper with and adulterate (kaphleu) the word

of God, but that as of sincerity (e]c ei]likrinei) he speaks

in Christ (2 C r. ii. 17).

Kaqro, connected with the Latin 'castus,' with the

German 'heiter,' in its earliest use (Homer does not know

it in any other Od. vi. 61; xvii. 48), is clean, and this in

a physical or non-ethical sense, as opposed to r[uparo.

Thus kaqaro>n sw?ma (Xenophon, OEcon. x. 7) is the body

not smeared with paint or ointment; and in this sense it

is often employed in the N. T. (Matt. xxvii. 59; Heb. x.

22; Rev. xv. 6). In another merely physical sense kaqaro

is applied to that which is clear and transparent; thus

we have kaqaro and diaugh (Plutarch, De Gen. Soc. 22).

LXXXV. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 321
But already in Pindar (Pyth. v. 2, kaqara> a]reth<), in Plato

(Rep. vi. 496 d, kaqaro a]diki a]nosi), and

in the tragic poets it had obtained an ethical meaning.

The same is not uncommon in the Septuagint, where it

often designates cleanness of heart (Job viii. 6; xxxiii. 9;

Ps. xxiii. 4), although far oftener a cleanness merely ex-

ternal or ceremonial (Gen. ix. 21; Lev. iv. 7). That it

frequently runs into the domain of meaning just claimed

for ei]likrinh must be freely admitted. It also is found

associated with a]lhqino (Job 6); with a]migh (Philo,

De Mund. 0pif. 8); with a@kratoj (Xenophon, Cyrop. viii.

7. 20; Plutarch, AEmil. Paul. 34); with a@xrantoj (De Is.

et Osir. 79); with a]kh (Plato, Crat. 96 b); kaqaro>j

si?toj is wheat with the chaff winnowed away (Xenophon,

OEcon. xviii. 8. 9); kaqaro>j strato, an army rid of its sick

and ineffective (Herodotus, i. 211; cf. iv. 135), or, as the

same phrase is used in Xenophon, an army made up of

the best materials, not lowered by an admixture of mer-

cenaries or cowards; the flower of the army, all a@ndrej

a]xrei?oi having been set aside (Appian, viii. 117). In the

main, however, kaqaro is the pure contemplated under

the aspect of the clean, the free from soil or stain; thus

qrhskei kai> a]mi (Jam. i. 27), and compare

the constant use of the phrase kaqaro>j foj

a]diki (Plato, Rep. vi. 496 d; Acts xviii. 6 and the like;

and the standing antithesis in which the kaqaro stands

to the koino, contemplated as also the a]ka (Heb. ix.

13; Rom. xiv. 14, 20).

It may then be affirmed in conclusion, that as the

Christian is ei]likrinh, this grace in him will exclude all

double-mindedness, the divided heart (Jam. i. 8; iv. 8),

the eye not single (Matt. vi. 22), all hypocrisies (I Pet.

ii. I); while, as he is kaqaro>j t^? kardi<% this are ex-

cluded the mia (2 Pet. ii. 20; cf. Tit. i. 15), the

molusmo, (2 Cor. vii. I), the r[upari (Jam. i. 21; I Pet.

iii. 21; Rev. xxii. 11) of sin. In the first is predicated

322 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LXXXVI.
his freedom from the falsehoods, in the second from the

defilements, of the flesh and of the world. If freedom

from foreign admixture belongs to both, yet is it a more

primary notion in ei]likrinh, being probably wrapt up in

the etymology of the word, a more secondary and super-

induced in kaqaro.

§ lxxxvi. po.
Po and ma occur often together (Homer, Il. i. 177;

v. 891; Plato, Tim. 19 e; Job xxxviii. 23; Jam. iv. I); and

in like manner polemei?n and ma. There is the same

difference between them as between our own ‘war’ and

‘battle’; o[ po, the Peloponnesian

War; h[ e]n Maraqw?ni ma, the battle of Marathon. Deal-

ing with the words in this antithesis, namely that po

embraces the whole course of hostilities, ma the actual

shock in arms of hostile armies, Pericles, dissuading the

Athenians from yielding to the demands of the Spartans,

admits that these with their allies were a match for all the

other Greeks together in a single battle, but denies that

they would retain the same superiority in a war, that is,

against such as had their preparations of another kind

(man ga?r mi%? pro>j a!pantaj !Ellhnaj dunatoi> Pelo-

ponnh oi[ cu mh> pro>j

o[moin a]du, Thucydides, i. 141). We

may compare Tacitus, Germ. 30: ‘Alios ad praelium ire

videas, Chattos lad bellum.’

