Souleimanov & Kraus
42
The events of 2006 and the harsh reprisals that followed served to solidify
Azerbaijani nationalism and to exacerbate animosity towards the theocratic
regime. That animosity has been strongly evident on repeated occasions, such as
during the presidential election in 2009, when northwestern Iran sided with the
local native and reformist Mousavi, an event that cost the lives of a number of
Azerbaijani demonstrators. Those demonstrations were riding the wave of anti-
regime protests subsequently called the Green Revolution or the Green Movement.
Millions of people in all of Iran’s major cities took to the streets in demonstrations
expressing their dissatisfaction with the official results of the election, and this led
to harsh repression by state security forces and pro-regime activists. There were
also frequent clashes between supporters of the two main presidential candidates.
The most serious situation was at universities, and the regime responded by
closing them temporarily, monitoring access to campuses, and turning off mobile
telephone networks in their vicinity.
85
During the unrest, there were also
intentional outages of internet connectivity, and selected internet servers were
blocked, particularly Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, where the protesters were
using for coordination and for public reports on the situation at given locations.
86
In addition, this was the first larger-scale demonstration where the phenomenon
of social networks and the role they can played a role in the creating and
organizing of protests. Although the Iranian regime already perceived the
importance of controlling the means of communication and especially mobile
telephone networks and the internet, it did not immediately realize the power of
information being spread rapidly through social networks. However intensively
the internet is monitored and censored in Iran, ordinary users routinely find ways
to get around this censorship. Whether with personal computers, smartphones, or
even publicly accessible computers in internet cafés, people use remote access
(VPN) through servers abroad to circumvent data filtering, thus being able to
connect to internet services banned in Iran without difficulty. The dissemination of
information through Twitter, which was lightning fast, not only had an influence
on the environment within Iran, but also, provided coverage of the events in Iran
to the worldwide public. Within a few hours, Twitter was able to spread literally
all over the world a video taken at anti-regime demonstrations following the
election depicted a young girl named Neda hit by gunfire; this video shows her
85
“Iran Cops Clash with Opposition Protesters,” CBC News, December 7, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/12/07/world/main5921492.shtml.
86
Slater Bakhtavar, Iran: The Green Movement (Irving: Parsa Enterprises, 2009), 220-230.
Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution
43
dying almost instantaneously. Even the repression of the post-election protests
failed to quell the situation in Iranian Azerbaijan. In 2010, an estimated two to three
thousand people protested in Tabriz to demand the right to receive education in
Azerbaijani and condemned what they called “discrimination against the
Azerbaijani Turks in Iran.” Demonstrators in the streets shouted slogans such as,
“All people have the right to be educated in their mother tongue,” or “Long live
Azerbaijan, and to hell with anyone who does not like us!” One of the protesters
gave an interview to the opposition radio station Radio Free Europe.
87
He
explained that shortly after the demonstration had begun, the protesters were
attacked by members of the Basij auxiliary militia, who were often dressed in
civilian clothing. Basij forces beat the demonstrators and arrested at least a dozen
of them. The demonstration appeared to have been organized by fans of the Tabriz
soccer team Tractor. During the soccer match, fans of Persepolis (a well-known
team from Tehran) shouted aggressive slogans at their rivals and were trying to
offend the Iranian Azerbaijanis, leading to violent clashes between the two camps.
During the presidential election of 2013, another wave of protests and subsequent
repression occurred. The Iranian regime intensified its repression of Azerbaijani
human rights activists, many of whom were arrested and imprisoned for lengthy
periods. In April 2013, the activists Abbas Valizadeh and Mehdi Kukhiyan were
sentenced to eight years and one year in prison, respectively, for propaganda
against the regime, collaboration with a separatist pan-Turkic movement, insulting
the supreme spiritual leader of Iran, and contempt for of religious values. In May,
the revolutionary court in Iran’s East Azerbaijan Province convicted five members
of an organization called the Movement for the National Revival of South
Azerbaijan of creating an illegal organization for the purpose of undermining
national security and of participating in anti-regime propaganda; each of the
defendants was sentenced to nine years in prison.
88
On the other hand, the scenario from 2009 did not repeat itself, and the
demonstrations were not nearly of such great intensity. Understandably, the
primary reason for this was that the candidate favored by a great number of the
Azerbaijanis – Hassan Rouhani – actually won the election and became the new
87
“Tabriz Demonstrators Demand Right To Education In Azeri,” Radio Free Europe, August 2, 2010,
http://www.rferl.org/content/Tabriz_Demonstrators_Demand_Right_To_Education_In_Azeri_
Turkish/2116559.html.
88
“Racism in Contemporary Iran: an Interview with Alireza Asgharzadeh.”