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INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
reality of discourse, it has competed for institutional space and
tested inter-disciplinary competence, and it has subverted and con-
formed to all sorts of ideologies. In its wake it has left a legacy to
the political struggles of the Western world and its cultural inter-
pretation of being human. Psychological theory is a reflection of
the historical moments of the nineteenth and twentieth-century,
transforming itself in science, technology and the media to form
ever-new ways of imagining the subject. There is no doubt that
since James, religion and psychology have been points of contesta-
tion in the twentieth-century landscape, struggling to find a plat-
form between philosophy, physiology and politics. The continual
historical interrogation of knowledge leaves the subject searching
for an identity in the collapsing and competing boundaries of disci-
plinary practice.
The memory of James in this history of the psychology of religion
conveniently anchors the subject and provides justification for
disciplinary demands, but at times this very remembrance is also
an act of “disciplinary amnesia”.
3
James can be historically remem-
bered, pictures of him can hang in departments of psychology, his
name echoed in textbooks on the methodology of religion, but his
work is often forgotten in practice and his texts buried in the
contemporary fetish of the new. It is the climate of such discipli-
nary amnesia that I wish draw out in relation to James’s VRE,
particularly with reference to the relatively new field of neuro-
science and religion. Through such a consideration, I wish to show
why the psychology of religion (including its branch of neuroscience)
needs to return to James to consider it foundational practices.
Disciplinary Amnesia
The contemporary engagement between psychological theory and
religion suffers from disciplinary amnesia, because it seeks to forget
that which threatens it existence. Psychology is a discourse that seeks
to suppress historical issues and problems in order to function as
3
Carrette, J. R., “Post-Structuralism and the Psychology of Religion: The Challenge of
Critical Psychology” in Jonte-Pace, D. and Parsons, W., Ed., 2001
Religion and Psychology:
Mapping the Terrain, London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 110, 124.
INTRODUCTION: SECTION TWO
xli
an authoritative discourse. The past needs to be forgotten because
its legacy exposes the problems of the cohesion of the subject and
its confused origins. The psychological subject wants to forget its
history because its history uncovers the fragility of its disciplinary
knowledge. If the contemporary field known as the “psychology
of religion” (reconceived anxiously as “religious psychology” and
“religious and psychological studies”) returns to its founding
ancestors it reveals the blind spots of its contemporary practice, the
uncertainty of its methods and the tensions of its discourse. But to
forget the past in the psychology of religion is also to avoid the
possibility of understanding what the fractures of historical thought
can reveal about human knowledge and its attempt to understand
the mystery of human experience.
The psychology of religion, from its formal disciplinary inception
in the 1890s, is a subject at odds with itself. It is a discourse born
out of Western Christian introspection, folded back upon itself
in structured and measured conditions, and then extracted from
its religious-philosophical foundation in the “secular” illusion of
scientific fact. The early experimental laboratories of James in
the USA (1875) and Wundt in Germany (1879) provided a way
for methodical and systematic examination of the subject. Indeed,
paradoxically, as Danziger notes, “the practice of introspection
had helped to construct the object it was meant to investigate”.
4
Historians of psychology have started to unravel the emergence of
psychological theory and its dependence on social and historical
moments, but few consider the extent to which models of self in
Western psychology still remain attached to theological construc-
tions.
5
Like psychology, the psychology of religion forgets its his-
tory. It forgets its foundations in order to assert its institutional
power over the religious body, like a powerful parasite that wishes
to forget its host.
The complex separation of “psychology” from religious intro-
spection and the ensuing tensions can be seen in the drama of late
4
Danziger, K., Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 52.
5
See Danziger, Constructing the Subject; Richards, G., Putting Psychology in its Place: An
Introduction from a Critical Historical Perspective,
London: Routledge, 1996; Gregersen, N. H.;
Drees, W. B. & Görman, U., The Human Person in Science and Theology, Edinburgh: T & T
Clark, 2000.