But besides this, while po and polemei?n remain

true to their primary meaning, and are not transferred to

any secondary, it is altogether otherwise with ma and

ma. Contentions which fall very short of the shock

of arms are continually designated by these words. There

are ma of every kind: e]rwtikai< (Xenophon, Hiero, i.

35); nomikai< (Tit. iii. 9; cf. 2 Tim. ii. 23); logomaxi (1

Tim. vi. 4); skiamaxi: and compare John vi. 52; 2 Tim.

§ LXXXVI. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 323

ii. 24; Prov. xxvi. 20, 21. Eustathius (on Homer, Il. i.

177) expresses these differences well: to> po

te, h} e]k parallh au]to<, h} kai> diafora< tij e@sti

tai?j le lo h[

logomaxi au]to>j de> o[ poihth>j met ] o]li

maxessame (ver. 304). kai> a@llwj de> ma

au]th> h[ tw?n a]ndrw?n suneisbolh<: o[ de> po e]pi>

parata maxi. Tittmann (De

Synon. in N. T. p. 66): ‘Conveniunt igitur in eo quod

dimicationem, contentionem, pugnam denotant, sed po

moj et polemei?n de pugna qua manibus fit proprie dicuntur,

maautem et ma de quacunque contentione, etiam

animorum, etiamsi non ad verbera et caedes pervenerit.

In illis igitur ipsa pugna cogitatur, in his sufficit cogitare

de contentione, quam pugna plerumque sequitur.’

I may observe before quitting this subject that sta

(Mark xv. 7; Luke xxiii. 19; Acts xxiv. 5; cf. Sophocles,

OEdip. Col. 1228), insurrection or sedition, is by Plato

distinguished from po, in that the one is a civil and

the other a foreign strife (Rep. v. 470 b): e]pi> ga>r t^? tou?

oi]kei de> t^? tw?n a]llotri

po.

§ lxxxvii. pa

Pa occurs three times in the N. T.; once coordinated

with e]piqumi (Col. iii. 5; for paqh any e]piqumi,

like manner joined together see Gal. v. 2.); once subor-

dinated to it (pa, 1 Thess. i . 5); while on

the other occasion of its use (Rom. i. 26), the pa

("vile affections," A. V.) are lusts that dishonour those

who indulge in them. The word belongs to the ter-

minology of the Greek Schools. Thus Cicero (Tuse.Quaest.

iv. 5): ‘Quae Graeci pavocant, nobis perturbationes

appellari magis placet quam morbos;’ on this preference

see iii. 10; and presently after he adopts Zeno's definition,

324 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LXXXVII.

‘aversa a recta, ratione, contra naturam, animi commotio;'

and elsewhere (Offic. iii. 5), ‘motus animi turbatus.’ The

exact definitio of Zeno, as given by Diogenes Laertius, is

as follows (vii. i. 63): e@sti de> au]to> to> pa

para> fu pleonaClement

of Alexandria has this in his mind when, distinguishing

between o[rmh< and pa, he writes (Strom. ii. 13): o[rmh>

me>n ou#n fora> dianoi

zousa o[rmh<, h[ u[pertei kata> to>n lo

e]kferome a]peiqh>j le (see Zeller, Philos. d. Griechen,

iii. I. 208).

So far as th N. T. is concerned, pa nowhere obtains

that wide sense which it thus obtained in the Schools; a

sense so much wider than that ascribed to e]piqumi, that

this last was only regarded as one of the several paof

our nature, being coordinated with o]rgh<, fo, and the

rest (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. ii. 4; Diogenes Laertius, vii. i.

