Venona Special Studies doc

 
- 153 - 
 
 
     4.  New York - Moscow 1340 [753], 21 September 
[20 September] 1944: 
 
         --149F-- detained VOLOK (?who is?) working at the  
     ENORMOZ plant.  He is a fellow countryman [U.S. Communist]. 
     --1U-- (?recognition?) (?of? ?from?) his work they  
     dismissed (?him?).  The cause of the dismissal was 
     his active work in the past in progressive organizations. 
 
         According to --1U-- of the fellow countrymen 
[U.S. Communists],  LIBERAL (?is in touch with CHESTER 
he --2F-- cutter ** ERCESE? [this part very dubious]) 
once a month.  CHESTER is interested in whether we  
are satisfied with the cooperation and whether there 
are not any misunderstandings.  About concrete details  
of the work he does not inquire.  Inasmuch as CHESTER 
knows about the role of LIBERAL's group we beg consent 
to inquire of CH. through LIBERAL about (?sketches 
(drafts)?) from (?the milieu?) of persons working on 
ENORMOZ and other spheres of technical science. 
 
     Here the subject changes; in the new section, there is 
some mention of a person named LARIN, but the text is un- 
intelligible.  The signature is MAY. 
 
     5.  New York - Moscow 1699 [conclusion of 940], 2 December 1944 
(the preceding part or parts of this message cannot be located): 
 
                    Conclusion of telegram no. 940 
 
Stated to be (?participants?) --1G-- (?research?) 
on the problem are HANS BETHE, NIELS BOHR, ENRICO FERMI, 
JOHN NEUMANN, BRUNO ROSSI, GEORGE KISTIAKOWSKI, EMILIO 
SEGRE, G.I. TAYLOR, WILLIAM PENNEY, ARTHUR COMPTON,  
ERNEST LAWRENCE, HAROLD UREY, HANS (?STNA? ?STROGN?) 
AR(?K? ?L? ?M?), EDWARD TELLER, PERCY BRIDGEMAN, 
WERNER EISENBERG
a
,  --1F-- AS --4F--  [There follows 
a repetition of all these names.]  --5F--  (?of?) our 
country turned [or "applied"] to NAPOLI the latter 
(?did not?) --2F-- him [or "his"] --2F--BEK [BECK?] 
--7F--.  When he tried to see RULEV, he was not admitted 
to see him by the latter's secretary. 
 
                                 (?ANTON?) 
 
 
 
a.  Mistake for WERNER HEINSENBERG?  It had been known for some  
    time that Heinsenberg was working for the German Reich 
    throughout the war. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                            2 
 
 
 
 

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- 154 - 
     6.  New York - Moscow 1773 [967], 16 December [15 December] 
1944: 
 
To VIKTOR. 
 
        (?OSA?) has returned from a trip to see (?KALIBR?) 
[a word beginning with KAL, tentatively set down as 
KALIBR 'calibre'; henceforth used without question 
marks].  KALIBR expressed readiness --2F-- (?work?) 
--2F-- (?DASH 2?) and reported that he had already  
reflected over this question earlier.  KALIBR said  
that the authorities of the (?camp?) (?openly?) took 
all imaginable precautions lest intelligence on ENORMOZ 
should fall into the hands of Russians.  --2F-- (?strong?) 
--1F-- (?among?) --1F-- progressive --17F-- middle of 
January KALIBR will be in Tyre [New York].  LIBERAL, 
with reference to his ignorance of the problem, ex- 
pressed the wish that our man should meet KALIBR and 
interrogate him personally.  He assured me that KALIBR 
would be very glad of such a meeting.  Do you consider 
such a meeting advisable?  If not, I shall be obliged  
to compose a questionnaire and hand it to LIBERAL.   
Advise whether you have --10F-- (?council? ?advice?) 
OPPENHEIM from California –1U—KISTIAKOWSKI (concerning 
the latter --2F-- MLADA) (?the latest?) process (?carried 
out?) by thermodynamics.  [Interpretation of last phrase  
quite dubious.]  Advise whether you have intelligence on  
these two professors. 
 
