lvi
INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
is suggesting that “religious experiences” are related to slight activ-
ity of temporal lobe transients.
67
Persinger may well be critical of
those who try to separate “semantics from science”, but there are
important factors about religious language and the politics of eth-
nic and cultural experience which Persinger fails to fully acknowl-
edge in his work.
68
Persinger’s error is to take the correlation between
religious experience and neural activity beyond the “existential
judgement” to a whole series of “spiritual judgements”, without the
technical skills of religious or philosophical scholarship. He, like
Blackmore in relation to Near-Death experience, makes a category
error out of a politics of knowledge.
69
Such writers need to return to
James to understand their disciplinary amnesia.
One of the most striking features in Persinger’s book Neuro-
psychological Bases of God Beliefs is that only the first two chapters
discuss the empirical material we find in his more considered em-
pirical articles on the subject.
70
The rest of the book is a series of
speculations (judgements) about religion (principally Christianity)
in regard to learnt behaviour, conditioning, compartmentalization
and personality, which have no empirical grounding in neuroscience.
The neuroscience becomes a technical packaging for making a whole
series of reflections on religious practice, without the history and
context of religious ideas. If a scholar of religion was to enter the
field of physics and make all sorts of assumptions about the universe
he or she would be laughed out of court, but the weight of scientific
discourse allows Persinger, and others, to make sweeping state-
ments about God, Yahwah, Allah, Cosmic consciousness, Pente-
costal and Southern Baptist groups, biblical literature, the Catholic
concept of the Virgin Mary, Tibetan Buddhism, Asian religions,
ritual initiation in Catholic, Islamic, Protestant and Jewish groups,
the Catholic Mass, religious dogma, to mention just a few of the
areas that are drawn into the discussion (without detailed textual
evidence, chronology, or cultural specification).
71
On the grounds
of empirical correlation between certain experiences and the
67
ibid., pp. 14, 17.
68
ibid., p. 16.
69
Blackmore, Dying to Live.
70
Persinger, M. A., Religious and Mystical Experience as Artifacts of Temporal Lobe
Function: A General Hypothesis’ in Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1983, Vol. 57, pp. 1255–
1262; Persinger, M. A., 1984 “Propensity to Report Paranormal Experiences is Correlated with
Temporal Lobe Signs” in Perceptual and Motor Skills, Vol. 59, 1984, pp. 583–586; Makarec &
Persinger, “Temporal Lobe Signs”; Persinger & Makarec “Temporal Lobe Epileptic Signs”.
71
Persinger, Neuropsychological Bases of God Beliefs, pp. 24, 31, 60, 68, 79, 90, 96, 107, 116.
INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
lvii
temporal lobes (valid as it may be, but certainly not undisputed),
Persinger is able to disregard entire technicalities of knowledge
about the history and method of the study of religion. The status of
science, as a powerful explanatory discourse, serves as an excuse for
doing the hard work of cultural, social and linguistic analysis.
One of the greatest errors of Persinger’s study is to assume that
the signifier “God” and the construct “experience” are valid registers
to account for all the very diverse phenomena found in religi-
ous activities. What we may ask is the “God experience”? Or what
does Persinger mean by the idea that “God experiences are prod-
ucts of the human brain”.
72
Persinger does seem to concede in one
early moment that “God Concepts are determined by verbal condi-
tioning” and “derived from multiple references by the power of
peer-group affinity, social pressure, and the individual’s identifica-
tion with the group”.
73
Despite the problem of assuming all reli-
gious experiences are held under the Christo-centric signifier “God”
— a crude form of Christian imperialism operating under scientific
rubric — there is just no evaluation of the infinitely complex social
realities understood by the term religion. To say that God, Allah
and Cosmic Consciousness are the same realties found in the tem-
poral lobes, or even that the “professed atheist displays some form
of God belief ” is to seriously underestimate the nature and value of
culture, language and the politics of experience.
74
Persinger attributes the “God Experience” (sic) to an evolutionary
development of the human brain, serving certain survival func-
tions.
75
The experience, according to Persinger, stabilised the self
by providing a mechanism to cope with the “terror of personal
extinction”.
76
As Persinger states, somewhat boldly:
The capacity to have the God Experience is a consequence of the
human brain’s construction. If the temporal lobe had developed in some
other way, the God Experience would not have occurred.
77
Persinger fails to realise that while it is true that the evolved form
of the brain can only carry out the functions it has developed,
the capacity of the brain for language and imagination has made all
sorts of religious and non-religious realities possible. It is also the
72
ibid., p. x.
73
ibid., p. 1.
74
ibid., p. 3.
75
ibid., p. 12.
76
ibid.
77
ibid., p. 14.