xlviii
INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
years after James. I wish to show why the neuroscience of religion
needs to return to the foundational text of James’s VRE in order to
overcome its disciplinary amnesia. I hope, at least, to show — the
ancient wisdom — that we forget history at our peril and that we
only repeat the errors and misfortunes of our ancestors if fail to
listen to their experience. James is one ancestor of the psychologi-
cal theory of religion who can still teach us about the problems of
psychological method.
One reason greater concern should be directed to the history of
psychological theory is that the discipline is a relatively recent
invention of human exploration; compared, at least, to the explo-
rations of both Eastern and Western philosophy it is a mere infant.
Given the nature of the history of religion, psychology has much to
learn from the existing cross-cultural models of humanity. As
Foucault declared in his critique of the discourses of the human
sciences: “You may have killed God beneath the weight of all that
you have said; but don’t imagine that, with all that you are saying,
you will make a man that will live longer than he”.
37
Psychology
constantly needs to recognise the limitations of its project, and it is
for this reason that the psychology of religion needs to return to
the insights of James’s VRE.
The Gods of Neuroscience
As the old millennium closes, the world is inching (a micron at a time)
toward a behavioral neurology of religion, a topic slightly more valid and
acceptable now than when William James first spoke about it nearly a
century ago. James H. Austin Zen and Brain.
38
James’s VRE was written at a time when the new psychology of the
subconscious was emerging in Europe, one hundred years later the
most striking development in psychological theory — at the begin-
ning of twenty-first century — is the continual expansion of
neuroscience. This move from subliminal theory to neuroscience
reflects the political domination of empirical methods; it is a sign of
the move from descriptive method to quantitative and experimental
37
Foucault, M., The Archaeology of Knowledge, London: Routledge, [1969] 1989, p. 211.
38
Austin, J. A., Zen and the Brain, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT, 1998, p. 697.
INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
xlix
method that has marked scientific discourse in the twentieth-
century. The huge advances in technology were central to the emer-
gence of such ideas. If the beginning of the twentieth-century saw
the start of “the decades of the unconscious”, it ended with the
so-called “decade of the brain” in the 1990s. The experiential ques-
tionnaire was soon coupled with technical developments in brain
scanning equipment. From the 1920s the electrical activity of the
brain could be monitored through EEG (electroencephalogram).
Advances in technology towards the end of the twentieth-century
gave even more precision with such devices as PET (positron emis-
sion tomography), scans showing oxygen and glucose tagged with
radioactivity, and more direct scans such as MEG (magnetoencepha-
lography), which monitored the electrical activity of the brain cells.
39
These advancements meant that electrical activity of the brain
was
now being monitored before, after and during so-called “religious
experiences”, early studies, for example, explored states of meditation
and prayer.
40
The aim was to deduce which functions of the brain
were operating during religious experience. The irony, which I will
return to later, was that plotting electrical activity alone did not
show anything unless a correlation could be established with re-
ported experience. Personal inventories were therefore used along-
side the brain scans in order to evaluate the mental experience and
the physical activity of the brain.
41
Reported experiences, with all
their discursive and cultural variables, were still the central criteria.
The imprecision of language was set against the attempts to pin-
point electrical activity in brain cells, with philosophical assump-
tions that linguistic displays and neurons could in some way provide
statements of reality.
The domination of experimental methods can be seen in a number
of recent attempts by psychologists and neuroscientists to evaluate
a range of experiences that James previously assessed according
39
Greenfield, S., Brain Story, London: BBC, 2000, p. 23; Newberg, A. B. & d’Aquili, E.
G., “The Neuropsychology of Religious and Spiritual Experience”
in Andresen, J. & Forman,
R. K. C., Cognitive Models and Spiritual Maps, Thorverton: Imprint Academic, 2000, p. 252.
40
Wulff, Psychology of Religion, pp. 176–188.
41
Makarec, K. & Persinger, M. A., “Temporal Lobe Signs: Electroencephalographic
Validity and Enhanced Scores in Special Populations” in Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1985,
Vol. 60, pp. 831–842; Persinger, M. A. & Makarec, K., Temporal Lobe Epileptic Signs and
Correlative Behaviours Displayed by Normal Populations’ in The Journal of General Psychol-
ogy, 1987, Vol. 114, No. 2, pp. 179–195.