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INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
The other important factor that William James identifies is that
“religious” emotion is constituted by a whole array of other human
emotions. There is no distinct emotion which is religious or spiritual.
Religious emotions are not somehow different from the “common
storehouse of emotions” that human beings experience.
59
Fear, love
and joy are human emotions, what makes them “religious” accord-
ing to James is the “object” to which they are directed. James long
recognised, what scholars of religion rediscovered at the end of the
twentieth-century, that “religion” did not stand for any “single
principle or essence” but was an abstract conception holding many
complex factors.
60
What, perhaps, James did not fully appreciate,
but which is now understood from discourse theory, is the fact that
what makes something “religious” is the discursive context or
framing of an experience. Religion in this sense is a narrative con-
struction of experience and its correlation with material reality is
secondary to the reality of its cultural-discursive operation. Neurol-
ogy can tell us no more about the reality of “religious experience”,
or any other form of experience, than its mechanics. To continue
the analogy, it can tell us how the car works but not about the
“experience” of driving the car, or the language used to understand
the experience and the environment or reality outside the car.
Reality is far more complex than materialist science can appreciate.
Science itself is bound by a cultural logic and a series of linguistic
registers that limit its scope. It seeks closure of one discourse (reli-
gion) by assuming the rules of another discourse (neurology).
Studies in neuroscience and religion over the last 15 years
only serve to demonstrate the disciplinary amnesia of the subject.
The central confusion is related to the scope of analysis. There
is an assumption that neurology is offering some insight beyond
the limits of its own disciplinary apparatus — a kind of disciplin-
ary arrogance that neglects careful exploration of the history of
religious concepts and ideas. Neuroscience tells us very little about
religion, but a lot about the brain (the actual scope of its remit)
and the politics of neuro-scientific discourse in Western society.
The fact that it tells us very little about “religion” can be seen by
briefly exploring the fascinating work of Canadian neuroscientist
Michael Persinger.
59
James, The Varieties, p. 27.
60
ibid., p. 26.
INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
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Persinger and the Temporal Lobes
Persinger has played a leading and important role in confirming
earlier insights into the relationship between temporal lobe disorders
and certain types of religious experience.
61
Through initial experi-
ments examining the neural basis of paranormal experiences, he
discovered the importance of electrical activity in the temporal
lobes and examined a continuum of experiences from temporal
lobe epilepsy to what he called TLTs (temporal lobe transients) or
slight electrical activity in the temporal lobes. TLTs were experi-
ences regarded as “normal” and included such things as “personal
dilemma, grief, fatigue, and a variety of physiological conditions”.
62
Unlike other forms of epileptic disorders, such as petit mal (black
outs) and grand mal seizure (epileptic ‘fit’), temporal lobe epilepsy
is “not necessarily associated with convulsions”.
63
It is rather
electrical instability in the temporal region, which can cause such
experiences as “vivid landscapes”, bright lights, sounds, smells, or
intense feelings. The associated feeling can range from fear to
euphoria and hold powerful emotions, even if the precise nature
of the event remains vague. According to Persinger, the temporal
epileptic is at one end of a spectrum, along which we all reside.
He even goes as far to suggest that “the essential symptoms are seen
in a milder manner within every type of religious experience that
has been reported”, such as “being touched by God” or “being at
one with the universe”.
64
Persinger may well be correct when he states that “there is some-
thing about the temporal lobe and religious experience that cannot
be refuted”.
65
But establishing some correlation between temporal
lobe activity and experiences demarcated as “religious”
is one thing,
to suggest “the God Experience is a normal and more organised
pattern of temporal activity” is quite another.
66
While Persinger
does qualify his position by saying he is not suggesting “the experi-
ences of God are synonymous with temporal lobe epilepsy” or that
the experience of God is “localized within the temporal lobes”, he
61
Dewhurst, K. & Beard, A. W., “Sudden Religious Conversion in Temporal Lobe
Epilepsy” in
British Journal of Psychiatry, 1970, Vol. 117, pp. 497–507.
62
Persinger, Neuropsychological Bases of God Beliefs, p. x.
63
ibid., p. 17.
64
ibid., p. 19.
65
ibid., p. 20.
66
ibid., p. 17.