Venona Special Studies doc

 
- 157 - 
1948, listing the persons to whom the material was to be made available; 
to these two more names were added by memoranda of Op-322Y1 of 5 October 
1948 and 14 February 1949. 
 
     It was obvious that a considerable part of the nnnnn material 
would interest the CIA, and as has been seen, members of CIA had access 
to certain early reports from at least October 1948.  No satisfactory 
way to channel later specific information to the proper place in CIA 
existed, however, until 1952, when with the help of Mr. Nnnnnnn, by new 
with CIA, direct liaison between Gardner and nnnnnnnnnnnnnnn of CIA 
was arranged for and the security of nnnnn material at CIA was taken 
care of. 
 
     Complete lists of FBI and CIA personnel indoctrinated in nnnnn 
are not available at AFSA, nor is a list available of British subjects 
who are.  It is known that the British surround the handling of 
nnnnn material with rigid safeguards.  Individuals in these three 
categories who have come to AFSA on nnnnn business are given in our 
list. 
 

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- 158 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Special Study 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE “G--“HOMER” [“GOMER”] CASE 
 
 

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- 159 - 
                                       11 October 1951 
 
 
 
       DEVELOPMENT OF THE “G--“HOMER” [“GOMER”] CASE 
 
     1. From the earlier days of nnnnnnnn code-value recovery 
(1947), it was known that several Washington to Moscow 
messages of 29-31 March 1945 began with the stereotype: 
 
          To the 8th Section.  Materials “G”. 
 
The Eighth Section was known to receive political intelligence,  
and the scanty recoveries from the interior of the messages 
confirmed that the contents concerned foreign policy and 
involved Sir Archibald Clark Kerr. 
 
     In December 1948, further work by nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn 
revealed that the contents were telegrams from Churchill, and in 
January 1949 the originals were identified in London. 
 
     It was thought that “G” was probably an arbitrary code 
designation.  When names are abbreviated to their initials, 
in the traffic as far as it was then known the letter is fol- 
lowed by a period (inside the quotation marks, when there are  
quotation marks). Thus there was no reason to connect “G” 
with a person’s name or cover name. 
 
     2. Separately, in the New York to Moscow traffic, a short  
message of 5 September 1944 was partly worked out (probably  
in 1947 and 1948) reading: 
#xx63__ 
          To Victor [VIKTOR].  According to advice from 
     Homer [GOMER], Captain and Boar [?] will meet about 
     9 September in Quebec to discuss questions connected  
     [4 groups missing].  A detailed exposition of Homer’s  
     resume is following. 
 
          70 [1 groups missing] 
 
Captain is Roosevelt and Boar [?] is Churchill.  There was 
nothing in the message to suggest a connection with the 
Washington material of the following year. 
#1271-1274 
     The resume mentioned was transmitted 7 September 1944, 
but the opening (which contained the name “Homer”) was not      but before  
solved until much later (probably 1951). The resume con-        1 May ‘5x 
cerned chiefly occupation policies, mentioning both American  
and British plans. 

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                                    #915  
     3. A New York to Moscow message of 28 June 1944 had been 
fragmentarily recovered.  It revealed that Sergius [SERGEJ] 
(Vladimir Pravdin) had met a GOMMER (not GOMER x HOMER). 
the contents were totally unknown until recently and are now 
known only in fragments.  It was impossible until actual 
identification has been made to be sure that GOMMER was the  
same as GOMER, as is now believed. 
 
     4. The link between material “G” and New York to Moscow 
messages was forged in the following manner:  There is in 
the New York to Moscow traffic a six-part message of 2 and 3   #1105-1110 
August 1944. The “matching” messages (the ones enciphered 
with the same two-time additive key) were all in the diffi- 
cult “Greex” (nnnnnnnnn code, and only the most trifling 
fragments have been recovered. 
 
     In August 1950, Mrs. Gray of AFSA recovered two stretches 
which read “work including the personal telegraphic corres 
spondence of Boar [? Churchill] with Captain [Roosevelt]” 
and “weeks ago G. was entrusted with deciphering a confi- 
dential telegram of Boar’s [?] to Captain”.  These recov- 
eries were communicated to the British 11 August 1950, who 
thereupon set up work-sheets for further recovery work. 
The suspicion that “G.” was the source of material “G” 
occurred to people at AFSA immediately upon seeing Mrs. 
Gray’s work, and this suspicion was suggested to the British  
at the same time. 
 
     Subsequent work on this message brought forth the sug- 
gestion that G. was married. 
 
     5. On 30 March 1951. Nnnnnnnnn transmitted to England 
the suggestion that G. was Homer [GOMER] and GOMMER.  (This 
suggestion may have been the by-product of the compilation by 
him of an index of cover names.)  This identification, if  
true, allowed the placing of G. in New York in June 1944. 
 
     6. On 7 June 1951, the press reported the disappearance 
of Donald Duart MacLean and Guy Francis de Monoy Burgess. 
On 26 June 1951, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported 
to AFSA that Homer [GOMER], GOMMER, and “G” were believed to  
be identical with Donald Duart MacLean 

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