lviii
INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
case, as James has indicated, that religious experiences are no dif-
ferent from other experiences. For one person the chemical effects
of LSD may be framed according to religious language, but the
same chemical reactions for another will be just chemical reac-
tions. The key feature that Persinger and others in neuroscience
fail to realise is that the location of the “experience” in neural
processes does not offer the meaning or significance of the reality.
The human brain has also evolved to appreciate that realities can
be of different orders and that language can function in very differ-
ent ways. The key problem is the fusion of different orders of state-
ment and a refusal to consider the nature of scientific language.
The problem can be seen more explicitly in a new set of writ-
ings described, perhaps more accurately, as “neuro-theology”. In
a fascinating study drawing together contemporary insights from
neuroscience and theological models of divinity, James Ashbrook
and Carol Albright attempt a theology of neuroscience. While such
work holds an important appreciation of analogy, it can easily be
mistaken for empirical science, especially when different languages
are so closely fused and confused. The key to the whole project
can be seen when Ashbrook and Albright acknowledge that their
approach is one of “convergence and overlap among the technical
disciplines”.
78
As they indicate: “We combine the languages of reli-
gion, whether understood in broad cultural terms or in narrower
theological categories, with neuroscience talk to make sense of
religion.”.
79
It should be made clear that convergence and overlap do
not
constitute empirical data, something so easily disguised. Psycho-
logy is a master parasitic discourse for merging different orders of
languages and carrying out reification.
80
Ashbrook and Albright are
at least honest in their method, but what they are performing is no
more than Augustine in making an analogy between models of the
mind and the trinity.
81
Such work is theological in nature, but it is
part of a wider disciplinary apparatus that seeks to explore how the
78
Ashbrook & Albright, The Humanizing Brain, p. xxi.
79
ibid.
80
See Carrette, J. R., “The Language of Archetypes: A Conspiracy in Psychological
Theory.” Harvest: Journal for Jungian Studies, 1994, Vol. 40, pp. 168–192.
81
Augustine, St., On the Holy Trinity, Selected Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers, Vol. 3, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, [c.490] 1988.
INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
lix
language of psychology and religion interact. There are many dan-
gers of distortion with such an approach and the potential for
disciplinary amnesia is great. It is for this reason that we need to
return to the founding texts of the discipline to recover the roots of
the subject and prevent the confusion of scientific fact with scientific
analogy. The appeal to “science” is a powerfully seductive move in
contemporary Western society, because it holds the currency of
authority and truth. Such seductions do nonetheless hide many
errors of human knowledge, particularly in a subject like psychol-
ogy, which makes claims beyond its philosophical scope and func-
tion. Psychology in the last hundred years has wanted to escape the
politics of experience in order to find the authority of empirical
truth, but human experience, with all its problems of representa-
tion, constantly escapes the analysis of the natural sciences. The
return to James is a return to the category of experience with all its
imprecision and insight.
Experience and the Personal Philosophical Inventory
The complexity and multiplicity of the category “experience” is
awkward for both scientific analysis and the study of religion,
82
it is
never neutral, takes on
a priori forms, assumes an inner and private
dimension and tends to avoid social determinants, such as social
and economic realities.
83
It is precisely this “notoriously slippery”
nature of the category of “experience” which makes it difficult for
neuroscience, but it is also this aspect which makes up the messy
bedrock of human (“religious”) consciousness and communication.
84
It is, as I suggested earlier, one of the greatest ironies of Persinger’s
empirical studies of brain activity that it has to depend on personal
accounts of experience. In fact, like it or not, Persinger is brought
back to James’s method of gathering accounts of religious experi-
ence, even with all the technology of brain scanning. Without the
82
See Sharf, R. H., “Experience” in Taylor, M. C., Ed., Critical Terms for Religious Studies,
Chicago: Chicago, 1998, pp. 94–116; Jantzen, G.,
Becoming Divine: Towards a Feminist
Philosophy of Religion, Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1998, pp. 114, 127;
Fitzgerald,
T., “Experience”, in Braun, W. & McCutcheon, R. T., Ed., Guide to the Study of Religion,
London: Cassell, 2000, pp. 125–139.
83
Jantzen, Becoming Divine, p. 126.
84
ibid., p. 114.