67). ]Epiqumi, on the contrary, in Scripture is the larger

word, including the whole world of active lusts and desires,

all to which the saas the seat of desire and of the

natural appetites, impels; while the pa is rather the

‘morosa delectatio,’ not so much the soul's disease in its

more active operations, as the diseased condition out of

which these spring, the ‘morbus libidinis,’ as Bengel has

put it well, rather than the ‘libido,’ the ‘lustfulness’

(‘Leidenschaft’) as distinguished from the ‘lust.’ Theo-

phylact: pa w!sper pureto

trau?ma, h} a]llh> no. Godet (on Rom. i. 26): ‘Le terme

pa, passions, quelque chose de plus ignoble encore que

celui de e]piqumi, convoitises, au ver. 24; car it ren-

ferme une noti,n plus prononcee de passivite morale, de

honteux esclavage.’

]Epiqumi being tou? h[de, as Aristotle (Rhet. i.

10), a@logoj o@recij, as the Stoics, ‘immoderata appetitio

opinati magni boni, rationi non obtemperans,’ as Cicero

(Tusc. Quaest. iii. 11) defined it, is rendered for the most

§LXXXVII. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 325
part in our Translation ‘lust’ (Mark iv. 19, and often);

but sometimes ‘concupiscence’ (Rom. vii. 8; Col. iii. 5),

and sometimes ‘desire’ (Luke xxii. 15; Phil. i. 23). It

appears now and then, though rarely, in the N. T. in a

good sense (Luke xxii. 15; Phil. i. 23; 1 Thess. ii. 17; cf.

Prov. x. 24; Ps. cii. 5); much oftener in a bad; not as

‘concupiscentia’ merely, but as ‘prava concupiscentia,’

which Origen (in Joan. tom. 10) affirms to be the only

sense which in the Greek Schools it knew (but see Ari-

stotle, Rhet. i. 11); thus e]piqumi (Col. iii. 5);

qumi, (I Pet. ii. 11); newterikai<, (2 Tim. ii. 22);

a]noh blaberai<, (I Tim. vi. 9); kosmikai<, (Tit. ii. 12);

fqora?j (2 Pet. i. 4); miasmou? (2 Pet. ii. 10); a]nqrw

(1 Pet. iv. 2); tou? sw (Rom. vi. 12); tou? diabo

(John viii. 44); th?j a]pa (Ephes. iv. 22); th?j sarko

(1 John ii. 16); tw?n o]fqalmw?n (ibid.); and without a quali-

fying epithet (Rom. vii. 7; I Pet. iv. 3; Jude 16; cf. Gen.

xlix. 6; Ps. cv. 14). It is then, as Vitringa, in a disserta-

tion De Concupiscentia, Vitiosa, et Damnabili (Obss. Sac. p.

598, sqq.), defines it, ‘vitiosa illa voluntatis affectio, qua

fertur ad appetendum quae illicite usurpantur; aut quae

licite usurpantur, appetit a]ta;’ this same evil sense

being ascribed to it in such definitions as that of Clement

of Alexandria (Strom. ii. 20): e@fesij kai> o@recij a@logoj tou?

kexarisme Compare iv. 18: o@recin ou#n e]piqumi

diakri tau?ta deinoi<: kai> th>n me h[donai?j kai>

a]kolasi<% tan de> o@recin, e]pi> tw?n

kata> fun u[pa. In

these deinoi< he of course mainly points to Aristotle (thus

see Rhet. i. 10). Our English word ‘lust,’ once harmless

enough (thus see Deut. vii. 7, Coverdale's Version, and my

Select Glossary, s. v.), has had very much the same history.

The relation in which e]piqumi stands to pa it has been

already sought to trace.

[Ormh<, occurring twice in the N. T. (Acts xiv. 5; Jam.

iii. 4), and o@recij, occurring once (Rom. i. 27), are else-

326 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LXXXVII.
where often found together; thus in Plutarch (De Amor.

Prol. i; De Rect. Rat. Aud. 18; where see Wytten-

bach's note); and by Eusebius (Praep. Evang. xiv. 765 d).

[Ormh<, rendered by Cicero on one occasion ‘appetitio’

(Off. ii. 5), ‘appetitus animi’ on another (Fin. v. 7), is thus

defined by the S oics (Plutarch, De Rep. Stoic.11): h[ o]rmh>

tou? a]nqrw
prostaktiko>j au]t&? tou? poiei?n.

