2017-Iran’s Azerbaijan Question
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- Bu səhifədəki naviqasiya:
- Regime Reaction to Azerbaijani Protests
Souleimanov & Kraus
46 The authors visited Lake Urmia and the area around it in person. 94 From places where there had been beaches just a few years ago, the lake itself is no longer visible, the dry lake bottom consisting of a ubiquitous layer of salt. The desperation of the local people is evident, and they blame the government for the situation. The opinion among embittered local people is that the government in Tehran is not interested in this region, and is more concerned with industrial and agricultural plans elsewhere that draw on water which would normally flow towards the lake. The high concentration of salt in the atmosphere destroys farmland, and afflicts nearby towns, especially Urmia – Iran’s seventh-largest city with 1.2 million inhabitants. Azerbaijanis inhabiting Urmia increasingly view the situation through the prism of a Persian-Turkish struggle, and feel discriminated against by a Persian majority that takes care of its own territory while exploiting the rest of the country. From 2010-12, a series of protests sought to draw attention to this serious ecological problem. The demands of the demonstrators were initially apolitical, yet the regime chose to crack down on the demonstrators, and in reaction to this growing pressure, political and nationalistic themes began to emerge ever more frequently. 95
At later demonstrations, banners could be seen with such inscriptions as “Lake Urmia is drying up. Iran has ordered its execution,” “Urmia is thirsty; Azerbaijan must rise up or lose the lake,” etc. 96 Fans of Tractor Sazi have joined in the wave of nationalistic protests over Lake Urmia, including chanting “come weep and fill Lake Urmia with your tears,” one of the most widespread and popular slogans for expressing the demonstrators’ stances. 97
The most visible demonstrations over Lake Urmia took place in mid-2011, when there were sharp clashes between protesters and police in riot gear not only in bigger cities like Tabriz and Urmia, but also right on the shores of the lake itself. 98
Clearly, the originally issue-driven ecological protests have begun to assume ever clearer nationalistic features in reaction to the regime’s unresponsiveness, and the
94 Josef Kraus did field research there in August 2012, making numerous observations and interviewing local people. 95 Dehghan, “Iranian Greens Fear Disaster as Lake Orumieh Shrinks.” 96 Emil Souleimanov, “Concerns About Urmia Lake Boosts Nationalism among Azerbaijanis in Iran,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, October 5, 2011, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5637. 97 “Ormu,” YouTube, October 13, 2010, http://youtu.be/wbgqwAjPR00. 98 Golnaz Esfandiari, “Dying Lake Gives New Life to Iran's Antigovernment Protests,” Radio Free Europe, September 1, 2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/dying_lake_revives_iran_protests/24314925.html.
Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution 47
problem is increasingly being interpreted to mean that an Azerbaijani natural landmark will cease to exist because of the deliberate inaction of the Persians. 99
worries about the environment. 100
The topic again found itself on the front pages of local and foreign newspapers after Iran declared that it would spend half a billion dollars during the next five years in order to restore Lake Urmia. The money is to be spent mainly on improving water management, a reduction of water usage for farming, and the overall restoration of the environment. The Iranian Ministry of the Environment and the UN Development Program have introduced a plan to save the lake and the surrounding areas, which President Rouhani has publicly confirmed. 101 Even so, Lake Urmia has become one of the most significant manifestations of Azerbaijani nationalism, and is certain to remain an important issue in Azerbaijani-Persian relations for many years to come. Regime Reaction to Azerbaijani Protests The Iranian regime tends to react to demonstrations with harsh repression. Measures against rioters have increased in intensity, especially since the 2009 presidential election. Riot police and in some cases the Basij militia are frequently deployed to disperse protesters using batons, water cannons, tear gas, and rubber projectiles. Typically, selected protesters are arrested or quasi-legally or even illegally abducted, subjected to harsh interrogation, and jailed. There are also targeted provocations intended to legitimize the intervention of regime security forces and to cause outbreaks of violence in places that benefit deployed forces rather than demonstrators. Thanks to this well-known tactic for suppressing protests, it is possible to take action against riots quickly, keep them under control, and then disperse them with the aid of targeted attacks by the security forces. Demonstrations also tend to be suppressed by the pro-regime vigilante group
enforcing Islamic morality among the citizenry and on suppression of opposition to the regime and expressions of protest. 102
However, the deployment of Ansar-e
99 Souleimanov, “Concerns About Urmia Lake Boosts Nationalism among Azerbaijanis in Iran.” 100 Hamed Bey, semistructured interview with a fan of Tabriz Tractor soccer club, March 2013, Tabriz. 101 Jeff Hecht, “Iran to Spend $500 Million to Save Shrunken Lake Urmia,” New Scientist, 2014, http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn25850-iran-to-spend-500-million-to-save-shrunken-lake- urmia.html#.U8PRRFOAI_2. 102 Frederic Wehrey, The Rise of Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 10-11. Yüklə 0,58 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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