386
THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
measure of our concrete actuality, and any would-be existent that
should lack such a feeling, or its analogue, would be a piece of
reality only half made up.
1
If this be true, it is absurd for science to say that the egotistic
elements of experience should be suppressed. The axis of reality
runs solely through the egotistic places, — they are strung upon
it like so many beads. To describe the world with all the various
feelings of the individual pinch of destiny, all the various spiritual
attitudes, left out from the description — they being as describ-
able as anything else — would be something like offering a printed
bill of fare as the equivalent for a solid meal. Religion makes no
such blunder. The individual’s religion may be egotistic, and those
private realities which it keeps in touch with may be narrow enough;
but at any rate it always remains infinitely less hollow and abstract,
as far as it goes, than a science which prides itself on taking no
account of anything private at all.
A bill of fare with one real raisin on it instead of the word
“raisin,” with one real egg instead of the word “egg,” might be
an inadequate meal, but it would at least be a commencement
of reality. The contention of the survival-theory that we ought to
stick to non-personal elements exclusively seems like saying that
we ought to be satisfied forever with reading the naked bill of fare.
I think, therefore, that however particular questions connected with
our individual destinies may be answered, it is only by acknowledg-
ing them as genuine questions, and living in the sphere of thought
which they open up, that we become profound. But to live thus
is to be religious; so I unhesitatingly repudiate the survival-theory
of religion, as being founded on an egregious mistake. It does not
follow, because our ancestors made so many errors of fact and
mixed them with their religion, that we should therefore leave off
being religious at all.
2
By being religious we establish ourselves in
1
Compare Lotze’s doctrine that the only meaning we can attach to the notion of a thing
as it is “in itself” is by conceiving it as it is for itself; i. e., as a piece of full experience with
a private sense of “pinch” or inner activity of some sort going with it.
2
Even the errors of fact may possibly turn out not to be as wholesale as the scientist
assumes. We saw in Lecture IV how the religious conception of the universe seems to many
mind-curers “verified” from day to day by their experience of fact. “Experience of fact” is a
field with so many things in it that the sectarian scientist, methodically declining, as he
CONCLUSIONS
387
possession of ultimate reality at the only points at which reality
is given us to guard. Our responsible concern is with our private
destiny, after all.
You see now why I have been so individualistic throughout
these lectures, and why I have seemed so bent on rehabilitating
the element of feeling in religion and subordinating its intellectual
part. Individuality is founded in feeling; and the recesses of feel-
ing, the darker, blinder strata of character, are the only places in
the world in which we catch real fact in the making, and directly
perceive how events happen, and how work is actually done.
1
Com-
pared with this world of living individualized feelings, the world
of generalized objects which the intellect contemplates is without
solidity or life. As in stereoscopic or kinetoscopic pictures seen
outside the instrument, the third dimension, the movement, the
vital element, are not there. We get a beautiful picture of an express
does, to recognize such “facts” as mind-curers and others like them experience, otherwise
than by such rude heads of classification as “bosh,” “rot,” “folly,” certainly leaves out a mass
of raw fact which, save for the industrious interest of the religious in the more personal
aspects of reality, would never have succeeded in getting itself recorded at all. We know this
to be true already in certain cases; it may, therefore, be true in others as well. Miraculous
healings have always been part of the supernaturalist stock in trade, and have always been
dismissed by the scientist as figments of the imagination. But the scientist’s tardy education
in the facts of hypnotism has recently given him an apperceiving mass for phenomena of this
order, and he consequently now allows that the healings may exist, provided you expressly
call them effects of “suggestion.” Even the stigmata of the cross on Saint Francis’s hands
and feet may on these terms not be a fable. Similarly, the time-honored phenomenon of
diabolical possession is on the point of being admitted by the scientist as a fact, now that he
has the name of “hystero-demonopathy” by which to apperceive it. No one can foresee just
how far this legitimation of occultist phenomena under newly found scientist titles may
proceed — even “prophecy,” even “levitation,” might creep into the pale.
Thus the divorce between scientist facts and religious facts may not necessarily be as
eternal as it at first sight seems, nor the personalism and romanticism of the world, as they
appeared to primitive thinking, be matters so irrevocably outgrown. The final human opinion
may, in short, in some manner now impossible to foresee, revert to the more personal style,
just as any path of progress may follow a spiral rather than a straight line. If this were so, the
rigorously impersonal view of science might one day appear as having been a temporarily
useful eccentricity rather than the definitively triumphant position which the sectarian
scientist at present so confidently announces it to be.
1
Hume’s criticism has banished causation from the world of physical objects, and
“Science” is absolutely satisfied to define cause in terms of concomitant change — read
Mach, Pearson, Ostwald. The “original” of the notion of causation is in our inner personal
experience, and only there can causes in the old-fashioned sense be directly observed and
described.