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INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
nineteenth-century thinking, particularly in the works of Nietzsche.
Psychology is a language that sets itself up against religion and
returns to be healed in the formation of the psychology “of ” religion.
6
Such contestation is the power struggle for a dominant model of
being human, the desire of modernity to find an authoritative dis-
course to position human experience.
7
The late nineteenth-century
psychologists, such as Ribot, Flournoy, Starbuck, Leuba, provide a
fascinating record of the double movement involved in analysing
the religious subject and the mental gymnastics necessary to avoid
philosophical confusions in psychological accounts of religious
experience. These early psychologists show the slow demarcation
of the religious subject as separate and distinct from psychological
knowledge, but yet grounded upon and defined in relationship to
the new psychological space of knowledge.
The early psychologists of religion marked out a fragile terri-
tory in which human experience could be divided out, however
precariously, into the so-called “religious” and the “everyday”. The
“secular” and “religious” models of the self were illusory categories
set up to establish a new order of power and the intervention
of psychology enforced such ambiguous categories.
8
Perhaps, more
than most, the subject of the psychology of religion reflects the
artificial imposition of boundaries between the religious and the
secular, the failure to realise that psychology was born out of Chris-
tian history. The psychology of religion is in some ways the bril-
liant art of the surgeon cutting the tendons that link the immanent
and transcendent, it is the separation of human observation from
metaphysical speculation, empirical data from philosophical assump-
tion. This piece of surgery was never successful. The history of the
psychology of religion is witness to this failure.
Despite consistent attempts to delineate the nature and scope of the
psychology of religion, continuing pluriformality can be partly attributed
to the lack of clarity and consensus, and perhaps more recently some
6
Wulff, D. M., Psychology and Religion: Classic and Contemporary, 2nd Edition, New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1997, p. 3.
7
Shotter, J., Images of Man in Psychological Research, London: Methuen, 1975.
8
King, R., Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and “The Mystic East”,
London: Routledge, 1999; Fitzgerald, T., The Ideology of Religious Studies, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000.
INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
xliii
active resistance to defining its appropriate limits and boundaries
vis-à-vis
other systems of knowledge.
9
The plurality of contemporary studies in the area of the psychology
of religion reveals the power struggles between psychological and
religious discourse, each position giving greater or lesser authority
to the respective terms. While such “multiple viewpoints”, as Jonte-
Pace and Parsons reveal, are healthy for continuing the “communi-
cation and collaboration” it is also a reflection of the fragility of the
foundations of psychological knowledge, something positivistic
psychologists would wish to deny.
10
If we are to understand the
foundational problems of psychological knowledge of religion we
need to return to the work of French psychopathology (Pierre Janet
and Theodore Flournoy), the empirical methods of the Clark School
(G. Stanley Hall, Edwin Starbuck, James Leuba) and James’s own
efforts to position the religious subject. It is these early writers who
map the terms that later empower disciplinary knowledge, but if
these terms perpetuate confusion and continuing ideological strug-
gle then it surely requires some historical reconsideration of the
subject. The problem, as Jacob Belzen recalls Amedeo Giorgi, is
that the varieties of the psychology of religion lack their own “self-
understanding”.
11
It is surprising how many books in the field of the psychology of
religion can still forget these early explorations of religion, as if
they had no influence on present practice and as if the progression
of knowledge has corrected previous errors. What contemporary
psychologists fail to realise is that the early psychologists of religion
set up the terms of the debate and wrestled with unresolved category
errors in the attempt to determine different domains of knowledge.
The textbooks of psychology avoid the history of the subject and its
philosophical ambiguity in order to deny confusion, as if the field
has moved forward, in true Whiggish fashion, and somehow resolved
all epistemological and hermeneutical problems. Such is the dis-
ciplinary amnesia of psychology and the psychology of religion.
9
O’Conner, K. V., “Reconsidering the psychology of religion — Hermeneutical
Approaches in the Contexts of Reason of Research and Debate” in Belzen, J., Ed.,
Hermeneutical Approaches in Psychology of Religion, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997, p. 86.
10
Jonte-Pace & Parsons, Religion and Psychology, pp. 9–10.
11
Belzen, Hermeneutical Approaches in Psychology of Religion, p. 8.