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INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
near-death experiences through the visual cortex and anoxia
51
tran-
sients of the temporal lobes,
52
holistic operators in mystical states
53
or
more far-fetched ideas about an evolutionary neurobiology of mean-
ing,
54
to name but a few examples, there is a confusion of method
which requires a return to James. Some 80 or 90 years before these
studies James had already marked out the territory of the subject:
Modern psychology, finding definite psycho-physical connections to hold
good, assumes as a convenient hypothesis that the dependence of mental
states upon bodily conditions must be thoroughgoing and complete.
55
As James goes on to illustrate, there is confusion here between
existential and spiritual judgements.
According to the general postulate of psychology just referred to, there
is not a single one of our states of mind, high or low, healthy or morbid,
that has not some organic process as its condition. Scientific theories are
organically conditioned just as much as religious emotions are . . .
56
This foundational statement of the psychology of religion has been
forgotten and only by recalling such methods can the psychology
of religion assume its rightful place in the understanding of reli-
gious experience. The fundamental problem is that scholars are
never specific about what they are dealing with when they refer
to religion, which they dismiss so easily. As Jacob Belzen makes
clear: “As with all cultural phenomena, religions are multifarious
and complex, not to be explained by one single scientific dis-
cipline, but neither to be approached by one single theory or method
within a branch of scholarship. Simple as this sounds, it is still a
not too common realisation.
57
Dismissing religious practices or be-
liefs because of a direct correlation between neurological functions
51
Blackmore, S., Beyond the Body: An Investigation of Out-of-Body Experiences, London:
Heinemann, 1982; Blackmore, S.,
Dying to Live: Science and the Near-Death Experience,
London: Grafton, 1993.
52
Persinger, M. A., Neuropsychological Bases of God Beliefs, New York: Praeger, 1987.
53
Newberg, A. B. & d’Aquili, E. G., “The Neuropsychology of Religion” in Watts, F.,
Science Meets Faith: Theology and Science in Conversation, London: SPCK, 1998;
Newberg,
A. B. & d’Aquili, E. G., “The Neuropsychology of Religious and Spiritual Experience”.
54
Ashbrook, J. B. & Albright, C. R., The Humanizing Brain: Where Religion and Neuroscience
Meet, Cleveland, Ohio:
The Pilgrim Press, 1997.
55
James, The Varieties, p. 16.
56
ibid.
57
Belzen, J., “Religion as Embodiment”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1999,
Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 237.
INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
liii
and religious experience is like trying to argue that identifying
electrical activity and functions of the brain of a football player
somehow reduces the skill of the player, undervalues the rules of
the game, reduces the excitement and emotion of the crowd, ques-
tions the value of a stadium, the importance of football associations
and the cultural values of sport. Neuroscience clearly cannot com-
ment on anything other than the physical activity, even though it
regularly reaches beyond its remit, in a form of cultural dominance,
to explain wider forms of reality.
The key point here is to ask why explorations are made by
neuropsychologists into something called “religion”. Why, we may
ask, do not neurologists analyse the brain functions of scientists
during scientific experimentation or the writing of books on the
psychology of religion? One of the reasons, as Danziger has pointed
out, is that the history of psychological theory is the politics of the
community which ascribes value on methods and perspectives and
gives weight to arguments.
58
The functional attributes of the scien-
tist’s brain are not studied because they do not serve a political
purpose in the struggle for power-knowledge. The scientist studies
the brain functions of an experience understood as “religious” in
order to establish some authority over that domain of knowledge. It
makes the “religious” experience “subject” to its power-knowledge,
rather than putting itself under the power-knowledge of other cul-
tural models of being human. Psychology and neuroscience are thus
forms of discourse struggling for a hegemonic reading of human
experience, an attempt to eradicate those experiences — arbitrarily
held under the signifier “religion” — which threaten the certainty
and domination of a scientific worldview. To live within a space of
limits and not-knowing is challenging, but this is precisely the
value of certain forms of religious language, or, at least, those forms
not determined by religious fundamentalism. Certain forms of reli-
gious language have the potential to hold mystery and render hu-
manity its humility. The problem is that religious language functions
in a different way to scientific language and to confuse the two is to
enter a political power struggle for ideological supremacy on the
nature of human experience, a dangerous form of fascism.
58
Danziger, K., “The History of Introspection Reconsidered” in Journal of the History of
the Behavioral Sciences, 1980,
Vol. 16, pp. 241–262; Danziger,
Constructing the Subject.