[
xxxii ] Introduction
tural and manufactured goods.
24
By making trade flows less sensitive
to price changes, countries could gain some degree of greater predict-
ability in their international transactions and be less vulnerable to
sudden and unanticipated gold outflows.
A further expedient was the rush by the major European powers,
the United States, and Japan to establish formal colonies in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century. The logic of free trade had been
strongly anticolonial, because the costs of empire would not be offset
by corresponding benefits if all traders had access to the same markets
and investment opportunities. But with the rise of protectionism in
international trade, this calculation was reversed. Newly acquired col-
onies would be protected by the imperial powers' tariffs, and the colo-
nizers' traders would have privileged access to the colonies' markets
and raw materials. The "rush to empire" of this period intensified the
political, military, and economic rivalry between England and Ger-
many that culminated in the First World War.
25
For Polanyi the imperialist impulse cannot be found somewhere
in the genetic code of nations; rather, it materializes as nations strug-
gle to find some way to protect themselves from the relentless pres-
sures of the gold standard system. The flow of resources from a lucra-
tive colony might save the nation from a wrenching crisis caused by a
sudden outflow of gold, and the exploitation of the overseas popula-
tions might help keep domestic class relations from becoming even
more explosive.
Polanyi argues that the utopianism of the market liberals led them
to invent the gold standard as a mechanism that would bring a bor-
derless world of growing prosperity. Instead, the relentless shocks of
the gold standard forced nations to consolidate themselves around
heightened national and then imperial boundaries. The gold standard
continued to exert disciplinary pressure on nations, but its function-
ing was effectively undermined by the rise of various forms of protec-
24. Peter Gourevitch,
Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to Interna-
tional Economic Crises (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), chap. 3; Christo-
pher Chase-Dunn, Yukio Kawano, and Benjamin Brewer, "Trade Globalization since
1795: Waves of Integration in the World-System"
American Sociological Review 65 (Feb-
ruary 2000): 77-95.
25. Polanyi's argument is quite different from Lenin's thesis that intensifying in-
terimperialist conflicts are a product of the growth of finance capital in the final stage
of capitalist development. Polanyi takes pains to argue that financial capitalists can be
a major force for preventing war.