They explain it further as this ‘motus animi,’ fora> yuxh?j

e]pi< ti (see Zeller, Philos. d. Griechen, I. 206), which, if

toward a thing is o@recij, if from it e@kklisij. When our

Translators render o[rmh< ‘assault’ (Acts xiv. 5), they

ascribe to it more, than it there implies. Manifestly there

was no ‘assault’ actually made on the house where Paul

and Barnabas abode; for in such a case it would have

been very superfluous for St. Luke to tell us that they

“were ware" of it; but only a purpose and intention of

assault or onset, ‘trieb,’ ‘drang,’ as Meyer gives it. And

in the same way at Jam. iii. 4, the o[rmh< of the pilot is not

the ‘impetus brachiorum,’ but the ‘studium et conatus

voluntatis.’ Compare for this use of o[rmh<, Sophocles,

Philoct. 237; Plutarch, De Rect. Rat. Aud. I; Prov. iii.

25; and the many passages in which o[rmh< is joined with

proai (Joserhus, Antt. xix. 6. 3).

But while the o[rmh< is thus oftentimes the hostile motion

and spring toward an object, with a purpose of propelling

and repelling it still further from itself, as for example

the o[rmh< of the spear, of the assaulting host, the o@recij

(from o]re) is always the reaching out after and

toward an object, with a purpose of drawing that after

which it reaches to itself, and making it its own. Very

commonly the word is used to express the appetite for

food (Plutarch, De Frat. Am. 2; Symp. vi. 2. I); so too

‘orexis’ in the Latin of the silver age (Juvenal, Sat. vi.

427; xi. 127); in the Platonic Definitions (414 b) philo-

sophy is describes as th?j tw?n o@ntwn a]ei> e]pisth.

After what vile enjoyments the heathen, as judged by St.

§ LXXXVII. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 327
Paul, are regarded as reaching out, any seeking to make

these their own, is sufficiently manifest from the context

of the one passage in the N. T. where o@recij occurs (Rom.

i. 27; cf. Plutarch, Quaest. Nat. 21).

§ lxxxviii. i[ero.
[Iero, probably the same word as the German ‘hehr’

(see Curtius, Grundzuge, vol. v. p. 369), never in the N. T.,

and very seldom elsewhere, implies any moral excellence.

It is singular how seldom the word is found there, indeed

only twice (1 Cor. ix. 13; 2 Tim. iii. 15); and only once

in the Septuagint (Josh vi. 8: i[erai> sa); four times

in 2 Maccabees, but not else in the Apocrypha; being in

none of these instances employed of persons, who only are

moral agents, but always of things. To persons the word

elsewhere also is of rarest application, though examples

are not wanting. Thus i[ero>j a@nqrwpoj is in Aristophanes

(Ranae, 652) a man initiated in the mysteries; kings for

Pindar (Pyth. v. 97) are i[eroi<, as having their dignity from

the gods; for Plutarch the Indian gymnosophists are

a@ndrej i[eroi> kai> au]to, (De Alex. Fort. i. 10); and again

(De Gen. Soc. 20), i[eroi> kai> daimo: and com-

pare De Def. Orac. 2. [Iero>j (t&? qe&? a]nateqeime, Suidas)

answers very closely to the Latin ‘sacer’ (‘quidquid destina-

tum est diis sacrum vocatur’), to our ‘sacred.’ It is that

which may not be violated, the word therefore being con-

stantly linked with a]be. (Plutarch, Quaest. Rom. 27),

with a@batoj (Ibid.), with a@suloj (De Gen. Soc. 24); this

its inviolable character springing from its relations, nearer

or remoter, to God; and qei?oj and i[ero being often joined

together (Plato, Tim. 45 a). At the same time the rela-

tion is contemplated merely as an external one; thus

Pillon (Syn. Grecs): [a!gioj exprime l'idee de saintete natur-

elle et interieure ou morale; tandis qu' i[ero, comme le latin

sacer, n'exprime que l'idee de saintete exterieure ou

328 SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. § LXXXVIII.

d'inviolabilite consacree par les lois ou la coutume.' See,

however, Sophocles, OEdip. Col. 287, which appears an ex-

ception to the absolute universality of this rule. Tittman:

