Birth of the Liberal Creed [147]
ity; or the increase in governmental administration entailed in the
meritorious task of municipal reform. And yet all these strongholds of
governmental interference were erected with a view to the organizing
of some simple freedom—such as that of land, labor, or municipal ad-
ministration. Just as, contrary to expectation, the invention of labor-
saving machinery had not diminished but actually increased the uses
of human labor, the introduction of free markets, far from doing away
with the need for control, regulation, and intervention, enormously
increased their range. Administrators had to be constantly on the
watch to ensure the free working of the system. Thus even those who
wished most ardently to free the state from all unnecessary duties, and
whose whole philosophy demanded the restriction of state activities,
could not but entrust the self-same state with the new powers, organs,
and instruments required for the establishment of laissez-faire.
This paradox was topped by another. While laissez-faire economy
was the product of deliberate State action, subsequent restrictions on
laissez-faire started in a spontaneous way. Laissez-faire was planned;
planning was not. The first half of this assertion was shown above to
be true, if ever there was conscious use of the executive in the service
of a deliberate government-controlled policy, it was on the part of the
Benthamites in the heroic period of laissez-faire. The other half was
first mooted by that eminent Liberal, Dicey, who made it his task to in-
quire into the origins of the "anti-laissez-faire" or, as he called it, the
"collectivist" trend in English public opinion, the existence of which
was manifest since the late 1860s. He was surprised to find that no evi-
dence of the existence of such a trend could be traced
save the acts of
legislation themselves. More exactly, no evidence of a "collectivist
trend" in public opinion
prior to the laws which appeared to represent
such a trend could be found. As to later "collectivist" opinion, Dicey
inferred that the "collectivist" legislation itself might have been its
prime source. The upshot of his penetrating inquiry was that there
had been complete absence of any deliberate intention to extend the
functions of the state, or to restrict the freedom of the individual, on
the part of those who were directly responsible for the restrictive en-
actments of the 1870s and 1880s. The legislative spearhead of the coun-
termovement against a self-regulating market as it developed in the
half century following i860 turned out to be spontaneous, undirected
by opinion, and actuated by a purely pragmatic spirit.
Economic liberals must strongly take exception to such a view.