967 
                                (?ANTON?) 
                                            15 December 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                               3 

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- 155 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Special Study 
 
Undated Report of Meredith Gardner 

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- 156 - 
 
 
Copy of an undated report of Meredith Gardner 
 
 
 
The early history of compartmentalization of the nnnnnnnnLnnnnn problem 
can be summarized as a gradual tightening up.  In the beginning no special 
treatment was given nnnnn.  Achievements in it could become known to any 
worker in the nnn branch, working as a unit in a single area, with all 
systems in an xxxxxxx inseparable cryptographic relation to each other. 
Besides, achievements were reported to personnel and associates, both those 
who had a right to know of them and mere busybodies who perhaps considered 
themselves consultants at large for all nnn. 
 
The fact that the G-2 liaison man Howard Barkey heard that there was 
something interesting going on in nMnnn without having been officially 
informed shows that this sort of knowledge might have been picked up almost 
anywhere in the nKn 
 
     On the other hand, Gardner realized from near the beginning that the 
contents of nnnnn text would be so sensational that it would be hard to 
control talk about them, and Dr. Dubberstein directed that unusual discretion 
be exercised.  BARKEY’s interest was recognized as proper, though thought 
(perhaps incorectly) to be premature and disruptive of the technical work; 
he took some material to Col. Carter Clarke. 
 
     From here on, in general, each tightening up followed upon disclosures 
or leaks that were proper or inevitable enough at the stage of compartmenta- 
tion in effect when they occurred.  It is, unfortunately, all but impossible  
to recover the names of all persons who in the course of normal procedure 
were given some kind of insight into the nature of nnnnn texts. 
 
     Collateral intelligence had to be secured, and thus such persons as  
John J. Larkin (later formally indoctrinated), Major Pratt (of G-2) who  
found invaluable documents, and a man doing liaison with ASA and the 
Department of State (name not remembered) got a clue to the material. 
 
     The Navy at one point would have been the regular recipient of reports 
on all nnnJn progress, and thus, for example, a Navy officer named Carl 
looked the work over and even took notes back on one or two texts. ASA had  
no control over such information once it was imparted; no understanding 
was reached until September 1948. 
 
     On 30 August 1947 WDGAS-93 issued what was called “I.D. Special ANALYSIS 
Report #1:  Covernames in Diplomatic Traffic (nnnnnnn)” (dittoed with the 
following distribution. 
          2 copies     ID 
          1 copy       Chief, ASA 
          1 copy       Chief, OP-20-2 
          1 copy       ISIC (thru Col. Marr-Johnson) 
          1 copy       WDGAS-93-B        xxxxx XSXAX 
          1 copy       OP-32-Y (thru OP-20-2) 
 
     However, after the appearance of this report, it was decided on a high 
level that security could b e better served by not issuing dittoed reports, 
but rather by communicating interesting leads to Col. Hayes for transmittal 
to Col Forncy of others who could advantageously exploit them.  Such leads 
were communicated from time to time over the following year, and collateral in 
return was routed through Col Hayes to Mr. Gardner.  Some from the FBI came 
in as early as September 1947, and in May, July and August 1948.  By this 
time it was amply plain that the FBI was the logical recipient of nnnnn 
material of the type until then chiefly exploited; hence direct liaison 
with that agency through Robert Joseph Lamphere was established on 19 October 
1948 at a meeting between Col Hayes, Mr. Rowlett, Mr. Kirby and Mr. Gardner 
of ASA and Mr. Reynolds and Mr. Lamphere of the FBI. 
 
     Just previously, on 6
 
October 1948, copies of eleven reports on 
Nnnnn (including the I.D. Special Analysis Report #1) had been handed to  
Commander Richard H. Tenney of the U. S. Navy (OP-32Y14).  The handling of 
this material was to be governed by a memorandum of OP-32Y1 of 13 September  

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