‘In voce i[ero proprie nihil aliud cogitatur, quam quod res

quaedam aut persona Deo sacra sit, nulla ingenii morumque

ratione habita; imprimis quod sacris inservit.' Thus the

i[ereu is a sacred person, as serving at God's altar; but it

is not in the least implied that he is a holy one as well;

he may be a Hophni, a Caiaphas, an Alexander Borgia

(Grinfield, Schol. in N. T., p. 397). The true antithesis

to i[ero is be (Plutarch, Quaest. Rom. 27), and,

though not so perfectly antithetic, miaro (2 Macc. v. 19).

!Osioj is oftener grouped with di for purposes of

discrimination, than with the words here associated with

it; and undoubtedly the two constantly keep company

together; thus in Plato often (Theaet. 176 b; Rep. x. 613

b; Legg. ii. 663 b); in Josephus (Antt. viii. 9. 1), and in

the N. T. (Tit. i. 8); and so also the derivatives from these;

o[si and dikai (1 Thess. ii. 10); o[sio and dikaiosu

(Plato, Prot. 329 c; Luke i. 75; Ephes. iv. 24; Wisd. ix.

3; Clement of Rome, 1 Ep. 48). The distinction too has

been often urger that the o!sioj is one careful of his

duties toward God, the di toward men; and in

classical Greek no doubt we meet with many passages in

which such a distinction is either openly asserted or im-

plicitly involved: as in an often quoted passage from

Plato (Gorg. 507 b): kai> mh>n peri> tou>j a]nqrw


prosh de> qeou>j o!sia.¹

Of Socrates, Marc is Antoninus says (vii. 66), that he was

di pro>j a]nqrw
pro>j qeou: cf. Plutarch,
¹ Not altogether so in the Euthyphro, where Plato regards to> di,

or dikaiosu, as the sum total of all virtue, of which o[sio or piety is

a part. In this Dialogue, which is throughout a discussion on the o!sion,

Plato makes Euthyphro to say (12 e): tou?to toi

kratej, to> me o!sion, to> peri> th>n tw?n qew?n

qerapei de> peri> th>n tw?n a]nqrw
poipo>n ei#nai tou? dikai.

Socrates admits and allows this; indeed, has himself forced him to it.

§LXXXVIII. SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 329
Demet. 24; Charito, i. 10. 4; and a large collection of pas-

sages in Rost and Palm's Lexicon, s. v. There is nothing,

however, which warrants the transfer of this distinction to

the N. T., nothing which would restrict di to him who

should fulfil accurately the precepts of the second table

(thus see Luke i. 6; Rom. i. 17; I John ii. I); or o!sioj to

him who should fulfil the demands of the first (thus see

Acts ii. 27; Heb. vii. 26). It is beforehand unlikely that

such distinction should there find place. In fact the Scrip-

ture, which recognizes all righteousness as one, as growing

out of a single root, and obedient to a single law, gives no

room for such an antithesis as this. He who loves his

brother, and fulfils his duties towards him, loves him in

God and for God. The second great commandment is not

coordinated with the first greatest, but subordinated to,

and in fact included in, it (Mark xii. 30, 31).

If i[ero is ‘sacer,’ o!sioj is ‘sanctus’ ( = ‘sancitus’),

quod sanctione antiqua et praecepto firmatum' (Popma ; cf.

Augustine, De Fid. et Symb. 19), as opposed to ‘pollutus.’

Some of the ancient grammarians derive it from a!zesqai,

the Homeric synonym for se, rightly as regards

sense, but wrongly as regards etymology; the derivation

indeed of the word remains very doubtful (see Pott, Etym.

Forschung. vol. i. p. 126). In classical Greek it is far more

frequently used of things than of persons; o[si, with

boulh< or di understood, expressing th everlasting or-

dinances of right, which no law or custom of men has

constituted, for they are anterior to all law and custom;

and rest on the divine constitution of the moral universe

and man's relation to this, on that eternal law which, in

the noble words of Chrysippus, is paj qei

te kai> a]nqrwpi: cf. Euripides, Hecuba, 799–

801. Thus Homer (Odyss. xvi. 423): ou]d ] o[si