Souleimanov & Kraus
52
Azerbaijani population is confined to the urban centers, while most of the Iranian
Azerbaijani’s rural areas and smaller towns are home to populations with a fairly
strong Shiite identity. The latter group is supportive of the Assad regime as fellow
Shiites, and Sunni Turkey is increasingly portrayed as a religious enemy. The
situation is exacerbated by the hundreds of young Iranian Azerbaijanis who
volunteer in Syria as part of Iran’s semi-official forces – of whom dozens have been
killed or injured in combat. Although our sample size is far from being
representative, available evidence suggests that the civil war in Syria has halted the
advance of ethnic nationalism – a phenomenon that had been gaining momentum
since the Urmia protests of 2011 – in Iran’s Azerbaijani-majority areas. Perhaps
even more importantly, the Syrian Civil War has deepened divisions between
Iran’s nationalist secular Azerbaijanis on the one hand, and socially conservative
and religiously-minded Azerbaijanis on the other.
112
112
Numbers of interviews of Emil Souleimanov with Iranian Azerbaijanis based in Europe and of Josef
Kraus with Iranian Azerbaijanis based in Tabriz and Urumieh.
53
Iranian Relations with Azerbaijan and Impact on
Iranian Azerbaijan
The relationship between Iran and Azerbaijan has been troubled from the very
beginning, when the former Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic gained
independence in 1991. Iran’s worries over the irredentist or separatist tendencies
of its Azerbaijani minority have influenced its relations with its northern neighbor
to a considerable extent. Somewhat surprisingly for many outsiders, during the
Armenian-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992-1994, Iran did not side
with its fellow Shiites. Instead, Tehran supported Azerbaijan’s Christian adversary
with deliveries of weapons from Russia and the Armenian diaspora.
113
Iran’s
ultimate goal was to prevent the strengthening of the newly independent
Azerbaijan, which it feared could inspire a desire among its ethnic brethren for a
separate state or for union with their northern neighbor and the creation of a
Greater Azerbaijan.
114
To achieve this goal, Iran, backed by Russia, initially sought
to problematize Azerbaijan‘s claim to its national sector in the Caspian Sea, trying
to block the construction of the crucial Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that would
enable Azerbaijani oil to be supplied to world markets while bypassing Russia and
Iran. Tehran has challenged a portion of the Azerbaijani national sector – in the
Araz-Alov-Sharg oilfield – effectively freezing its exploitation since 2001.
115
Iran
also protested against the building of a Trans-Caspian pipeline that would help
export Turkmen oil or natural gas via Baku to Turkey.
116
In fact, in the early 2000s,
facing the increasingly visible American presence in the South Caucasus aimed
113
See, for instance, Emil Souleimanov, "Dealing with Azerbaijan: The Policies of Turkey and Iran toward
the Karabakh War (1991-1994)."
Middle Eastern Review of International Affairs 15, no. 3 (2013),
http://www.rubincenter.org/2011/10/dealing-with-azerbaijan-the-policies-of-turkey-and-iran-toward-the-
karabakh-war-1991-1994/.
114
See Emil Souleimanov, Maya Ehrmann, and Huseyn Aliyev, "Focused on Iran? Exploring the Rationale
behind the Strategic Relationship between Azerbaijan and Israel." Southeast European and Black Sea Studies
14, no. 4 (2014): 471-488.
115
In mid-2001, an Iranian warship forced an Azerbaijani survey ship with experts from British Petroleum
to leave waters around the contested oilfield.
116
Sureyya Yigit, “Trans-Caspian Pipeline: When or If?“ Turkish Weekly, October 22, 2015,
http://www.turkishweekly.net/2015/10/22/op-ed/the-trans-caspian-pipeline-when-or-if/.
Souleimanov & Kraus
54
particularly at acquiring access to Azerbaijan’s Caspian oil and natural gas, Tehran
sought to create an alternative Tehran – Yerevan – Moscow axis.
117
In addition, Iran has sought, so far unsuccessfully, to help establish and back anti-
regime Shiite opposition in Azerbaijan in order to destabilize the country. In fact,
since the 1990s, Tehran has cultivated and supported conservative pro-Iranian
Shiite clergy in Azerbaijan, along with the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan (IPA), an
organization established in 1991 that seeks to transform Azerbaijan into an Iranian-
style Shiite theocracy.
118
The IPA has failed to rally popular support across
Azerbaijan’s secular society, although its appeal has been relatively strong in some
parts of the Absheron peninsula and in Azerbaijan’s southeast.
119
In recent years,
Baku’s increasingly cordial relationship with Israel has also caused considerable
concern in the Islamic Republic.
120
In fact, there is an opinion that Israel’s sale of
sophisticated weapons to Azerbaijan in the recent past has served to put pressure
on Tehran.
121
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Iran has been an important
partner of Armenia, and the countries’ bilateral political affinity and orientation,
mutual trade, and cooperation in the energy sector are constantly growing.
The strained relations between Iran and Azerbaijan culminated in the early 2010s.
In January 2012, Azerbaijani authorities announced that a plot by three Azerbaijani
citizens to assassinate leading members of Azerbaijan’s Jewish community and a
prominent Israeli official had been uncovered. Of even greater significance were
Baku’s allegations of Hezbollah and Iranian involvement in masterminding the
attempted assassinations. According to some sources, the conspirators were also
117
For a more detailed analysis of the Iranian-Azerbaijani relations, see Svante Cornell, “Iran and the
Caucasus,“
Middle East Policy 5, no. 4 (1998): 51-67; Svante Cornell, Geopolitics and Strategic Alignments in
the Caucasus and Central Asia, Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs IV, no. 2 (1999): 108-121; Emil
Souleimanov and Ondrej Ditrych, "Iran and Azerbaijan: A Contested Neighborhood," Middle East Policy 14,
no. 2 (2007): 101-116.
118
North Azerbaijani society is notably secular due to the decades of Soviet-imposed atheism which has
rendered Azerbaijani society largely immune to the manifestations of political Islam promoted by Iran and
its agents. The main tools used by Iran are charities and religious foundations that use funds provided
mainly by the Iranian state budget, Iranian religious organizations, or fundraising campaigns (zakat) to help
families in need (if, of course, they are properly religiously and ideologically oriented), to build and operate
community and religious centers, and also, to a considerable extent, to contribute towards the building of
mosques. Since 2010, however, the activities of Iranian charities have stagnated, and during the past year,
they have even been deliberately suppressed by the Azerbaijani government.
119
Emil Souleimanov, “Azerbaijan, Islamism, and Unrest in Nardaran,”
Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst,
September 27, 2015, http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13316-azerbaijan-
islamism-and-unrest-in-nardaran.html.
120
See Souleimanov, Ehrmann, and Aliyev, “Focused on Iran?”
121
Robert Swift, Azerbaijan: Israel’s secret Muslim friend.
Jerusalem Post, 11. 2. 2015. Available at:
http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Azerbaijan-Israels-Secret-Muslim-Friend-431810.