Souleimanov & Kraus
50
appears to seek to infiltrate its network with agents and to prosecute the most
politically engaged fans.
108
Another regime tactic is to incite Kurdish-Azerbaijani tensions. This is an integral
component of Tehran’s policy, especially in West Azerbaijan, where there is a large
Kurdish community. Especially in the 1990s, the Islamic regime was settling Kurds
in villages to the south of the Araxes River, which flows along the border with
Azerbaijan and Armenia, in order to create a sort of buffer zone. At the time, the
government managed to create considerable tension between the local Azerbaijani
inhabitants and the newly arrived Kurds. Tensions are especially high in the area
around Lake Urmia, an area which many Kurds are moving to. The contempt
between the two communities is observable when interviewing locals of both
ethnic groups. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party and other Kurdish militant
organizations often proclaim territorial demands for an independent Kurdistan
that many Azerbaijanis regard as impinging on their own territory. One such map
even included Tabriz, causing a wave of indignation. Iran’s Azerbaijanis therefore
do not tend to feel sympathy for the Kurdish movement, and they regard Kurdish
activists as excessively militant. This manifests itself at soccer games between
Kurdish and Azerbaijani teams, when there are occasionally physical altercations
between fans in the streets of Tabriz.
Tehran’s efforts to set the Kurdish and Azerbaijani communities of this province
against each other have been partially successful and have resulted in a decline of
their mutual relations, although this has not yet led to a more serious clash.
However, there is significant agreement among the leaders of the two
communities, who strive for similar reforms – instruction in Kurdish and
Azerbaijani Turkish, the establishment of ethno-administrative autonomy, etc.
109
The mutual relations between the two nationalities are, in fact, aided by the one
thing they truly have in common – the feeling of being repressed by the Iranian
regime.
Lately, Iran’s political elite has tried to cool nationalistic passions, and the election
of Rouhani has made a positive contribution. It should, however, be added that so
far, there have been no legislative or practical improvements to the status quo
108
Emil Souleimanov, “Iranian Azerbaijan: The Brewing Hotspot of Future Separatism?” Central Asia-
Caucasus Analyst, October 27, 2010, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5432/print.
109
Majid Khorshidi, Yok Fee Lee and Fakhreddin Soltani, “Ethnic Secessionism in Iran. Accusation or Fact?”
Journal of Politics and Law 3, no. 2, August (2010): 273.
Iran’s Azerbaijani Question in Evolution
51
concerning cultural and linguistic freedoms, in spite of Rouhani’s campaign
promises. The fact that equal rights are just the subject of governmental and
political proclamations, while the situation has in fact improved only minimally,
means that further outbursts of frustration and dissatisfaction are possible. At the
same time, in an effort to avoid stirring up Azerbaijani passions, the regime now
appears to tolerate the watching of Turkish and Azerbaijani television using
widespread satellite receivers that are technically illegal. Locals believe the
government is aware that it cannot enforce the ban, because that would mean
enormous upheaval and mass protests.
The Syrian Civil War has begun to find its way into the issue of Iranian Azerbaijani
nationalist aspirations. An example of this can be seen at soccer matches: at several
Tabriz Tractor matches, there have been protests by Azerbaijani fans against Iran’s
engagement in Syria, which they understand as an indirect war against Turkish
interests in that country. These tensions over Syria have also been reflected in
Iranian Azerbaijan, through Azerbaijani soccer fans shouting pro-Turkish slogans
and burning pictures of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.
110
Thus, Iran is once
again in their eyes supporting an enemy of the Turks in an armed conflict. James
Dorsey sees this as another impulse for the strengthening of Azerbaijani
nationalism, and at the same time, a proxy war between Iran and Turkey on Syrian
territory could lead to an escalation of secessionist tendencies in Iranian
Azerbaijan.
111
Nevertheless, these extreme manifestations of pro-Turkish sympathies
notwithstanding, the ongoing war in Syria appears to have deepened ideological
barriers between parts of Iranian Azerbaijani population and the Turks. In fact,
with a vocal minority of nationalists supportive of Turkey’s efforts in the Middle
East, most secular-minded Iranian Azerbaijanis have been rather indifferent to the
religious dimensions of the Syrian Civil War. But this segment of the Iranian
110
Videos of these protests and of the burning of photographs are available on social media, discussion
forums and also on YouTube, e.g. “Iran, Football Fans Carrying Syrian Independence Flag & Burning
Bashar Assad’s Picture,” Youtube, December 10, 2011, http://youtu.be/yIIVKgeRiiI or “Bashar al-Assad
Photos Was Burned in Azerbaycan-Iran 9 Dec 2011 – Tabriz, Sahand Stadium,” Youtube, December 9, 2011,
http://youtu.be/0Ib8vMsd1tM.
111
James Dorsey, “Iranian Azeri Soccer Protests Raise Spectre of Turkish-Iranian-Syrian Proxy War,” Middle
east Soccer, November 30, 2011, http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.cz/2011/11/iranian-azeri-soccer-protests-
raise.html.